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Abstract
The question that this thesis examines is whether traditional monolithic satellite designs have
limited the value that the satellite market generates for the space industry. To answer this
question, this thesis focuses on the "Value" that satellites generate. By examining the value that
satellites offer their operators, this thesis determines if alternative methods of satellite design
offer greater value than traditional satellite designs. One alternative method that is examined is
on-orbit satellite servicing. On a basic level, on-orbit satellite servicing is the process of providing
services to a satellite in orbit, such as: relocation, refueling, repairs, or upgrades.
The purpose of this thesis is to describe and support a framework for determining the value of
on-orbit satellite servicing. The framework involves examining on-orbit servicing as a
competitive market and dividing that market into two sides -the customer and the provider. By
examining the customer side of on-orbit servicing, this thesis identifies the reasons a customer
would require servicing and thus determines the value that can be delivered to the customer. By
determining the point where the value of servicing is zero, the customer's maximum servicing
price can be computed.
By examining the provider's side of the market, this thesis identifies the different forms of
servicing that can fulfill the customer's needs. Based on a provider's forms of servicing, the
provider's minimum servicing price can be determined. Finally, by overlaying the maximum
servicing price with the minimum servicing price, one can determine if a feasible on-orbit
servicing market exists. If any overlap exists, then a feasible range of servicing prices exists and
servicing makes sense. Simply put, an overlap represents the case where a customer need exists
and a provider has the ability to meet that need - hence a servicing market exists. This thesis
concludes with a discussion concerning the development of on-orbit satellite servicing and how
this development is not limited solely by economic and technical issues.
It is the purpose of this thesis to show that on-orbit satellite servicing provides a means for
escape from the traditional approach of satellite design, thereby allowing a paradigm shift
towards more valuable design approaches. While some may believe that on-orbit satellite
servicing provides a means to sustain current technology trends, it is argued that on-orbit satellite
servicing is a disruptive technology. With disruptive technologies come the opportunities for
greater value and dramatic change. On-orbit satellite servicing provides the opportunity for a
paradigm shift in satellite design that can lead to dramatic new ideas, uses, and valuations of
space.
Thesis Supervisor: Professor Daniel Hastings
Professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics and Engineering Systems
Director, Engineering Systems Division
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Chapter 1. Introduction
Since the launch of the first satellite, Sputnik, on October 4, 1957; the applications of
satellites have become essential. Today satellites contribute vastly to the world economy
and to our daily lives. Satellites provide entertainment in the form of video, help in an
emergency using the Global Positioning System (GPS), clear global communications
(Voice and Radio), global monitoring (observations and environmental conditions),
agricultural savings, continuing education, business investment, cancer research, support
for banking and gas stations in the form of secure ATM and credit-card transactions,
global internet access where no supporting infrastructure exists, and various other
military and scientific applications (Sacknoff, 1999). The applications of satellites and
space appear to be limitless. Looking into the future, as the demand for information and
global commerce expands, the demand for space technology and its applications will
likely increase, thereby creating a continued demand for satellites. This leads to the big
question at hand: with the likelihood of increased demand for satellites in the future, is
traditional satellite design the best approach?
1.1. Current Problems with Traditional Satellite Design
Despite the possibility of great future demand for space applications, the development
and deployment of satellites have a single unifying barrier -cost. It is well known that
the deployment of satellites is an expensive task. The typical cost for the launch of a
geosynchronous (GEO) communications satellite ranges from $75 to $200M
(Aerospace, 2002, CBS NEWS, 2002). These high costs pose a real problem for the
aerospace industry since satellites historically have a 5-13% failure rate during their
operational lives (Sullivan, 2001). Combining this failure rate with the historic 4 to 5%
launch failure rate, (Sullivan, 2001) indicates that about 1 in every 7 satellites can be
expected to fail before the end of its operational life (Figure 1-1). This high chance of
failure could contribute to a slowing-down, or worse reduction, in the demand for future
space technologies and applications.
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Figure 1-2: U.S Satellite Launch Trends (Aerospace Commission, 2902)
The slow-down or reduction in demand for space applications was strengthened by
the shift from a government-based industry to a commercial-based industry after the Cold
War. This trend is supported by the clear reduction in overall government launches and
increase in commercial launches (Figure 1-2). The shift from the government-based
industry to a commercial-based industry has major ramifications for future space
applications due to the differences between these organizations and their cultures. As the
space industry has shifted towards a highly economic-based industry, the use of space
and its applications have been held captive by the traditional economic practices of the
12
commercial world. This shift has switched the focus of space away from innovation and
re-centered the focus on investor return. With investor return being the dominant focus of
the industry, the real chance of satellite failure (1 in 7) combined with the high cost of
space systems has generated a strong risk-aversion within the industry. The risk-adverse
nature of the industry has forced satellite designers toward three common elements of
design: redundancy, proven technology, and long operational lifetimes. While these
design trends may lead to a perceived greater guarantee of future returns, these design
trends may not be the best choice if the industry is going to meet the high-paced high
demand for space that the future could bring.
1.1.1. Design with Redundancy
A common source of failure in any space system is component failure. Component
failure is when a particular subsystem or component onboard the satellite fails due to a
design flaw, unknown interaction effect, unintended reaction to exposure to the harsh
environment of space, or some other random event. Satellite operators are uncomfortable
with the uncertainty about the causes and sources of these failures. The discomfort arises
from the additional constraints associated with the use of space that are not associated
with Earth-based systems. One of these constraints is the inability to repair the satellite
when systems fail.
For the most part, when things go wrong with Earth-based systems, they can be fixed.
However, satellites do not have the option of being repaired when things go wrong. With
few exceptions, from the moment of launch, human hands will never touch these systems
again. Satellite operators have been forced by traditional satellite design to accept that, if
and when any space system fails, there is very little anyone can do about it. Thus, in order
for the commercially-driven industry to maintain satellite return, satellite operators have
placed a large amount of pressure on satellite designers to avoid or at least limit all
potential sources of failure. Satellite designers have responded by adding redundancy into
satellites in large part to eliminate, or at least minimize, the occurrence of a lifetime
failure.
13
1.1.1.1. What is a Redundant System?
The idea of a redundant system is that in the event that a subsystem or component
onboard the satellite fails, the redundant systems will take over the operation of the
system that failed. A good example of a redundant Earth-based system is a back-up
generator that is used in case of power outages. The purpose of back-up generator is to
supply an uninterrupted source of power in the event that the main power system goes
down. The downside of a redundant system is that typically the system must be
purchased and installed prior to the failure. If the redundant system is complex, then the
design of the primary system may have to be redesigned to incorporate the redundant
system. The installation of a redundant system can have rippling effects that impact the
design of the primary system. These rippling effects can lead to substantial cost increases,
unique/non-universal fixes, redesigning of the primary system; etc. Thus, due to the
drastic changes that are often required to incorporate redundant systems, it is common to
find redundancy only in cases where either the system cannot be repaired or failures are
simply unacceptable.
Unfortunately, current satellites are one of these cases. It is not uncommon to see
triple, if not more, redundancy in today's space systems due to the high costs and risk-
aversion of the industry. While a large amount of redundancy decreases the likelihood of
lifetime spacecraft failures, the increased redundancy also leads to a major problem.
While redundant systems provide security in the event of a system failure, redundancy
results in the design of very complex satellites. As complexity in the satellite increases,
production takes longer, potential rework increases, and standardization decreases,
resulting in an extremely high price tag.
In theory, the value of a redundant system is only delivered in the event of a system
failure. Thus, redundancy adds value to the satellite operator because it allows the
satellite to react to potential future failures with intervention. This flexibility to support
failure is the value that redundancy offers the satellite operator. But, is redundancy the
only way to deliver this flexibility? Couldn't the flexibility to support future failures also
be provided if the satellites could be repaired? This raises the question about whether or
14
not satellite redundancy is a more effective method of delivering value than satellite
repair.
1.1.2. Designs with Proven technology
In addition to redundant systems, the second way satellite designers have responded
to the demand for reducing lifetime failure is through the use of low-risk proven
technology. The transition towards a risk-adverse industry has forced satellite designers
to take less and less risk. One result has been that satellite designers have been pressured
to use more reliable technology in their design of satellites. An example of the designer's
reaction has been the development of technology readiness levels (TRLs) by NASA.
NASA classifies all technology for space applications on a scale from 1 to 9 based on the
maturity of the technology. Although TRLs 5 through 7 indicate that the technology that
has been demonstrated, NASA generally requires a TRL of 8 or higher for a technology
to be used in space.
The adoption of these types of technology readiness scales, along with the low return
on investment (ROI) associated with new technology development, has forced satellite
designers towards the use of low-risk flight-tested technology. In the short term, these
evaluation scales have had the desired effect: by using proven technology satellite
operators have reduced the chance of system failure, thereby reducing lifetime failures.
However, the result of long term use of these types of scales and proven technology has
lead to negative long-term effects with respect to space-related innovation. Today, it is
not uncommon for new satellites to incorporate technology that is almost a decade or
more old because of the pressure for low-risk proven technology.
Although the use of proven technology decreases the chance of system failure, it
creates a greater problem with regard to satellite performance. By using proven
technology, innovation into new more capable technologies is delayed or prevented. By
neglecting these new technologies, satellite operators are trading the greater performance
that a new satellite design can achieve for the increased reliability delivered by proven
technology. Historically, space-based processors have been three or four generations
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behind commercial off-the-self processors. In fact, a study by the Aerospace Corporation
estimates that "the performance of space-qualified electronics has typically lagged by 5 to
7 years behind their non-hardened counterparts (Mayer and Lacoe, 2003)". By forcing the
use of time proven technology, satellites are not delivering the maximum amount of
performance to their operators. A bigger issue is that the shift toward proven technology
appears to be in direct contradiction to the very nature of the aerospace industry, the
scientific community, and the military. All of these organizations have historically relied
on state-of-the-art technology to maximize satellite performance. This raises the
following question: do the known benefits of low-risk proven technology outweigh the
potential greater benefits of new technology? Has the industry shifted focus towards
minimizing risk as the dominate design element instead of satellite performance? Again,
is traditional satellite design the best approach for meeting future demand?
1.1.3. Demand for Long Operational Lives
Finally, the last response to the risk-adverse nature of the satellite industry is the
demand for longer operational lives of satellites. As the industry has become dominated
by economic decision-making, satellite operators have made decisions concerning
satellite design with regard to maximizing their Return-On-Investment (ROI). While the
demand for redundancy and proven technology has reduced the failure rate of satellites,
the result has been an increase in satellite complexity that has led to higher satellite costs.
For example, the cost of a Boeing 601 satellite was once estimated at around $1 00M, but
the new Boeing 702 satellite bus has an estimated sticker price of about $200M.
According to a spokesman for Boeing, satellite operators can now expect that the cost of
new satellites will be approximately the cost of two older satellites (CBS NEWS, 2002).
The increase in satellite cost, along with the marginal improvements in performance,
has lead to the demand for longer operational lives of satellites. The reason for the longer
operational lives is that, as the initial price of a satellite increases, it takes longer for the
operator to pay-off their investment. Typical break-points on investments in GEO
communications satellites do not begin until the 5th to 7th operational year of the
satellite's operational life. Thus, due to the shift to an economic-influenced industry the
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only way to generate acceptable ROI is to require that satellites have a long operational
life. Figure 1-3 shows the current trend for satellite operational lifetimes launched over
the past decade.
While longer operational lives may be a good short-term solution, in the long run
longer operational lives help to reinforce innovation stagnation. Due to the demand for
longer lives, satellite designers must incorporate additional redundancy and proven
technology to maintain the satellite over the longer period of time. The net effect is that
the shift towards an economic-based industry has created a reinforcing downward spiral
of increased redundancy, proven technology and longer operational lifetimes. Some may
argue that these trends are just some of the early warning signs of the maturity of the
aerospace industry. One cannot help but ask, is there a better way to design satellites?
Can a paradigm shift in satellite design be adopted such that the industry can meet its
investment needs, but at the same time move away from innovation stagnation?
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Figure 1-3: Satellite Design Life Trend (Futron, 2004)
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1.1.4. Current Dilemma
Is there a way for the satellite industry to escape from the downward spiral of satellite
designs that provide long lifetimes, added redundancy, and reliance on proven technology
to maximize ROI? The answer to that question is.. .maybe. To explore alternative
options for satellite deign, one must examine the real problem satellites pose for their
operators, not the designer's reaction to the operators' needs. The problem with current
satellite design is not the high likelihood of failure, but the inaccessible nature of
satellites. Everyday systems fail on Earth and they are repaired. It is the accessible nature
of the Earth-based systems that allow for the repair. In the case of satellites,
inaccessibility of the system is what prevents its repair.
For almost two decades NASA has had the capability to repair one of its most
successful scientific satellites, the Hubble Space Telescope (HST). The Hubble was
designed to be repaired by astronauts in the event of a systems failure. NASA also
designed HST so that its systems could be upgraded as new technology was developed.
The ability to upgrade has allowed NASA to greatly increase the performance and return
on investment of HST. The general process of repairing or upgrading a satellite on-orbit
is commonly referred to as On-Orbit satellite Servicing (OOS).
1.2. What is OOS?
OOS has been studied for over four decades. OOS was first introduced on March 18,
1965 with the first successful Manned ExtraVehicular Activity (EVA). The mission
consisted of Alexei Leonov exiting the Voskhod 2 spacecraft and being the first human to
step into space (Portree and Trevifuo, 1997). However, the best known examples of OOS
are the four HST repair missions. Each mission sought to repair problems along with
installing upgrades. Since the first servicing mission, the performance of HST has been
increased by roughly three orders of magnitude due to its serviceable design. While
additional cost was incurred to support HST's design and servicing, without a doubt
servicing HST has lead to vast increases in investor ROI. As a result of the HST servicing
missions, the promise of on-orbit repair, upgrade, assembly, and relocation has drawn
great interest from engineers, scientists, and space architects.
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In 1999, the Spacecraft Modular Architecture Design (SMAD) study identified six
potential benefits of OOS: reduced lifecycle costs, increased payload sensor availability,
extended spacecraft orbital lifetime, enhanced spacecraft capabilities, enhanced mission
flexibility and operational readiness, and pre-launch spacecraft integration flexibility
(Reynerson, 1999). The benefits of OOS seem great. But while OOS has already been
embraced by NASA in the case of the HST, OOS has not been embraced by the other
sectors of the aerospace industry. Although HST proved that astronauts could service a
satellite in orbit, the majority of potential target satellites remain out of the range of the
Space Shuttle. Furthermore, the high cost of manned spaceflight combined with the
potential risk has made manned OOS next to impossible for the commercial and scientific
sectors of the industry.
In response, the focus in OOS has switched from manned servicing to robotic
servicing. This shift is not without its own problems. As was stated earlier, the current
risk-adverse nature of the aerospace industry prevents the adoption of risky technology.
Clearly the technology (particularly space robotics) required for OOS can be viewed as
both new and risky. The avoidance of risky OOS technologies is the likely the cause for
the resistance in the adoption of OOS by the commercial, military, and scientific sectors.
But times may be changing....
Although there was a lack of interest in OOS during the 1990's, a vast amount of
research effort was diverted toward investigating the technical issues of OOS. Brief
descriptions of each influential research program focused on OOS or its supporting
technologies are given below.
1.2.1. Technical OOS issues:
The majority of OOS research conducted over the past decade has focused on the
design of servicing infrastructures. By focusing on the "How" of OOS, engineers have
identified several technologies required for OOS. These technologies are: autonomous
rendezvous and docking, fluid transfer, standard interfaces, space robotics, standardized
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payloads and satellite buses, and "plug-and-play" satellite design. In 2005, there exist
several ongoing research projects focused on the technology required for OOS and the
design of on-orbit satellite servicers. The following is a brief discussion of each one of
these projects along with the technologies emphasized in each particular design.
1.2.1.1. XSS-10/XSS-11
The Experimental Space Systems (XSS) satellite program is one of the few space-
technology-driven research programs in the U.S. Air Force. The XSS program seeks to
study future applications and technologies using mini-satellites in a fast-paced 30-month
development program. Two satellites programs that have ties to OOS technologies are the
XSS-10 and XSS- 11 programs. Both of these satellites program seek to evaluate "future
applications of micro-satellite technologies that include: inspection; rendezvous and
docking; repositioning; and techniques for close-in proximity maneuvering around on
orbit assets (Global Security, 2003)." The goal of the XSS-10 program is to demonstrate
the complex interactions of line-of-sight guidance with basic inertial maneuvering. The
XSS-10 program provides a "stepping stone for future micro-satellite technology
demonstrations (Global Security, 2003)." The XSS-10 experimental satellite was
launched on 29 January 2003 and successfully performed its 20-hour mission
(Figure 1-4).
Figure 1-4: XSS-10
The XSS-1 I is the second satellite being developed by the Air Force for the purpose of
OOS technology assessment (Figure 1-5). The focus of the XSS- 11 program is to
demonstrate autonomous operations and provide experience with command and control
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in proximity operations to another space object. To accomplish its mission, the XSS- 11
will perform autonomous near object operations with the satellite's second stage. Both
the XSS-10 and XSS- 11 programs will significantly enhance in-space rendezvous
capability, which is essential for all OOS missions.
Figure 1-5: XSS-11
1.2.1.2. Orbital Express
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is looking at the
development of OOS from a different point of view. DARPA's has teamed with the
Boeing Company to work on the Orbital Express program. (DARPA, 2004) The goal of
the Orbital Express program is to "validate the technical feasibility of robotic,
autonomous on-orbit refueling and reconfiguration of satellites to support a broad range
of future U.S. national security and commercial space programs." Orbital Express will
focus on vital OOS technologies such as: refueling, electronics upgrades, autonomous
rendezvous and proximity operations, and supporting robotics and interfaces. The
mission will consist of two satellites: ASTRO and NextSat (Figure 1-6). ASTRO is a
prototype satellite servicer in which most of the new technology will be housed. The
other satellite, NextSat, will be a prototype of a next generation serviceable satellite. The
goal of the mission is for ASTRO to rendezvous with NextSat, transfer fuel and install a
new payload. The program seeks to demonstrate a variety of new technologies vital to
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each step in a typical OOS mission. Orbital Express is scheduled to be tested in
September of 2006 with the eventual goal to provide OOS capability for U.S national
security space around the end of the decade.
Figure 1-6: Orbital Express with ASTRO and NextSat
1.2.1.3. Hubble Robotic Repair Mission
HST was launched in 1990 and its mission was to look deeper into the universe than
was capable with traditional terrestrial telescopes. The most unique design feature of
HST was that it was, and remains, the only satellite that was ever designed to be serviced
in space. In addition to repairing failed components, NASA claims that each and every
time HST is serviced the scientific power of the HST increase by a factor of 10 (Hubble,
2005 ). Through servicing the HST's usefulness and lifetime appear essentially limitless.
HST represents the first step in creating alternative methods to address the inaccessible
nature of satellites. Unfortunately, it appears that HST's days are numbered.
Currently, HST is overdue for repairs and upgrading, but the next scheduled servicing
mission is in question due to the grounding of the shuttle fleet since the Columbia
disaster on February 1, 2003. In light of the guidelines suggested by the Columbia
Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) at the time, the former NASA chief Sean O'Keefe
repeatedly stated that he would not risk lives to fix the telescope. As a result, all the
22
planned HST repair missions were cancelled. In 2004, a major backlash erupted in the
scientific community in response to the NASA chief's decision. Later that year, in
response to the scientific community's outcry and congressional pressure, NASA began
considering servicing HST using a robotic servicer (Britt, 2004). After an exhaustive
search of possible servicing missions, MDR Robotics was chosen to develop a concept
for a robotic server. To date no decision has been made concerning the fate of HST, but
research into robotic servicing options still continues. Figure 1-7 provides MDR
Robotics' current concept for the robotics repair of HST.
:,~: :~.,
Figure 1-7: Hubble Robotic Servicer Concept (Weiss and Corbo, 2005)
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1.2.1.4. ConeXpress
The only fully commercial team pursuing OOS technologies is led by Orbital
Recovery Corporation (ORC). ORC's plan is to service a niche market by providing the
first commercial-based life extension of satellites by the end of 2008. (ORC, 2004) ORC
has focused its market on three-axis stabilized telecommunications satellites currently, or
planned, in space. ORC's commercial service is focused on the ConeXpress satellite
(Figure 1-8). The ConeXpress will "link up using a special docking system that connects
to the telecommunication satellite's apogee kick motor." Once attached ConeXpress is
designed to provide station-keeping ability for the target satellite. The concept of the
ConeXpress is not to refuel the target satellite, but instead to act as a "Space Tug." ORC
expects that by providing additional station-keeping ability ConeXpress can provide up to
10 additional years of operational life.
Figure 1-8: ConeXpress
1.2.1.5. Ranger Telerobotic Shuttle/Flight eXperiments
The Ranger Telerobotic Flight and Shuttle eXperiments (RTFX/RTSX) represents the
current research program with the greatest legacy that remains directed towards robotic
OOS. Both RTFX and RTSX are in development at the University of Maryland's Space
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Systems Laboratory (Ranger, 1998), (Ranger, 2002). Initially RTFX was designed to be a
free-flying telerobotic servicer capable of repair and upgrade. RTFX was designed so it
could mimic most of the tasks that astronauts performed during the HST repair missions
(Figure 1-9). The program was put on hold in 1998 when the program encountered
funding problems associated the purchase of a launch vehicle. To solve this problem,
RTSX was designed. RTSX uses a design similar to RTFX except that RTSX was to be
mounted in the Space Shuttle cargo bay (Figure 1-10). To date RTSX is still undergoing
testing but delays have resulted in part due to the Columbia accident and reduced funding
within NASA. Currently, both RTFX and RTSX remain as one of the most capable
servicers designed for OOS. Both servicers are capable of a variety of servicing tasks
ranging from simple to complex.
Figure 1-9: RTFX- Neutral Buoyancy Testing (Ranger, 1998)
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Figure 1-10: RTSX-Mounted Instead Shuttle Cargo Bay (Ranger, 2002)
1.2.1.6. NASA's Robonaut
The final major OOS technology program is the Robonaut program in development at
NASA's Johnson Space Flight Center (Figure 1-11). "The Robonaut project seeks to
develop and demonstrate a robotic system that can function as an EVA astronaut
equivalent....Robonaut jumps generations ahead by eliminating the robotic scars (e.g.,
special robotic grapples and targets) and specialized robotic tools of traditional on-orbit
robotics (Robonaut, 2003)." The advantage of the Robonaut design is that it seeks to
mimic the actions of an astronaut in space. To do this the design focuses on the
development of a human-based robotic servicer. Since humans have been the only
successful way to service satellites in orbit, Robonaut may prove to have an advantage
over the other OOS designs. However, it remains to be seen if human interfaces prove to
be the best design for serviceable satellites. Either way, Robonaut is a vital program
towards the progress of OOS technologies. Like the Ranger program, Robonaut is
capable of a variety of servicing tasks ranging from simple to complex.
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Figure 1-11: NASA's Robonaut
Each of these programs shows great promise towards the development of OOS. One may
then ask; if such great technical programs have been going on for almost a decade, why
hasn't a single robotics OOS program been launched?
1.2.2. Why Hasn't OOS Happened?
Many supporters of robotic OOS believe that OOS is being held back due to the
technical issues and the risk-aversion of the aerospace industry; i.e. that the reason for the
lack of support is the immature state of space autonomy and telerobotics. However, this is
not the case. Although support for OOS programs remains low even though promising
OOS technology programs exist, the reason for the lack of OOS interest is that the
aerospace industry as a whole has failed to define and understand the "why" behind OOS.
OOS researchers have been worried about the "how" of OOS and not whether OOS
provided more value than traditional satellite design. Simply put, no one has addressed
the demand side of OOS; the focus of OOS research has been solely on the supply side of
servicing. To make OOS a reality, the industry must first focus on the reasons for
servicing (the "why") and worry about the technical issues (the "how") later.
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1.2.3. The "Why" Side of OOS
Any assessment of the reasons for servicing begins with looking at the value that is
delivered by servicing. Reynerson defines a serviceable spacecraft as any spacecraft for
which the value of OOS outweighs the associated cost (Reynerson, 1999). Therefore, a
target satellite should only be serviced when the value the satellite's operator derives
from servicing outweighs the associated cost. Servicing then represents a method by
which the satellite operator can derive additional value from the satellite. In this case, it is
reasonable to assume that an operator would only choose to service when the value of
servicing outweighs the value delivered by alternative value-generating methods.
Because a satellite operator can choose between different methods of deriving value,
whether through servicing or alternate methods, the feasibility of OOS can be determined
by examining servicing as a commercial (competitive) market.
1.3. Conclusion
The uncertainty and risk-aversion that exists in the aerospace industry surrounding
the creation of a commercial OOS service market demands a framework to evaluate
potential OOS architectures. This framework must be able to evaluate potential servicing
architectures based on the value they deliver to the satellite operator. Saleh states that to
determine when OOS is a feasible course of action, the value of OOS must be examined
from a customer's (target satellite operator) point-of-view, not the service provider's
(servicer) point-of-view (Saleh, 2002). This thesis utilizes the customer-centric model
proposed by Saleh to determine the value provided by different forms of servicing and
based on these results determines the customer's willingness to purchase the service.
The customer's maximum price for servicing (demand) is determined by determining
the point at which a customer is indifferent to OOS versus an alternative method of
achieving value. The maximum servicing price creates a range of servicing prices
bounded between zero and the maximum servicing price. Next by calculating the
provider's minimum servicing price or supply, the feasible servicing range becomes
bounded by the provider's minimum servicing price and the customer's maximum
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servicing price. This creates a feasible range of servicing prices and as a result, a range of
feasible OOS markets.
The evaluation process for OOS demonstrated in this thesis consists of five parts:
1) Deriving how servicing can deliver value to the customer
2) Explicitly computing the value that OOS can deliver to the customer
3) Determining the customer's maximum service price
4) Determining the minimum price for which a provider can deliver the customer's
desired value (for each potential form of servicing)
5) Determining if a feasible OOS markets exists based on the overlap of the
customer's maximum service price with the provider's minimum servicing price.
The overall purpose of this thesis is to provide an understanding of OOS, to define the
additional value that OOS delivers to satellite operators over traditional satellite design,
and to determine if OOS provides a feasible approach for dealing with the inaccessible
nature of satellites.
1.3.1. Thesis Outline
The thesis is divided into nine chapters. Chapter 2 focuses on the first part of the
evaluation method. Chapter 2 discusses how OOS represents a commercial servicing
market. It shows that, by adopting a commercial market mentality, the service customer's
and service provider's points-of-view can be separated and solved independently. Based
on this separation, one can adopt the customer-centric framework suggested by Saleh.
The customer-centric framework allows one to determine the value that servicing delivers
to the service customer independently of the servicing architecture. Chapter 3 discusses
the analytical process behind the customer-centric point-of-view for determining
customer value. Chapter 3 also describes how to determine the customer's maximum
servicing price.
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 provide three examples of determining customer value and the
maximum servicing price. Chapter 4 discusses a satellite restoration scenario where a
provider extends the operational life of a geosynchronous (GEO) communications
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satellite. The purpose of extending the operational life of the satellite is the need to
maintain the value that the satellite delivers to the customer. In a restoration case, the
servicer does not increase the value that the satellite delivers to the customer, but simply
restores the value to a previous state. Chapters 5 and 6 examine the case where value is
added to a satellite. Chapter 5 focuses on GEO communications satellites, but examines
the value that is delivered to the customer through technology upgrades. The purpose of
the example is to determine the customer's maximum servicing price with respect to the
additional value that can be delivered through satellite upgrades. Chapter 6 also focuses
on technology upgrades, but examines the case of a non-commercial customer. Chapter 6
examines the upgrade of the GOES weather satellites and focuses on determining the
value that can be delivered through not one, but two potential upgrades. In addition to
finding the maximum servicing price, the three examples introduce the reader to the
general characteristics of a feasible OOS market. These characteristics can be thought of
as guidelines for satellites designers with the goal of creating a feasible OOS market.
Chapter 7 focuses on the provider's point-of-view. Chapter 7 introduces the different
forms of servicing and discusses how a service provider can design a servicer to meet the
customer's demand for value. Chapter 8 concludes the evaluation framework by defining
the process for finding a feasible OOS region and identifies potential roadblocks in the
development of OOS. This chapter discusses how the customer's maximum servicing
price and the provider's minimum servicing price can be overlaid to define a feasible
OOS region. Finally, Chapter 9 summarizes the overall findings of the thesis.
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Chapter 2. Defining the OOS Market
For the better part of two decades, the focus of OOS research has been primarily
technical. Now that many of the technical issues have been resolved, or soon will be,
O0S is being delayed because the industry does not understand the benefits provided by
OOS. In addition, the satellite industry has failed to distinguish the reasons for servicing
from the methods to provide servicing. The satellite industry needs an understanding of
how to map the functions of servicing to the forms of servicing. To provide insight into
how this mapping can occur, this chapter examines OOS as a commercial market with
servicing being a method by which a service provider can fulfill customer need.
As previously discussed, Reynerson stated that a satellite operator would only want to
service a satellite when servicing would provide additional value (Reynerson, 1999). In
this thesis, value is considered a function of the benefit that a target satellite delivers to its
operator, the risk associated with servicing, the operator's perception of those risks, and
all costs associated with operating and servicing the target satellite. In addition to
monetary benefits, value can include non-monetary forms such as potential military and
scientific observations, the discovery efficiency provided by HST, or the accuracy of
weather prediction. An in-depth discussion of value is provided in Chapter 3:
Determining the Value OOS Delivers to the Customer. In the current chapter, value will
be looked at as a function of the ROI that a satellite delivers to its operator.
2.1. Examining OOS as a Commercial Market
To analyze OOS as a commercial market, the characteristics of the OOS market must
be defined. Namely, what type of market does OOS represent, what is being bought or
sold, how much supply and demand exists, and how much would a customer be willing to
pay for the product or service? There are no correct answers to these questions; no one
can predict the demand or how much a customer is willing to spend for a market that
does not exist. The lack of answers to these questions creates uncertainty around the
definition of an OOS market. This uncertainty in market definition is one of the primary
reasons why OOS capabilities have yet to be embraced by the commercial industry.
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To understand if a satellite operator would pursue OOS, the value of servicing must
first be determined. In order to determine the value of servicing, OOS will be viewed as a
commercial market. Traditionally, a commercial service market is the interaction of
buyers and sellers or the cross over of supply and demand. For the most part, this
definition still holds for OOS, however, the product that is exchanged in the OOS market
is not physical, but it is the value that is delivered to the customer. As is common with
any commercial market, a customer (satellite operator) always has the option to pursue
other means of generating value. In the OOS market, this can be represented by a service
provider utilizing different servicing architectures to meet customer demand or a satellite
operator pursuing alternative ways of generating value. An OOS market only exists when
a servicing architecture can deliver more value to a customer than the customer's
alternative value-generating options.
2.1.1. OOS: A Commercial Service Market
What type of market does OOS represent? The market for OOS is not a market where
raw materials are turned into goods, components are assembled to make a final product,
or a market where goods are exchanged. OOS is a service market. In a service market, the
service provider provides a service to a customer at a cost and in turn the service creates
value for the customer. Figure 2-1 provides a high-level representation of a potential
OOS market. In Figure 2-1, the buyer is the service customer (satellite operator) and the
seller is the service provider (00S provider). Simple microeconomic theory states that
any market is comprised of three elements; a buyer and seller, a product, and a price.
Pindyck and Rubinfeld explain that no matter the type of business a "market is a
collection of buyers and sellers that, through their actual or potential interaction,
determine the price of a product (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 2001)." To establish if an OOS
market exists, one must determine if an appropriate price of the product exists for both
the buyer (satellite operator) and the seller (service provider). The appropriate price of the
product is found by the intersection of the supply and demand curves for that market. As
a result, supply and demand curves must be established for OOS to determine if a market
exists. This step is this focus of Chapter 8.
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2.1.2. 00S Demand: The Customer
The demand side of servicing can be examined as the additional value that is delivered
to the satellite operator. The right side of Figure 2-1 relates to the satellite operator. In
the OOS market, the satellite operator seeks to purchase a given amount of value. Based
on that value, the satellite operator has a maximum servicing price for which he will
purchase that value. For any price above the maximum servicing price, it is assumed that
servicing will not be the most valuable strategy, i.e. supply does not intersect satellite
operator demand. The most important aspect of Figure 2-1 is that the customer's decision
process is entirely independent of the service provider. The only aspect of the service
provider's architecture that influences the satellite operator's decision is the value
delivered from servicing.
Actual Service Price
Value (Max Service Price)
Service Provider Service Customer
(Servicer) (Satellite)
(Min Break-even Price) Value
Figure 2-1: Pictorial of On-Orbit Satellite Servicing Market
2.1.3. OS Supply: The Supplier
The supply side of OOS can be viewed as the service provider's servicing
architectures that attempt to satisfy customer demand. The concern of the provider is to
provide value to the customer at an appropriate servicing price. Based on the provider's
servicing architecture, a minimum servicing price exists for each level of the satellite
operator's demand. It is assumed that it is not advantageous to the service provider to
provide the service to the customer at a price below the minimum servicing price. In all
likelihood this can be represented as the point at which the provider's cost of servicing
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exceeds the revenue received from the customer. However, this is not the only possible
definition for the minimum servicing price.
A provider's minimum servicing price could also be set according to other economic
strategies, such as network externalities. In the case of network externalities, a service
provider could set their minimum servicing price at such a low price to drive off
competition and capture a large network of users. Under this strategy, the service
provider would lose money at first but, after a large user base was established, the service
provider could supply additional services. For example, initially a service provider could
charge extremely low prices for satellite refueling; but, after a large customer base was
established, the service provider could charge for other services such as satellite repair or
upgrade. By adopting the idea of a competitive market, a service provider can set their
minimum servicing price according to any number of economic strategies.
Whatever strategy the service provider chooses, the service provider must be able to
offer a servicing price below the customer's maximum servicing price. To establish an
appropriate servicing price, a service provider has different servicing methods to
consider, each representative of a different servicer design. A unique minimum servicing
price is associated with each servicer design. Thus, a service provider is left with a single
demand curve and the potential for multiple supply curves. The goal of the supplier is to
then determine which supply curve creates the largest range of servicing prices.
2.2. Determining the Price of Servicing
The focus of any market evaluation is to understand the interaction between the buyer
and seller in order to determine an appropriate price for the product. The interaction of
the service customer and the service provider determines the actual servicing price
associated with providing a given level of value to the satellite operator. Precisely
mapping the interaction between customer and provider to determine the appropriate
price of servicing is very difficult, if not impossible for a market that does not exist.
However, based on Figure 2-1, the actual servicing price must exist between the
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customer's maximum servicing price and the provider's minimum servicing price or a
feasible OOS market would not exist.
Examining OOS in this manner provides a clear distinction between the two sides of
the market. On the supply side of the market is the service provider. This side has been
the focus of the various technical studies conducted over the past two decades. On the
demand side of the market is the satellite operator along with their decisions with regard
to servicing. The demand side of the market has not been examined and represents the
critical roadblock in the adoption of OOS by the aerospace industry. By focusing on the
supply side of OOS, previous studies have created feasible solutions for a fictional
market. To determine if OOS creates a feasible market, the demand side of the market
must be understood.
Determining customer demand (value) is not entirely an uncharted region in the
evaluation of OOS. In his Ph.D. dissertation, Dr. Joseph Saleh introduced the idea of a
customer-centric framework for the evaluation of OOS (Saleh, 2002). Saleh states that by
focusing on only the customer, the value that OOS delivers to the customer can be
evaluated. Because value is a customer-driven attribute, the customer will make the
decision to service based on the value servicing delivers and not on the form of servicing
architecture. It is this separation of the market that allows for the evaluation of OOS.
Before using Saleh's customer-centric framework to determine the value of servicing, an
understanding of customer value is essential.
2.2.1. Understanding the Customer's Perspective
Minimal emphasis has been placed on understanding how a target satellite can
generate additional value and how the need for this value maps to OOS. The foundation
of any service market begins with understanding the customers, their values, and their
need for ways to derive value. In the case of OOS, the ways in which a provider can
deliver value to a customer can range from simple to complex servicing tasks. However,
the customer is only concerned with the additional value that can result from the service,
not the servicing method. Assuming that the customer will make decisions based on
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value, a customer will be indifferent between servicing methods as long as all methods
provide the same value.
This point is illustrated by the following example of the automobile and a gas station.
See Figure 2-2. The automobile market exists because it fulfills a customer's need to go
from one location to another in an efficient manner. The automobile owner's need to
maintain, or restore, the ability of the vehicle to generate value is satisfied by purchasing
fuel from a gas station. Providing fuel to the vehicle in turn restores value for the
automobile owner. However, a customer can restore value by calling a tow truck to tow
their car, pushing the car themselves, or purchasing a new car with fuel. It can be
assumed that an automobile owner values their ability to travel and therefore an owner is
only concerned with the amount of fuel that must be purchased to restore the ability to go
to the next location. It can safely be assumed that, in the case of an automobile and a gas
station, an automobile owner is concerned with the amount of fuel that must be purchased
and not the way in which that fuel was brought to market.
If all ga was the same, how would you Do you care about where
decide where to purchase gas? the gas comes from?
Figure 2-2: Conceptual Example of the Separation between the Customer and
Provider Perspectives
Next, if one assumes that all gas on the market is equivalent, it is reasonable to assume
that the customer will be concerned with the amount of fuel purchased and the price paid
36
for that fuel. This idea is depicted on the left side of Figure 2-2. In choosing where to
purchase the gas, the customer will not be concerned about where the crude oil was
extracted, how the oil was refined into gas, how the refined gas was sent to the gas
station, or how the gas station operates. In Figure 2-2, the customer's view of the gas
station does not extend beyond the dashed line; the customer does not see how the gas
station obtained the gasoline. Due to the lack of transparency, the source of the gasoline
does not come into play in the customer's decision to purchase gas. If one accepts this
logic, a customer would be indifferent to the choice of the gas station and would choose
based only on price. This same logic can be applied to OOS. If multiple forms of
servicing provide the same value to the satellite operator, the satellite operator will
choose between the various forms of servicing based on the servicing price.
When a given form of service experiences a change in the servicing price, the demand
for that form of service is affected. In the case of multiple forms of service, the increase
in price for one form of servicing will increase the demand for an alternative form of
service. 'When this occurs, the forms of servicing are said to be substitutable.
Substitutable forms of servicing allow the satellite operator to choose based on the price
of servicing because the value that is delivered by the forms of service is substitutable.
The substitutable nature of servicing architecture reinforces Saleh's customer-centric
approach to the valuation of OOS by removing the servicing architecture from the
decision to service and allowing the satellite operator to decide solely based on price.
2.3. How On-Orbit Servicing Provides Value
In general, the purpose of OOS is to provide additional value to the satellite operator
that could not have been provided otherwise. In past studies, many authors have written
about servicing architectures and different forms of servicing methods and how these
designs provide value to the customer. However, first there is a need to understand why a
satellite operator would choose to service in the first place. The answer lies in how OOS
can provide additional value to the customer. There are four fundamental functions by
which OOS can provide additional value to a satellite operator. These functions are: 1)
asset assessment, 2) asset re-organization, 3) asset restoration, and 4) asset augmentation.
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The four fundamental functions of servicing are customer specific (i.e. associated with
the right side of Figure 2-1). Chapter 7 will discuss how the various forms of servicing
(Left side of Figure 2-1) map to the customer's fundamental functions of servicing.
2.3.1. Asset Assessment
Many case studies indicate that satellite operators have the potential need to assess
the state of their satellite. This assessment can include understanding how the satellite is
operating, where the satellite is, and the physical state of the satellite. Note that the form
in which assessment is achieved is irrelevant. All that matters is determining the state of
the satellite. An example of assessing the physical state of a satellite would have been
determining whether or not damage existed on the Space Shuttle Columbia before the
shuttle re-entered the Earth's atmosphere. Although assessment of the physical state of a
satellite may not include delivery of a service to a specific satellite, the assessment
delivers information concerning that satellite to the operator and thereby generates value.
2.3.2. Asset Re-organization
Re-organizing a customer's asset consists of reorganizing the relationship between
the target satellite and the satellite's immediate network for the purpose of increasing
customer value. The most common form of asset re-organization is the physical
relocation of the customer's satellite(s) to another orbit, independent of the method used
to accomplish the relocation. Possible reasons for relocating a satellite could be to
provide satellite service to a more profitable market or to decommission a satellite to a
graveyard orbit to accommodate a replacement satellite.
Another form of asset organization would be the physical re-organization of a
constellation of satellites. Consider the example of a constellation of satellites used for
interferometry. A servicer could increase/decrease the distance between the satellites
within the constellation, thereby changing the aperture. Aperture size of a satellite
constellation directly affects the performance of the constellation and therefore changes
in aperture can lead to increases in the value generated by the constellation. Thus, the
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goal of asset re-organization is to increase the value the satellite provides to its operator
without the need to physically alter the satellite.
2.3.3. Asset Restoration
Satellite restoration consists of restoring the value of a satellite or satellite
constellation to a previous operating state. Two cases of restoration are repair and life
extension. In the case of repair, a customer needs to repair a failure or malfunction so that
the value generated by the satellite can be restored. Restoring a satellite's value through
repair could consist of mechanical manipulation of the satellite, replacement of failed
components, upgrade of failed software, etc. An excellent example of asset restoration is
the replacement of the HST gyros. Replacing the gyros of the HST allowed the telescope
to resume normal operations, but the service did not provide value beyond what was
expected by its operators.
In the second example of restoration, life extension, the satellite's value is restored by
preventing a customer's value stream from diminishing due to the decommissioning of
the satellite. By extending the operational life of a satellite, the value provided by the
satellite can be continued into the future; hence, life extension restores the value provided
by the satellite that would have otherwise been lost. The aim of asset restoration is to
restore an asset's value to a previous state.
2.3.4. Asset Augmentation
In asset augmentation, OOS adds value for the customer by increasing the capability
of the satellite. Capability can be added to a customer's satellite in three ways: 1) a unit-
value increase, 2) a unit increase, and 3) a combination of unit-value increase and unit
increase. A unit-value increase includes augmenting a satellite with new technology,
modifying a piece of existing technology, or upgrading components of the satellite. An
example of new technology would be a modification to an imaging payload that allows
the payload to be able to view more of the visible spectrum. By increasing the range of
visible spectrum, the service increases the capability of the payload that in turn filters
down to the customer in the form of additional value. What makes a unit-value increase
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unique is that the increase in capability provided by the service can be distributed to each
of the value generating units (payloads) onboard a customer's satellite. Through a unit-
value increase, asset augmentation increases customer value by increasing the capability
of each value-generating unit onboard the customer's asset.
The second way to increase a satellite's capability is by increasing the number of
value generating units, or payloads, on a given asset. In the case of a geosynchronous
(GEO) communications satellite, a customer could increase the number of antennas or
transponders, thereby increasing the data rate associated with the satellite. A unit increase
affects the customer's value by adding capability through additional units; this form of
service does not affect any existing value generating units already in place. Finally, a
customer's asset can be augmented through a combination of both unit increase and unit-
value increase. A combination approach allows the customer to apply new technology to
each value-generating unit onboard, as well as directly increase the number of value-
generating units.
With this understanding of the fundamental functions of OOS, the next step is to
understand the process by which a satellite operator chooses to service their satellite.
2.4. Deriving Value from Future Uncertainty
Markets can change, components can fail, and new laws can be passed. All of these
events can affect customer value. Having the flexibility to react to future uncertainty is
how OOS generates value. Saleh et al. point out that "In a world of certainty, flexibility
has no value." (Saleh, et al. 2003) By not designing for serviceability, a customer has
locked in their future decisions and limits their ability to react to future uncertainty.
OOS delivers value by creating flexibility for a satellite to react to future uncertainty.
Customers gain value from their ability to choose between servicing or not servicing,
when future uncertainty has been resolved. Previous work has defined the value of OOS
as the difference between the expected value of a serviceable satellite and the expected
value of a non-serviceable satellite. (Saleh, 2002), (Lamassoure, 2001), (Joppin, 2004)
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But, this definition of the value of OOS is not entirely accurate. The true value that
servicing provides the customer is the difference between the expected lifetime value
with servicing and the expected lifetime value with the next best alternative form of
generating value. Why? At some point the price of servicing will be too high and the
customer will choose the next best alternative option. The point at which the price of
servicing makes the customer indifferent to servicing versus the next best alternative is
the customer's maximum servicing price. For any servicing price above the customer's
maximum servicing price, the customer will choose the alternative option and the value
of servicing will be zero. Therefore, the value of servicing must be defined with respect
to a customer's next best alternative options. The customer's maximum service price is
then found by determining when the value of servicing is zero.
2.4.1. Customer's Decision to Service
After a service provider determines which fundamental function of servicing will
generate value for the customer, the next step is to explicitly determine that value. To
determine the value servicing can provide a customer, the customer's decision process
with respect to servicing must be examined. For servicing to be a possibility, either the
target satellite must be designed to be serviced or the servicer will have to be designed to
service a satellite that was not designed to be serviced. Understanding these distinct
options and determining which method provides the most value to the customer is the
focus of this section.
2.4.1.1. Two-Part Decision: Design Serviceable Satellite
In many OOS cases, a customer will have the desire to restore or augment a satellite.
Under these circumstances, a customer must design a serviceable satellite. The question
becomes how to the design a serviceable satellite. Reynerson states "the most cost
effective way to design a serviceable architecture is to establish the requirement at the
beginning of the acquisition program." (Reynerson, 1999) Turner agrees with
Reynerson's belief and states "servicing can be used to make large profits by enabling
spacecraft to be redesigned to increase revenue generating capacity, not through
reduction of spacecraft fabrication and launch costs." (Turner, 2002) It is assumed that in
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order to develop a serviceable satellite, satellite operators must initially demand that their
satellites be designed for servicing from the beginning.
Under this assumption, the customer's decision to service becomes a two-part decision
analysis. The satellite operator first decides whether or not to design the satellite for
servicing. If an operator decides to design for servicing, the operator can later decide
whether or not to service the satellite. The operator will make the decision to service as
long as it provides additional value. If the satellite operator decides not to design a
serviceable spacecraft, the operator's choices are limited. The operator still has
alternatives for generating additional value, but OOS is not one of them.
Figure 2-3 displays a simplified version of the satellite operator's two-part decision
model. The upper branch of the decision tree represents the decision path available to a
satellite operator that has decided not to design their satellite for servicing. Notice that in
this branch the operator does not have the option to service the satellite; the operator's
future options are either decommission, do nothing, or replacement. The upper branch of
the decision tree represents the design and operational practices of today's space industry.
The lower branch of the decision tree represents the available options if the customer
initially decides to design a serviceable satellite. This branch represents the alternate
satellite design method that allows an operator access to the satellite. The objective of the
analysis is to determine under what circumstances the lower branch (serviceable satellite)
of the decision tree provides greater value over the upper branch (non-serviceable
satellite). Under these circumstances, a serviceable satellite design will provide a
customer with more value than a traditional satellite design. Thus the satellite access
problem is resolved and support is given for a new paradigm shift in satellite design.
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Figure 2-3. Customer Two-Part Decision Process
2.4.1.2. One-Part Decision Process
There are also servicing architectures that can provide additional value for satellites
that were not originally designed for servicing. With these architectures, the operator's
decision process concerning OOS reduces to a single decision, i.e. the decision to service
or pursue other options. Figure 2-4 shows a pictorial representation of a customer's one-
part decision process. In this decision, the value prior to the decision to service is
irrelevant. Determining whether a satellite operator will choose to service reduces to
determining whether the servicing branch of the one-part decision process provides
greater value after the time of servicing than the remaining branches.
Do Nofhirg
Senrice
Tk Decommission
Deploy New
Satellte
Figure 2-4: Customer One-Part Decision Process
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2.5. Conclusions
To determine if OOS is feasible, one must be able to determine if an OOS market
exists. To determine if an OOS market exists, both the customer's maximum servicing
price and the provider's minimum servicing price must be determined. By adopting the
customer-centric approach suggested by Saleh, the customer's maximum servicing price
can be determined independent from the servicing architecture. This separation of
customer and provider allows an evaluation of servicing from two different perspectives:
one in terms of the functions of servicing and the other in terms of the forms of servicing.
The functions of servicing are customer driven while the forms of servicing are provider
driven.
To determine if servicing is feasible, one must understand the value that servicing
offers the customer. The customer's need for servicing can be broken into four
fundamental functions. These functions of servicing are asset assessment, asset re-
organization, asset restoration, and asset augmentation. The evaluation of the value
delivered by servicing will differ based on which function of servicing fulfills the
customer's need. For instance, asset restoration and augmentation require that a satellite
be designed for servicing. Due to the need for a serviceable design, the evaluation process
takes on a two-part decision process: the decision to design for servicing and the decision
to service. If the function of servicing does not require a serviceable design, the
evaluation process reduces to a one-part decision process, the decision to service.
By examining the customer's decision process, one can determine the servicing price
at which the customer is indifferent to servicing versus alternative forms of generating
value. The servicing price at which this occurs is the customer's maximum servicing
price. Consequently, the value of servicing for the point at which the customer is
indifferent to servicing versus any alternative form of generating value is zero. By
following the customer's decision process for a given functional need, the point at which
the value of servicing is zero can be found, and the customer's maximum servicing price
can be determined.
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The next chapter will discuss the process for determining the value of OOS suggested
by Saleh and later implemented by Lamassoure and Joppin. Chapter 3 discusses how
customer value is computed from the future uncertainty in the satellite's future. Based on
this uncertainty, the customer's maximum servicing price is determined by finding the
point at which the value of servicing is zero.
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Chapter 3. Determining the Value OOS
Delivers to the Customer
To determine if OOS is feasible, one must be able to predict the additional value that
servicing can offer. If servicing provides no additional value above that provided by the
current operation and development of satellites, then what value does it have? The
problem with determining the additional value provided by OOS is that the value of OOS
is rooted in uncertainty. For instance, the augmentation of a satellite with new technology
depends on the development of new technology, which is uncertain. Restoration of a
satellite depends on when a satellite develops a failure, which is unknown. In fact, if the
future were not uncertain, servicing would not provide any additional value. If the future
were certain, a satellite designer would design for these future certainties and thus have
no need to access the satellite in the future; i.e. thus no need for OOS. Unfortunately,
there is no crystal ball to predict the future and thus servicing has the ability to provide a
satellite operator with additional value.
The slow adoption of OOS by the satellite industry is due to the industry's impression
of uncertainty. However, it should be noted that the one exception to the slow adoption of
OOS can be found in the US Department of Defense (DoD). Currently, the DoD is
looking into OOS as a possible way to provide satellite upgrade and refueling capabilities
(See Orbital Express program in Chapter 1). In general, the opinion held by the satellite
industry is that designing for uncertainty is a negative design attribute. As previously
discussed, the industry appears to prefer to take a very risk-adverse position when it
comes to space applications. Because the value provided by OOS is uncertain, the
industry may not be quick to adopt a system dependent on uncertainty.
The Iridium constellation is one example of a satellite program that was unable to
react to uncertainty, resulting in a large negative response. In the case of Iridium, the
uncertainty about the number of users had a dramatic effect on the success of the
network. It turned out that the number of users was overestimated due to the unexpected
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adoption of terrestrial-based cellular phones. As a result of the overestimate of users,
Iridium was forced to charge a high per minute fee to compensate for the loss. The
convenience of a global cell-phone never justified this high cost and as a result the
Iridium customer base never increased; eventually Iridium filed for bankruptcy.
It appears that one of the major obstacles to the development of OOS may be the
negative connotation the satellite industry has associated with uncertainty. At the
moment, the only way to change this attitude may be to quantify the additional value that
OOS offers over conventional satellite design.
3.1. Deriving! Value Out of Uncertainty
The determination of the customer's additional value provided by OOS begins with
examining the uncertainty in a satellite's future. For any customer, uncertainty about the
future has some effect on customer value. However, uncertainty in the future is not
necessarily negative. Future uncertainty also provides the potential for positive change.
Saleh et al. emphasize that it is important to understand that "uncertainty is not a
synonym for risk any more; it can even become a source of value (Saleh et al., 2003)."
With any type of uncertainty, there are always two sides to the coin, an upside and a
downside. It is by exploiting the upsides of uncertainty that OOS has the ability to
generate additional value over traditional designs that cannot distinguish between the
upside and downside of uncertainty.
Traditionally uncertainty has held a negative connotation in the satellite industry; but
the idea of uncertainty generating positive outcomes is common among other industries.
For instance, in the case of the stock market, the future price of a stock is uncertain. If the
price of a stock goes up, greater profits will be created for the owner of that stock.
However, the owner of the stock understands and accepts a given level of risk associated
with the potential for the stock price to fall. In the stock market, the only thing that is
certain is that the price of a stock will change; it will either go up or down. What is
uncertain is the magnitude and direction of the change.
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Similar to the price of a stock, the value generated by a customer's satellite can either
go up or down according to the change in the satellite's underlying market. If the
satellite's underlying market goes up, the satellite will deliver more value to its operator,
if the market goes down the satellite will lose value. The underlying market for satellites
is the reason a satellite is launched in the first place. For instance, the underlying market
for a communications satellite is the current communications market. Satellite operators
meet the demand of the communications market by launching a commercial satellite in
order to provide communications capabilities over a given service region. The price that
consumers pay for this service is the driving force behind the customer's value.
The uncertain satellite market drives the future price that a satellite operator can
charge. If the price that a satellite operator can charge for communication capabilities
goes up, the satellite will generate more value for the operator. If the price of the
communication capabilities goes down, the satellite will lose value. The goal of the
satellite operator is to take advantage of the upside of the uncertainty and protect against
the downside. By understanding how uncertainty in the underlying market affects value,
one can determine the additional value produced by the flexibility to react to this
uncertainty.
On Wall Street, a very similar practice of protecting against/limiting losses and
capturing gains exists. In fact, Wall Street has economic mechanisms that allow for this
exact outcome. Certain purchase mechanisms allows for an investor to make a future
decision concerning whether or not to buy an investment. The future decision allows the
investor to react to uncertainty in the market by purchasing an investment if the market is
up or do nothing if the market is down. Economics typically refer to the mechanism in
which investors can make future decisions with regards to buying or selling of an
investment as an option.
3.1.1. Options
An option is the right, but not the obligation, to pursue an event. Options commonly
occur in the area of stocks and commodities. In the stock market, a consumer can
purchase a European call option on the stock that gives the consumer the right to
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purchase a stock at the end of a certain exercise period at a given price, known as the
strike price. In return for the ability to purchase the option the consumer must initially
pay some small fee (Wall Street Journal, 1999). Options generate value because the
investor is given the right to choose whether or not to exercise the option. If by the end of
the exercise period the current price of the stock (S) was above the strike price (K), the
consumer would exercise the option and have a positive payout (S-K). However, if the
stock price were to fall below the exercise price of the stock (K>S), the consumer would
not exercise the option. The payout of the option would then be zero, not K-S, and the
consumer would only loose the initial fee paid to purchase the option. What makes
options unique is the asymmetric payout that results from the investor's choice about
exercising the option. Modeling the uncertainty in the payout generated by options is
simply a function of knowing the strike price of the option and then predicting the future
price of the stock.
3.1.2. OOS as an Option
OOS can be thought of as an option on the future value of a satellite. OOS allows a
satellite operator to capture additional value brought about by future uncertainty, similar
to how stock options allow investors to generate profits. In terms of OOS, the additional
cost that is incurred to design a serviceable satellite can be viewed as the initial price one
pays to purchase a servicing option. By designing a serviceable satellite, the satellite
operator is given the right, but not the obligation, to service the satellite at some future
point in time. The satellite operator will only exercise the servicing option if the outcome
will be more valuable than not servicing.
Similar to stock options, if the operator chooses not to service, the operator will be left
with the same value (additional value = zero) and will have only incurred the additional
cost associated with designing a serviceable satellite. OOS thereby mimics the
asymmetric returns that are typical of a stock option by granting a satellite operator the
flexibility to gain additional value through servicing while allowing the operator the
ability to prevent a significant loss. The value of OOS, or payout, is similar to that of a
stock-option. With a few small assumptions, the value of OOS can be determined in the
same way that the value of a stock option is determined.
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3.2. Modeling Future Market Uncertainty
How can the value of servicing be determined? The Nobel Prize winner Robert
Merton stated that "the future is uncertain ... and in an uncertain environment, having the
flexibility to decide what to do after some of that uncertainty is resolved definitely has
value. Option-pricing theory provides the means for assessing that value (Merton, 1997)."
Option pricing theory is commonly known as Black-Scholes theory. Black-Scholes
theory originated from the Black-Scholes equations developed by Fisher Black and
Myron Scholes in 1973 (Black and Scholes, 1973). The Black-Scholes equations can be
used to model the varying price of future investments over time.
One of the key assumptions of the Black-Scholes equations is that the varying price
of the investment over time follows Brownian motion. Brownian motion is commonly
known as the random movement of a tiny particle suspended in a fluid or gas. In the case
of stock prices, Brownian motion is used to model the random change in stock prices
over time. In this thesis, Brownian motion will be used to model the uncertainty in the
changes in the satellite's underlying market over time.
Saleh was the first to use option pricing theory, commonly known as real options
analysis when pertaining to engineering systems, as a method with which to determine
the value provided by OOS (Saleh, 2002). Saleh modeled the satellite's future
uncertainty, under the assumption of Brownian motion, as a random change in the
satellite's market. Saleh modeled OOS as a servicing option provided to the satellite
operator. Using this model, he was able to determine that additional value of OOS. For a
more detailed discussion of real options theory, the reader is referred to Trigeorgis
(Trigeorgis, 1996). The next section describes Saleh's real options approach and the
evaluation method laid out by Lamassoure (Lamassoure, 2001) and Joppin (Joppin, 2004)
for determining the value of OOS.
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3.2.1. Geometric Brownian Motion
The core concept in Saleh, Lamassoure, and Joppin's work is the idea of flexibility
and generating value by reacting to future uncertainty. The first step is to determine what
uncertainty exists in the underlying market and how it affects customer value. Typically
one or more uncertain market parameters exist that provide the customer with value. A
typical assumption used by real options theory is that the change in the uncertainty
follows Geometric Brownian motion. The effect of modeling the change in the market
with Geometric Brownian motion is that the range of the potential market values is
bounded between zero and infinity. Thus the benefit of modeling the market uncertainty
with Geometric Brownian motion is that the uncertainty more precisely models the trends
of a commercial market. Geometric Brownian motion of the uncertainty can be simplified
to Brownian motion of the logarithm of the uncertain market (Joppin, 2004).
The uncertainty in the market, x, can be examined in terms of the change in the
market over time; i.e. the ratio between the predicted market value per unit time, Xth(t),
and the current value, X(t). "Using the Ito Lemma equation it can be shown that if x
follows a Geometric Brownian Motion with drift a and volatility a, Y defined as Y =
ln(x) follows a Brownian Motion with drift ( y-M2 ) and volatility a. Therefore the
change in the logarithm of x is normally distributed with mean (c -%2)t and variance a&t
(Joppin ,2004)." By knowing the current market value at a given point in time, X(t), the
change in the market uncertainty is log-normally distributed with an expected rate per
unit time of e't and rate of variance per unit time of ct. For example, the change in the
selling price for satellite bandwidth over time is uncertain and has a direct effect on
customer value. The only information required to predict the future selling price of
bandwidth is the current selling price of the bandwidth, X(t), and the volatility (a), and
drift (a) of the change in the selling price. Equation 3-1 provides a description of the
relative change in the uncertainty parameter and Equation 3-2 describes the associated
probability distribution with respect to time.
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Equation 3-1
Xth(t) X(t+ At)Y =1n(x), X- '=
X(t) X(t)
Equation 3-2
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3.2.2. Binomial Tree Distribution
Instead of modeling the uncertainty as a continuous change in the market, it is easier
from an analysis point of view to describe the continuous uncertainty as a discrete
uncertainty. To move from the continuous domain to the discrete domain, the Geometric
Brownian motion of the market uncertainty will be looked at as the continuous limit of a
discrete random walk. The random walk of the uncertainty parameter, Y, will be modeled
with a binomial tree distribution. The binomial tree distribution is developed such that the
range of potential values reproduces the expected drift and volatility of the Geometric
Brownian motion, see Figure 3-2.
2AY
Figure 3-1: Sample Log-Transformed Binomial Tree Distribution (Lamassoure, 2001)
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To mimic the Brownian motion behavior, the binomial tree is characterized by a step
up of AY or a step down of AY for each time step. The fixed change in AY allows for
independence between the value of the market at any point in time and the path (sequence
of ups and downs of the market) that was followed to attain that value. Equation 3-3
describes the step size up or down over any time step.
The independence of the market value relative to the path can be seen in Figure 3-1.
Notice that the second point in the third column (third time step) could have been attained
by either a initial step up in the market followed by a step down, or by an initial step
down in the market followed by a step up. Since a given market value at any point in time
is path independent, the only remaining unknown in the market prediction is determining
the probability of attaining each potential market value.
In addition to capturing the Markov relationship (an element of Brownian motion) of
the market uncertainty, the binomial tree was chosen because it allows for simple
calculation of the probabilities associated with future market values. The values of the
market described by the binomial tree must satisfy the probability distribution described
in Equation 3-2. To satisfy this equation, each point in the binomial tree is given a
probability p of an upwards step, and probability 1-p of a downwards step at any point in
time. The probability of an upwards step, p, is described by Equation 3-4.
Equation 3-3
AY= .2(5t + a - 2t 2
Equation 3-4
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The size of each discrete time step is determined by the length of the evaluation time
period divided by the desired number of time steps, L. It is common for the length of
each time step in the binomial tree (6t) to correspond to the units of the drift (a) and
volatility (G) of the underlying uncertainty. By matching the time periods for the market
volatility and drift with the time period for the discrete time step of the binomial tree,
additional model uncertainties are avoided. In practice, the market volatility and drift are
determined from historic market data over a given period of time. A problem that
frequently occurs in modeling future uncertainty is that historic market data can be
spaced over a long time period (years), but the operator wishes to map the market on a
small time scale (months). If this were the case, the operator will have to accept
additional uncertainty in the model due to the interpolation that would be required to
change between time scales. In order to avoid this form of added uncertainty, all case
studies in the thesis will assume that the discrete time steps of the binomial tree
correspond to the units of time for the historic market volatility and drift.
The possible values for the change in the market are described by the range of values
in the binomial tree. The potential uncertainty values can be described at any point in
time Tj, where Tj = To +j6T and j=0->L. The range of the logarithm of the change in the
uncertainty, Y, at any time, Tj, is donated as Yi,Tj where i= 1 -- n. This range of Y values
at any point in time is given by Equation 3-5. Because the change in uncertainty is
modeled as Geometric Brownian motion, Yi,1T = ln(Xi,Tj/X 0). Rearranging, the future
value of the uncertainty parameter can be described by XiT3 - Xo*e(YiTj) The
corresponding probability of obtaining Xi at Tj is given by Equation 3-6.
54
Equation 3-5
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for J =1,3,5,7,....
for J= 2,4,6,8,....
Equation 3-6 (H.S.Ang and Tang, 1975)
where k=1,l=1
3.3. Calculating Customer Value
The use of options theory proposed by Saleh (Saleh, 2002) laid the ground work for
the evaluation methods described by Lamassoure (2001) and Joppin (2004).
Lamassoure's and Joppin's evaluation methods consist of a reverse valuation method to
determine the value of servicing. Lamassoure and Joppin assume that the operator will
seek what is referred to as the "optimal strategy." The optimal strategy is the series of
choices that will lead a decision maker to the greatest overall lifetime value. To
determine the optimal strategy, Lamassoure and Joppin map the binomial tree distribution
used to describe the market uncertainty to the satellite operators decision tree with regard
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to servicing, see Figure 3-2. This mapping of uncertainty to the decision process allows
prediction of the value of the market at the point where the operator decides on servicing.
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Figure 3-2: Conceptual Relationship Between
Binomial Tree and Possible Decision Tree (Joppin, 2004)
Because the operator is given the choice to service, but not the obligation, the satellite
operator is able to decide which path will generate the greatest value for each value of the
market uncertainty. Thus, to achieve the optimal strategy, the satellite operator makes
different decisions for different values of the market such that the greatest value is
delivered. The operator's optimal strategy is thus the decision that would be made when
faced with each potential value of the market at any point in time. This strategy mimics
the asymmetric results that are delivered by options. Under the strategy, if servicing
provides the greatest value for a given market value, the operator will choose to service,
otherwise the operator will pursue another course of action.
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Before describing the process, several decision elements used to determine customer
value are discussed below. The majority of the design elements have been gathered from
previous work focusing on the value of OOS and a few have been added to reflect current
thinking.
3.3.1. Valuation Analysis Elements
3.3.1.1. Baseline Strategy
The baseline strategy is the reference strategy to which all options are compared. In
this thesis, the way in which satellites are typically built and operated in today's satellite
market is the baseline strategy. The baseline strategy consists of an initial satellite that
was not designed to be serviced. The satellite will remain operational for its entire
expected operational lifetime. When given the chance to make decisions concerning a
satellite's future, the satellite operator will always choose to do nothing. If a replacement
satellite is launched at the end of the initial satellite's operational life, this satellite will
also be designed without the ability to be serviced. The value of the baseline strategy is a
function of the initial expected benefit of the satellite over its lifetime along with all
expected deployment and operational costs.
3.3.1.2. Uncertain Parameter(s): X
The basis for generating value through OOS is the premise of uncertainty. In any
evaluation of OOS, there is the potential for a number of uncertainties. The uncertainty in
the satellite's market is the basis for the satellite's additional value; this uncertainty was
already discussed in the previous section. It is assumed that any other uncertainties are
independent of the market uncertainty. Typical additional uncertainties may deal with the
servicing of the satellite, the design of the satellite, or any other customer developed
uncertainty. A few potential uncertainties that can effect the decision to service are:
readiness of new technology, readiness of new satellite design, uncertainty in launch, and
satellite lifetime failures. No matter the form of the uncertainty, all uncertainties will be
modeled as a range of potential values with an appropriate probability distribution. If M
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uncertainties exist in a single model, the uncertainties, (Xi)M, are described as a vector
[X 1,.. .XM].
3.3.1.3. Time Horizon -TH
The time horizon is defined as the period of time from the customer's initial decision,
or launch, to some distant point in the future. The purpose of choosing a distant point in
the future is so that the cumulative discounted cost and benefit of a customer's decision
can be compared over the same time period. In the past, this period of time has been
chosen to be the same as the expected lifetime of the satellite. However, it will be shown
later that the time horizon should be extended beyond a single satellite lifetime. In this
thesis, the time range defined by the binomial tree distribution is equal to the time
horizon of the evaluation (i.e. TL=TH).
3.3.1.4. Decision Point(s) - Tk
Decision points represent a point during the operational life of the satellite, Tk, where
the customer has the ability to make a decision concerning the future operation of the
satellite. In the case of OOS, the decision point generally represents the point in time at
which the customer has the option to service the satellite or pursue a more beneficial
option. Throughout the operational life of a satellite, the customer may have the option to
make multiple decisions. Multiple decision points will be described as an array of
decision points and represented by Tk,,, where Tk,n= Tk,O + n6Tk and 6Tk represents the
change in time between decisions. Due to the discrete nature of the market uncertainty,
all decision points in the evaluation will occur at some point in time described by the
binomial tree distribution. Again, Figure 3-2 should provide some clarification.
3.3.1.5. States of Operation - S
The very nature of a flexible system is to design a system such that it can react to
future uncertainty. One method for providing flexibility is through the system's ability to
change its operational state in reaction to uncertainty. Let S donate an array of the
possible operational states of the system at all points in time. Examples of operational
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states of the system can be: normal operation, replacement satellite, serviced satellite, or
removal from the market. A satellite operator changes the operational state of the satellite
by switching to that state by way of a previous operational state. Initially the first
operational state of the satellite would represent normal operation. For any decision point
let Si, represent the entry states of the system, i.e. the state of the system before the
decision point. Next let Sf represent the exit states of the system, or the state of the system
after decision point. The discrete nature of the uncertainty constrains the evaluation and
forces the assumption that the system can only change its operational state at a decision
point.
3.3.1.6. Underlying Market
The underlying market is the market which the target satellite serves and
consequently generates benefit for the operator. It is assumed that the uncertainty in the
market is independent of the operator's future decisions. The underlying market is
represented in similar fashion to any other uncertainty parameter. Examples of an
underlying market can be the uncertainty around the price of a gigabit per second of data
rate, the location of a major theatre of war, or the location of inclement weather, etc. It is
the uncertainty in this market that allows OOS to generate benefit for the customer. The
range of potential market values described by the binomial tree distribution at time Tj is
denoted as Xi,rj, where Tj=to+j6t.
3.3.1.7. Benefit Function-EB
A customer's benefit function describes the benefit a customer gains over the
satellite's operational lifetime. The choice of the benefit function should be one such that
it describes the importance for the satellite operator. Ideally a satellite operator's benefit
function should be independent of the satellite's design. For instance, a customer seeks to
generate revenues, but revenues do not define the design of the satellite. Benefit is strictly
some function of the underlying market and not a function of the costs of operating the
satellite; i.e. the benefits for a commercial satellite operator are the revenues that the
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satellite generates, not the revenues minus the cost. In the case of a discrete step analysis,
a customer's benefit is constant and aggregated over each time step [T, 1 ;T.].
3.3.1.8. Risk
The most significant and most misunderstood parameter in the development of OOS
is risk. In the market of OOS several risk drivers exist. Operators take on the risk that a
satellite will not reach orbit due to a launch vehicle failure. Once in orbit, a satellite is
exposed to the risk of an upper stage failure, which prevents a target satellite from
reaching its target orbit. In the case of servicing, there is the risk that a servicing will
cause harm to a satellite or even worse destroy the satellite. Servicing also introduces a
new risk associated with the potential of third party effects (orbital debris caused by
servicing that affects a third party's satellite). Third party effects create possible liability
concerns for the satellite provider and satellite operator in the case where a third parties
satellite was damaged as a result of servicing.
Each type of risk has its place in the evaluation of OOS. With respect to servicing, the
customer is mainly concerned with the risk of servicer failure. For the purpose of this
discussion, the risk associated with servicing failure will be noted as 9iSVR. While third
party effects are a concern, these effects are more than likely to be a concern for the
service provider and not the satellite operator. Chapter 8 provides a more detailed
discussion of the potential liability concerns over third party effects. For now, it is
assumed that any insurance required for third -party-effect prevention will be accounted
for in the servicing price. In determining the value that OOS delivers to the customer, risk
is simply viewed as a probabilistic reduction in benefit. Equation 3-7 describes the
incorporation of risk into the satellite operator's calculation of benefit.
Equation 3-7
EBS(X), = (1- R )EBS (X)M +( )EBFailure(X,)M
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3.3.1.9. Cost
Three forms of cost exist in the evaluation of OOS; 1) the cost of operation, 2) the
cost of switching between operational states, and 3) the cost of the initial capital
investment. In order to evaluate the different cost structures, all costs will be discounted
to same year dollars representing the cost at the time of launch. In converting cost to
launch year dollars, a discount rate, 9 1DIs, and an interest free rate, 9 IIFR, will be used to
determine the customer's opportunity costs. The customer's internal rate of return, 93IRR,
will then be the sum of the discount rate and the interest free rate.
Due to the discrete nature of the analysis, the operational cost will be evaluated over
each time period, [Tn11 ;Tn], for each given operational state of the system. Each
operational state of the system has a fixed cost that is required for maintain the satellite in
operation. Typically this cost includes the cost of ground station, ground support,
operating personal, etc. In this thesis C ' represents the cost of operating the
system in state S.
At each decision point, the customer has the option to switch between operational
states of the system to gain additional value. However, a cost is associated with switching
between the states of the system. The cost of switching could be the cost of abandonment,
the cost of relocation, or the cost of servicing. In the case of OOS, the switching cost
would most likely represent the servicing cost. The cost of switching from any initial
state, Si, to a given final state, Sf, is denoted as Csi's,
The last cost element in the evaluation is the initial cost of the satellite. The initial
satellite cost included the cost of satellite procurement, the cost of launch, insurance
costs, research design test and evaluation (RDT&E) costs, and any other costs associated
with the satellite's deployment. The initial operating cost of a given satellite is
represented as C ,Oc .
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3.3.1.10. Value Function
The value provided to the customer by operating the system is a function of the
customer's benefit of operating the system and the cost of operating the system.
Assuming the cost of operation and the cost of switching between operational states of
the system are constant regardless of the value of the underlying market, the expected
value (EV) over period [T0 i;Tn] can be denoted according to the following equation:
Equation 3-8
SE*s Ij> \BS I SSS- Cs S)EV ->s,(x)m =f(EB ](x)r,EBfxrs-M,C C xp [,, CIOC)
For the case of determining the expected value over the range of uncertain market
values, Xi, at any point in time, the expected value is calculated by multiplying the
customer's value as a function of the market uncertainty by the probability of attaining
that value. The expected value to the customer over period [Tn-1 ;Tn] for state S is
determined by the following equation:
Equation 3-9
EVS =k EV x )M * X
3.3.1.11.Utility Function
A utility function is used to capture the customer's perception of risk and rewards.
Ross defines utility as "a dimensionless parameter that reflects the 'perceived value under
uncertainty' of an attribute. Often used in economic analysis, utility is the intangible
personal goal that each individual strives to increase through the allocation of resources."
(Ross, 2003) It is important to note that the definition of utility is not the same at that
used by Saleh and Lamassoure. The "utility metric" used by Saleh and Lamassoure,
Saleh, et al. 2003, is representational of the benefit function used in this article.
The purpose of the utility function is to capture the relationship between the
additional value from servicing and the operator's perceived risk. A decision-maker is
classified as exhibiting one of three forms of risk-preference. The three forms are: "risk-
62
adverse', "risk-neutral", and "risk-prone" (DeNeufville, 1990). A "Risk-neutral" decision
maker is described as a decision-maker who has no risk-preference because he makes
decisions on an expected value basis. A "risk-adverse" decision maker is described as one
who tends to prefer more certain outcomes although the outcomes tend to be less
profitable. On the contrary, a "Risk-prone" decision maker is described as one who
chooses options that on average are less profitable, but have the possibility of significant
rewards. Based on the customer's risk preference, a customer's utility function can have
either a positive or negative effect on the customer's valuation of the system and
therefore can effect the customer's decision to service. The customer's perceived value is
determined as a function of the utility function U and the expected value, as shown
below.
Equation 3-10
PerceivedValue = U(EVyfT I
3.4. Real Options Analysis
The purpose of real options analysis is to determine the additional value that results
from reacting to future uncertainty. The overall purpose of the options analysis is to
determine the customer's optimal servicing strategy. Recall that the optimal strategy is
the decision that a satellite operator makes, into order to maximize value, when faced
with a given market value. The satellite operator's optimal choice is the one that
maximizes future benefit over the lifetime of the system.
The satellite operator's decision process represents a Markov process because only
the future value of the satellite matters in the operator's decision. The earlier decision
points in time do not affect the current decision because the optimal strategy assumption
assumes that a decision maker will have chosen an optimal strategy up until the current
point. By modeling the customer's decision process as a Markov process, the customer's
optimal operation strategy is determined through a reverse evaluation method. For a more
detailed discussion, the reader should refer to (Joppin, 2004). A brief description of the
real options evaluation process is provided below.
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3.4.1. The Evaluation Process
To determine the customer's expected value over the entire time horizon, the
evaluation process is broken into two segments: 1) the expected value from deployment
to the first decision point (Tk,1) and 2) the expected value from the first decision point to
the time horizon (TH). Since the second segment can contain multiple decision points,
there is a need to determine the optimal strategy for the customer at each decision point.
The overall optimal strategy for all decision points are the decisions that maximize
the customer's value over the decision period, [Tk,TH]. The bellman equation states that
the expected value over any period of time [Tk, TH] can be broken down into multiple
parts; [Tk,Tk+.], ... [Tk,n-1,Tk,n],[Tk,n,TH]. Thus the customer's optimal strategy is
determined by working backwards and calculating the expected value over the decision
period [TK,,TH] for each decision period [Tk,n.1,Tk,0 ]. Starting at the time horizon, TH, at
each decision period [Tk,n-2,Tk,n.1] one must calculate the expected benefit, cost, and value
for the future decision points, [Tk,n.1,Tk,0 ], making sure to take into account the optimal
strategy computed at the future decision point.. This process is repeated until one reaches
the first decision point (Tk).
Uncertainty
1X r. X)M, P(Xi,Tk
To TK TH
Cakulate
1 1 Expected Benefit
Initial Stale 2 Cost of Switching
Cost of Operation Expe cte d V alue
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Figure 3-3: Conceptual Valuation Process'
Adapted from Carole Joppin. On-Orbit Servicingfor Satellite Upgrades. Master's Thesis. Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
February 2004. pg 98.
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At any given point in time, the optimal strategy depends on the current state of the
customer's underlying market (XTk)M and their perception of the expected value.
Equation 3-11 shows the decision model for determining the customer's optimal strategy
at Tk given X(Tk)M. A conceptual model of this process is adopted from Joppin's work
and can be found in Figure 3-3.
Equation 3-11
Possible States of the System
U[EVs >l(X,)] ... U[EV (X. U[EVs ((X.
Si I = EVs*
U[EV (X, --- U[EVs (XI U[EV (p4 + 1 , ,:T I tT.,:T-]I (]
Where:
EVj -+s= EV X +eC""- - [ p V - (X - pEV I-(X_1)r
The state of the satellite, Si, represents the initial state of the satellite at the decision
point. S* represents the optimal end state at Tk, given the underlying market value. S* is
found by determining the end state that provides the maximum value for given market
value. The optimal end state, S*, is therefore computed by finding the maximum value
among all the columns in Equation 3-11 for a given row. The optimal strategy over
period [Tk,Tk.1] is denoted as EVV 5,, which is equivalent to Joppin's denotation of
Inm for the optimal strategy. The expected value of state Si over period [TK,TK+1],
EVJ TI I no longer depends on the end state of the system, but only on the initial state.
This process is then repeated for all prior decision points. By repeating the process
one obtains with the optimal strategy over the period [Tk, TH]. The total value is then the
discounted sum of the customers optimal strategy after the decision point, [Tk,TH], and
the value generated up until the decision point, [T.,Tk].
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Equation 3-12
EVH ] EV + eT"'T] -e)EV
3.4.2. Improvements to Suggested Framework
To apply Saleh's customer-centric model and the methodology suggested by
Lamassoure and Joppin requires an understanding of the full extent of the customer's
decision model. Lamassoure's and Joppin's work focused on determining the value
provided by servicing over the design life of a single satellite. Despite the increased
accuracy of this work over traditional evaluation methods, it has one major weakness.
The previous work examined the value provided by servicing over the lifetime of a single
satellite. In doing so, that analysis fails to capture the full value that servicing provides
over alternative options.
Recall that in Chapter 2, the satellite operator has either a one-part or two-part
decision process based on the form of servicing. In the two-part decision model, the
operator has the option to replace the satellite in the upper branch of the decision tree
(non-serviceable satellite), the same as they do in the lower branch. Just because
servicing may prove to be the best option in the lower branch does not mean that it is the
best option overall. By focusing on a single satellite lifetime, Lamassoure and Joppin's
research fails to account for the alternative design options that are created by not
designing a serviceable satellite. As a result, the failure to capture the more valuable
decision leads to inaccurate prediction of the customer's maximum servicing price.
In addition to not fully representing the operator's decision process, both Joppin and
Lamassoure fail to capture the full extent of the value created by the customer's decision.
In an example of a satellite upgrade, Joppin assumes that the design of a replacement
satellite is available at the same point in time that servicing can be provided.2 The
conceptual notion behind on-orbit upgrade is that OOS can provide the customer with
additional benefit by introducing new technology earlier than could have otherwise been
accomplished. However, the customer has additional means of generating value and is
2 Note that Joppin delays the launch of a replacement satellite by two years in order to account for the time
of development. Thus the launch of any replacement satellite occurs two years after the decision to replace.
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not confined to only the decision points where servicing is possible. Recall that the
customer has the option to launch a replacement satellite. It is certainly possible that a
satellite is capable of supporting additional value generating units before any new
technology was developed. This choice would be the choice of satellite replacement that
is represented in the upper branch of the two-part decision tree in Figure 2-3, but the
option for replacement would occur at a different point in time. Joppin fails to accurately
take the difference in decision points into account and therefore determines the
customer's optimal strategy by only looking at the option for replacement at the same
decision point as the servicing option. By only looking at decision points where a
customer will decide on servicing, Joppin fails to account for the potentially more
valuable scenario of early, or later, satellite replacement.
Along the same lines as the previous concern, Lamassoure and Joppin did not account
for the option of asset augmentation by a unit-value and unit increase. In the development
of a replacement satellite, the satellite operator is not confined to using outdated
technology. The development of new technology allows the customer to incorporate new
technology into any replacement satellite along with the increase in the number of value-
generating units onboard the satellite. The result of incorporating both new technology
and more value-generating units on a replacement satellite would be a more valuable
satellite that incorporates the benefits of both a unit-value and unit increase. By
incorporating both technologies together, the customer has the potential to generate
substantially more value than could have been achieved through servicing alone; at best
servicing can only provide a unit-value increase. Therefore by not examining this option,
Lamassoure and Joppin misrepresented the value that OOS provides to the customer.
Since these potentially more valuable options can occur at different decisions points,
there is a need to evaluate the value of all the customer's options on the same time scale.
By focusing on the lifetime of a single satellite, the customer's options are not aligned,
which results in differing time scales on which to evaluate customer value. By extending
the time horizon to cover the lifetime of the initial satellite and its planned replacement
the difference in the discounted lifetime value becomes insignificant. Extending the time
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scale allows for more valuable future options to be compared on the same time scale as
less valuable near-term options. The result is a more accurate optimal customer strategy
that results in a more accurate prediction of the customer's maximum servicing price.
3.4.3. Determining the Maximum Servicing Price
The objective of the real options approach analysis is to determine the servicing price
at which OOS provides greater value than alternative decision paths. The maximum price
that a customer would be willing to spend on servicing represents the price at which a
customer is indifferent to servicing versus the next most beneficial option. The maximum
price at which servicing no longer provides greater value than alternative options can be
determined by varying the price of servicing. This price is the point at which the
additional value provided by OOS is zero. By determining the maximum servicing price
that a customer would spend, an upper limit is placed on the price that a service provider
could charge for servicing.
3.5. Case Studies
The next three chapters determine the customer's maximum servicing price for three
servicing scenarios. The first example is an asset restoration scenario where a provider
extends the operational life of a GEO communications satellite. The purpose of extending
the operational life of the satellite is to restore or maintain the value that the satellite
delivers to the customer. In a restoration case, the servicer does not increase the value
that the satellite delivers to the customer, but simply restores the value to a previous state.
The second and third examples are asset augmentation scenarios. The second example
focuses on GEO communications satellites, but examines the value that is delivered to a
commercial customer through technology upgrades. The third example addresses
technology upgrades for the case of a non-commercial customer. This example looks at
the upgrade of the Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites (GOES) weather
satellites and determines the value that can be delivered through two potential upgrades.
The first example uses the one-part decision tree and examines a case where a
satellite operator only decides whether or not to service their satellite. In this decision
model, the servicing option does not require that the target satellite be designed for
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servicing. The customer has a single decision to make-- whether to service the satellite,
replace the satellite, do nothing, or decommission the satellite. The customer will base
this decision on the branch of the decision tree that provides the greatest value. Since the
value before the decision point is unchanged, a customer is not concerned with the value
that is delivered before the decision point. The customer is only concerned with the value
beyond the decision point.
The example focuses on the additional value that can result from life extension. In the
case of life extension, the option to decommission a satellite would not provide additional
value, but the option to service the satellite has the potential to provide additional value.
Although the satellite operator also has the option to replace the satellite, which could
provide greater value; the replacement option is not considered in this study. If life
extension provides positive value to the customer, a feasible market for the life extension
of GEO communications satellites exists. The maximum price that a satellite operator
would be willing to pay for life extension is determined as the servicing price at which a
customer is indifferent to life extension versus decommissioning.
The next two examples examine cases where a service provider augments a
customer's satellite either by upgrading the satellite with new technology (unit-value
increase) or by the addition of value generating payloads (unit increase). Unlike the life
extension case, the upgrade cases require that a satellite be designed for servicing. As a
result, the customer's value is determined by focusing on the decision tree represented in
Figure 2-3.4 The decision tree maps the customer's two-part decision analysis concerning
their choice to design for servicing or not and potential future decisions in reaction to
future uncertainty.
' Make note of part one for a precise definition of unit-value and unit increase
4 In both augmentation cases, it was assumed that a satellite operator would not be given the choice to decommission the satellite due
to the fear of losing their entire market user base.
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Figure 3-4: Satellite Design Decision Tree
Since a customer's future decisions can only be finalized in the future when
uncertainty has been resolved, the purpose of the decision analysis is to determine how a
customer should initially design their satellite. By examining the decision tree, when the
upper branch of the decision tree provides more value than the lower branch the customer
should design their satellite without servicing in mind. However, the customer should
design their satellite for servicing if the lower branch provides more value than the upper
branch. Therefore, in order to determine how a customer should initially design their
satellite one needs to determine the expected value resulting from the decision to design
for servicing and the expected value from deciding not to design for servicing.
3.5.1. Additional Uncertainties
The asset augmentation scenario addresses three types of uncertainties. In addition to
uncertainty in the underlying market, the future decisions incorporate new technology
development uncertainties (potential unit-value increase) and new satellite bus
development uncertainties (potential unit increase). An advance in new technology is
assumed to increase the capability of each value-generating unit onboard a satellite and as
a result to increase customer value. An advance in satellite bus technology is assumed to
increase the capacity of the satellite bus and allow a satellite operator to add additional
value generating units. It is assumed that any new technology can be applied to any
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satellite on-orbit (given that is was designed for servicing), but that new bus technology
can only be applied to replacement satellites.
In order to capture the effect of a technology development period, a technology freeze
of three years beyond the launch date is assumed on all technology. This implies that at a
minimum it will take three years to develop any new technology regardless of the satellite
operator's action. In reality a satellite operator could always speed up technology
development by increasing research and development funding, but this effect was
excluded from the analysis. While the technology freeze limits the earliest possible
readiness date of any technology, the actual readiness of technology is uncertain. To
account for this uncertainty, the readiness of any new technology beyond the technology
freeze date, the uncertainty around technology development is assumed to be independent
of the decision-makers actions as well as independent of the development of other
technologies.
Based on these assumptions, the development of new technology is assumed to
follow a Poisson process and can thus be represented by an exponential probability
distribution. The exponential probability distribution was chosen because it describes the
probability of occurrence of an event as a function of time (H.S.Ang and Tang, 1975).
Thus in this case, the exponential probability distribution is used to predict when the
development of the new technology will be completed beyond the technology freeze date.
Because it is assumed that technology development can occur at any point in time after
the first day of any given year, the deployment of any technology developed during a
given year cannot be deployed until the beginning of the succeeding year. As a result of
the technology freeze, the upgrade or replacement of the target satellite cannot occur until
the fourth year of operation. In order to account for a new satellite development period, it
is assumed that a decision maker will have to wait two years between the decision to
launch a new satellite and the deployment of that satellite.
In addition to the additional value provided by upgrading or replacement, the
customer has the unique option to incorporate new technology into the replacement
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satellite. The incorporation of both technologies results in a replacement satellite that
incorporates the benefits of both a unit-value and unit increase. For a customer to launch
a more powerful replacement satellite, both the new technology and new bus technology
would need to be developed at, or before, the customer's decision for replacement.
Therefore, the readiness for new technologies can either work for or against the customer.
3.6. Conclusions
Throughout most of its existence, the aerospace industry has seen uncertainty as a
negative aspect of design. This apparent misrepresentation probably results from a
misunderstanding of the difference between risk and uncertainty. Risk is a form of
uncertainty, but uncertainty is not limited to risk. Uncertainty has an upside and a
downside. The downside is known as risk, while the upside can be thought of as rewards.
It is the upside of uncertainty that has escaped the minds of the aerospace industry and
OOS hopes to capture this value. Figure 3-5 portrays the relationship between risk and
uncertainty. Notice that risk is simply the downside of uncertainty, while rewards can be
defined as the upside. Allowing a decision maker to react to future uncertainty, by way of
future decisions, changes the range of possible outcomes by limiting, or eliminating, risk
entirely (Saleh et al, 2002).
5 Since there is the potential for this more powerful satellite to be ready at any point in time during the operational life of the initial
satellite, there is a need to evaluate the full value of this option on the same time scale as the other options. It was discussed how
previous research failed to take into account the potential for more valuable options. It was shown that because there is the potential
for higher valued future options there is a need to be able to compare these high value options with low value options. The solution to
the problem is to extend the time horizon of the valuation to encompass both the operation life of the initial satellite and the
operational life of its planned replacement.
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Figure 3-5: Uncertainty
It is well known within other industries that uncertainty has the ability to create value.
Uncertainty is widely used in the stock market. While the stock market has apparent risk,
the industry has developed some mechanisms that limit these risks and deliver
asymmetric returns. In particular, the stock market has developed stock options which
provide an investor with the right, but not the obligation to purchase stock in the future.
By allowing the investor to make a decision, stock options create flexibility for the
investor to react to future uncertainty in the market thereby generating value. Thus before
rejecting the idea of creating value out of uncertainty, the aerospace industry should
accept the idea that value can be generated through uncertainty. By adopting the
mentality of designing for flexibility to support future uncertainty, the aerospace industry
can capture additional value that is lost through traditional design.
The value of OOS can be determined by examining OOS as a customer's decision, or
option, for satellite servicing. By adopting the assumption that OOS represents an option,
the value of OOS can be determined in a similar fashion to finding the value of stock
options. It is suggested that real options theory be used to determine the value of
servicing. The underlying assumption behind real options theory is that, in the face of
uncertainty, the decision-maker can make choices to maximize value. By designing
satellites for servicing, the aerospace industry could have the right, but not the obligation
to service its satellites. Thus, the value of designing for servicing over the traditional
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satellite design methods is the additional value that is delivered through the customer's
ability to react to future uncertainty.
The real options approach for determining the value of servicing was previously used
by Lamassoure and Joppin. Through following this process, one can vary the servicing
price and determine the point at which the additional value of servicing is zero, which is
the maximum servicing price. The maximum servicing price represents the point at which
the customer is indifferent to servicing versus an alternative option. Thus by varying the
servicing price and determining the maximum servicing price, one can determine when a
satellite operator will service their satellite and when they will not service.
The next three chapters will look at three different examples servicing scenarios.
Each chapter will determine the value of servicing for the customer as well as determine
the customer's maximum servicing price. The first chapter will examine how to
determine the customer's maximum servicing price in a case where servicing restores a
commercial satellite's capability to a previous state. The next two chapters will look at
the customer's maximum servicing price in cases where additional value is delivered
through servicing; the first case will look at a commercial customer and the second case
will look at a non-commercial customer. All three chapters represent possible servicing
scenarios and are used as guides to how to determine the customer's maximum servicing
price.
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Chapter 4. Example: Asset Restoration
Typically, when a satellite fails, it cannot be repaired because the satellite cannot be
accessed in orbit. To combat this problem, satellite designers have designed redundancy
into satellites to compensate for the real risk of failure. But, can the access issue of
satellites be addressed in a different way? Is there value in the capability to repair
satellites? This chapter examines a case where a satellite operator wants to have the
capability to restore the satellite to a previous state. This example focuses on life
extension, but this same method could be applied to cases of satellite failure.
In todays satellite industry, it is common for satellite operators to lose value because
the satellite has run out of propellant. Propellant is used on a satellite for various reasons,
but a significant part of satellite's propellant is used to provide station keeping. Station
keeping is vital to the operation of a satellite because station keeping allows a satellite to
maintain its position in space. When satellites run out of propellant, the ability of the
satellite to maintain its position is lost, the performance of the satellite decreases, and the
satellite operator loses value. Eventually, if a satellite's ability to maintain position is not
restored, the performance of the satellite will deteriorate to the point where the satellite is
no longer useful. The focus of this example is to examine the case where an operator
wants to restore the ability of their satellite to maintain its position after the satellite has
reached the expected end of its operational life.
The overall purpose of life extension is to maintain a satellite's value by keeping the
satellite operational beyond its expected design life. When the operational life of the
satellite is extended by restoring the satellite's ability to maintain its position; this case of
OOS servicing is commonly referred to as life extension. The maximum servicing price a
satellite operator would spend on life extension is determined by finding the additional
value provided by life extension. In particular, this example will focus on life extension
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that restores the ability of commercial GEO communications satellite to maintain
position.
4.1. Presentation and Objectives
GEO communications satellites support the vast majority of the world's space-based
voice, data, and video communications. Despite the high initial costs of these satellites,
these satellites usually provide their operators with large revenues in the latter part of the
satellite's operational life. The slow development of communications technology and the
reliance on proven technology prevents GEO communications satellites from
incorporating state-of-the-art technology. Thus, the value of any GEO communications
satellites tends to remain fairly constant over time except for the occasional slight jump in
value that results from the introduction of a new satellite bus design. Since the value of
GEO communications satellites is fairly constant, the revenue potential of any given
GEO communications satellites is limited only by the length of the satellite's operational
life. The longer a GEO communications satellite remains operational, the more value it
delivers to the operator.
Because the small chance of system failure due to the heavy reliance on redundant
systems, a GEO communications satellite's lifespan is primarily fixed by the amount of
propellant onboard the satellite. The propellant required by these satellites is used
primarily to provide station-keeping for the satellite. Without the ability to provide
station-keeping, a GEO communications satellite cannot provide communications service
to the ground and hence provides no value to its operator. The amount of initial
propellant for a GEO satellite is constrained during its design phase, due the high costs of
launch and the common industry practice of minimizing mass in order to meet the mass
and volume requirements of launch vehicles. As operators have begun to realize the
potential value from longer operation, the design lives of satellites have begun to
increase, see Figure 1-3. All in all, the typical lifespan of GEO communications satellites
is about 10 to 13 years; this length of time is primarily limited by propellant and not
component failure or technology obsolescence.
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In an attempt to keep the mass of the system the same and have more revenue
producing assets onboard, satellite designers have switched from chemical bi-propellant
fuel to Xenon-electric propulsion in the more recent satellite designs. Xenon propulsion
promises station-keeping ability at -5 kilograms (kg) of propellant per year (Boeing,
2003). This would lead to about a 1 /1 0 th reduction in the propellant mass of bi- propellant
satellites, which typically require 50 kg of propellant per station-keeping year. However,
in light of the reduction in propellant mass, satellite operators have not used this mass
savings as a way to add more propellant and provide longer lives for the satellite, as is
shown by the slight increase in satellite design lives. The current Xenon-electric
propulsion based satellite still provides a satellite with about 15 years of operating life.
Extending the operational life of satellites with electric propulsion systems makes little
sense due to the small amount of mass required by these systems. If today's satellite
provider really desired an increased operating life, they could simply add additional years
of useful life at the cost of a few additional kilograms of fuel. Thus the focus of this
example will not include satellites with Xenon-electric propulsion, but will focus only on
determining the value from extending the life of the standard bi-propellant
communications GEO communications satellites
4.1.1. Customer Need: Asset Restoration
Satellite operators believe that GEO communications satellites could continue to
generate significant revenues if not for the fact that these satellites can no longer maintain
their position. When GEO communications satellites run out of propellant, the value of
these satellites reduces to zero. The ability to station-keep is the primary satellite
capability that an operator wants to restore. This should not be confused with a need to
re-fuel the satellite. Maintaining position is the customer's need, refueling is one way in
which this can be accomplished. The motivation of satellite operators and some service
providers is that, if a GEO communications satellite's station-keeping ability could be
restored, the value of the satellites could be returned to a previous operating state.
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4.1.2. Objective
The following example seeks to answer the following questions:
" What is the additional value that is delivered to the satellite operator through
life extension?
" What is the satellite operator's maximum service price?
e What is the relationship between customer value and the price of servicing?
(Linear, non-linear, etc...)
* What is the optimal length of life extension?
i.e. how many additional operational years should the life extension service
provide?
" Does the maximum servicing price vary with the length of the life extension?
4.2. Model Assumption and Characteristics
Life extension allows the satellite operator to gain additional value beyond the
expected operational life of their satellite by extending the life of their satellite. To
determine the additional value that life extension provides to the satellite operator, the
option to service must be compared to the operator's baseline strategy. The operator's
baseline strategy is defined as the normal operation of the satellite, i.e. launch followed
by 10 years of operation and then decommissioning. The value of the baseline strategy
will consist of the expected lifetime value of the satellite from launch to the satellites
expected end-of-life. The optimal servicing strategy for the satellite operator is the
baseline strategy with the option of extension rather than decommissioning. The value of
the optimal strategy is the expected value of the satellite from launch to the new expected
end-of-life that results from servicing. The difference between the value of the baseline
strategy and the value of the optimal servicing strategy is the additional value that life
extension provides to the satellite operator. The value from servicing is computed by
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using the evaluation method introduced by Lamassoure and Joppin that was discussed in
Chapter 3.
4.2.1. Lack of a Serviceable Design
Is has been suggested that 50 or more GEO communication satellites operating in
2005 could have their operational lives extended through OOS (Long and Hastings, 2004
and Wingo, 2004). If this is true, then life extension of these satellites do not require the
satellite to incorporate a serviceable design. If a serviceable design is not required, the
satellite operator's decision process reduces to the one-part decision process discussed in
Chapter 2. Before examining this case any further, a brief summary is provided on the
ways in which life extension can be provided to current GEO communications satellites.
4.2.1.1. Refueling Approach
One way to restore the capability to maintain satellite position is to resupply the
satellite with station-keeping propellant. Long and Hastings point out that GEO
communication satellites have been shown in the past to have the ability to be refueled on
the launch pad immediately before launch (Long and Hastings, 2004). The significance of
this design feature is that these satellites have some feature that allows propellant to be
removed from the satellite and later replaced. Because this feature allows one to
accomplish this immediately before launch, the satellite must have the inherent ability to
be fueled and refueled as a fully integrated satellite. Assuming this is the case,
theoretically this should allow the same refueling process to be mimicked on-orbit. The
limitation of this assumption is the need to mimic a human-dependent process in space.
While space robotics technology may not as yet be up to this operation, both the Ranger
and Robonaut programs show promise towards a robots ability to mimic humans in
space.
4.2.2. "Space Tug" Approach
Another approach for restoring the satellite's position maintenance capability is not to
refuel the satellite, but to supplement the satellite's inherent station-keeping systems with
an external system. This method of life extension is the current thinking of one
commercial satellite service provider, Orbital Recovery Corporation (ORC). ORC's life
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extension strategy does not involve refueling GEO satellites, but uses a less intrusive
method of supplementing the satellite's station keeping capability by attaching to the
target satellite's apogee kick motor. Orbital Recovery Corporation believes that a "Space
Tug" type servicer can attach to the target satellite and supplement the satellite's station-
keeping capability (ORC,2004), (Wingo, 2004). This method differs from the refueling
method because it requires that the servicer become permanently attached to the target
satellite in order to accomplish the mission.
4.2.3. One-Part Decision Model
In both the "refueling" approach and "Space Tug" approach, the operational state of
the satellite is maintained by restoring the satellite's station-keeping capability. In both
cases, the design of GEO communications satellites supports life extension even though
the target satellite was not initially designed to support servicing. Unlike the two-part
decision process, the customer is not forced to make a decision concerning the design of a
serviceable satellite (See Figure 2-4). Because a serviceable satellite is not required, the
additional value created by the life extension of GEO communications satellite can be
evaluated using the one-part decision process.
In the one-part decision, process the satellite operator's decision process only consists
of the decision to service the satellite, replace the satellite, do nothing, or decommission
the satellite. The satellite operator will choose the branch of the decision tree that
provides the greatest additional value. Because the value before the initial decision to
service remains unchanged, the operator's optimal strategy is dependent only on the
value generated by servicing after the first decision point.
4.2.4. Effect of Servicing
To determine when a customer should extend the life of their satellite, the focus of
this analysis is on the additional value that can result from the optimal life extension
strategy. The decision to decommission provides no additional value, while the decision
to extend the life of the satellite has the potential to provide additional value. Although
the satellite operator has the option to replace the satellite, which could provide greater
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value; the replacement option is not considered in this analysis. The reason for excluding
the replacement option is that this example is looking only at the additional value that can
be attained through asset restoration. Replacement would likely result in the launch of a
new more capable satellite and therefore would represent an asset augmentation case.
If life extension provides positive value to the customer (greater than zero), a feasible
market for the life extension of GEO communications satellites exists because more value
can be attained through servicing than alternative options. The maximum servicing price
that a satellite operator would be willing to pay for life extension results from varying the
servicing price until the point at which the operator is indifferent to life extension versus
decommissioning. The maximum servicing price theoretically represents the point at
which the value from the option from life extension is zero.
4.2.5. Satellite Characteristics
Table 4-1: GEO Communications Satellite Characteristics
Characteristic Value
Program Start 1994
Launch Date 1997 (Aviation Week. 2U02)
Expected End of Life 2011 (14 year expected life)
Operational Cost 10% initial annual revenue
(McVey, 2002, pg 79)
Total Initial Costs $206M (Estimated), (Intelsat u1, 20:3)
Number of Transponders 76 Total (64 C-Band, 12 Ku Band)
(Aviation Week. 2002)
Initial Revenue / Transponder $2.16M / year (FY $ 2000)
(McVey, 2002, pg75)
Inflation Rate 2 %
Internal Rate of Return 8 %
Communications Market Volatility 10%
Market Drift - 4% (Bonds et al., 2UUU)
Years of Additional Life Provided 1 year and 3 years
by Extension
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The specific characteristics of the target satellite were modeled after the Intelsat 801
satellite. Intelsat was developed by Lockheed Martin and based on the GE-7000 platform.
Intelsat 801 was launched in 1997 and had an expected operational life of 14 years.
Intelsat 801 consists of 76 commercial communications transponders comprised of 64 C-
Band and 12 Ku Band 36Mhz equivalent transponders (Aviation Week. 2002). Table 4-1
summarizes the characteristics used to describe the customer's satellite.
4.2.6. Baseline Strategy
The baseline strategy for the satellite operator consists of the originally planned
operation of Intelsat 801. The baseline consists of procurement of the satellite in 1994,
launch of the satellite on an Ariane 4 in 1997, an operational life of 14 years, and an
expected decommissioning in 2011. At the end of Intelsat 801's operational life, the
satellite will be placed in a graveyard orbit to make room for its replacement satellite.
4.2.7. Uncertainty/Underlying Market
The market for Intelsat 801 was assumed to be the commercial communications
market. It was assumed that the satellite's underlying market was based on the annual
revenues generated by a single 36MHz equivalent transponder, regardless of the
transponder frequency. The market was assumed to have an initial market value of
$2.16M per year per transponder (McVey, 2002). The only uncertainty in the analysis
was assumed to be the change in the annual revenues generated by a transponder. The
uncertainty about the change in annual revenues was modeled using the log-normal
binomial tree distribution. The market volatility was assumed to be 10% per year and an
overall market drift was set at -4% per year (Bonds et al, 2000). The step size of the
binomial tree was based on one year intervals based on the market data that was
available.
4.2.8. Time Horizon
The time horizon for the analysis was set at 10 years beyond the design life of the
satellite (2022). This value was chosen arbitrarily, but it is believed that any satellite
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would begin to experience component failure before an additional 10 years of operational
life have been exhausted.
4.2.9. Decision Points
The first decision point concerning life extension occurs at the satellite's end-of-life
(2011). From then on, the frequency of the operator's decision to service is a function of
the form in which the servicing is provided. For instance, a satellite operator could be
given the option of a single additional year of life through refueling. Here a service
provider could only supply enough fuel so that the station-keeping ability of the satellite
was maintained for a single year. By providing only a single year of life, the satellite
operator to is forced to make a decision concerning extending the life of their satellite or
decommissioning their satellite annually. This, however, is only one scenario.
Alternatively, the satellite operator could be provided with 10 years of extended life.
This case would represent ORC's plan for providing life extension using the "Space Tug"
approach. Recall from Chapter 1 that ORC's plan is that the ConeXpress servicer will be
capable of supplementing up to ten years of station-keeping ability for a target satellite.
In this case, given the time horizon chosen in the model the satellite operator would only
have to make one decision concerning life extension. This decision would take place only
at the satellite expected end of life (2011).
While the one-year and ten-year life extension scenarios are examples of possible
extended operational lives provided by servicing, the satellite operator is not forced to
base the decision on the additional life provided by servicing. Recall that the satellite
operator and the service provider are separate entities. Therefore, the decision process
and valuation of life extension are separate as well. The service provider therefore needs
to determine which servicing length works best for the customer and then have the
provider design a servicer to match. This, however, should not occur in the opposite
direction. The service provider should not dictate what the customer wants. This would
go against the idea of a customer-centric valuation approach and is one of the reasons
why OOS providers do not exist today.
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4.2.9.1. Time Step
The more decisions that a satellite operator makes concerning the operation of the
satellite the more flexibility the operator will have to react to future uncertainty. It was
assumed that a satellite operator would prefer to make a decision regarding servicing the
satellite as often as possible. By making a decision to service as often as possible, the
satellite operator is able to fully capture the flexibility provided by OOS. Increased
flexibility allows the satellite operator to capture the maximum amount of value available
through life extension. To limit additional uncertainties in the analysis, the time steps of
the uncertainty parameters were set at annual year increments. This is because a
customer's decision process is tied to the binomial tree used to describe the market
uncertainty and one year is the smallest time step used in the binomial tree. As a result,
the decision points concerning the operator's decision to extend will occur in years 2011,
2012, 2013 ... 2021.
4.2.10. Operational States
Four operational states for the satellite exist in the analysis, the states are: End-of-life
(EOL), Decommissioned, Just Serviced, and Waiting.
" The "End-of-life" state of the satellite represents the point at which the satellite
has run out of the ability to perform station-keeping. This state is assumed to be
the initial state of the analysis since the prior operational states of the system do
not matter in determining the additional value provided by life extension.
" The "Decommissioned" state of the satellite represents the operational state where
the life of the satellite has not been extended. The satellite is assumed to be placed
in a graveyard orbit and as a result provides no additional revenues and requires
no additional costs. Once a satellite has entered the "Decommissioned" state the
satellite remains in that state for the remainder of the time horizon.
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" The "Just Serviced" state represents that the operational state of the satellite
where the operator has extended the life of the satellite by restoring the station-
keeping capability of the satellite. Note: this is independent of the form of
servicing (Refueling or Space Tug approach). The "just Serviced" state is only a
single year in length and occurs immediately after the decision to extend. The
state provides the operator with their expected revenues along with the expected
costs of operating the system. In addition, the cost of servicing is assumed to be
the cost required to switch from the "EOL" state to the "Just Serviced" state.
e The last state of the satellite is "Waiting". While in this state a satellite is assumed
to be waiting until its station-keeping capability has run out. A satellite can only
be in the "Waiting" state if the length of life extension provided by the service is
greater than one. A satellite enters a waiting state from either of two previous
states: "Waiting" or "Just Serviced." For instance, if servicing provided three
years of life extension and the customer made the decision to do nothing in years
two and three, the sequence of operational states of the satellite would be "Just
Serviced" in year one and "Waiting" in years two and three. However, a satellite
operator is always allowed to decide to service the satellite at the end of each year
regardless of the length of life extension. While in the "Waiting" operational state
the satellite is assumed to provide the operator with their expected revenues along
with the appropriate operating costs. No switching cost are assumed to be
required to go from either a "Just Serviced" or "Waiting" initial state to a
"Waiting " final state.
4.2.11. Risk
The risk associated with life extension is assumed to be zero regardless of the failure
risk of the servicer. This is because, in the event of a failure, it is assumed that the
responsibly would be placed on the service provider, not the customer, and without life
extension the customer will gain nothing; thus the customer has nothing to lose by
servicing. Robert Bernstien states "risk and time are on the opposite sides of the same
coin, for if there was no tomorrow, there would be no risk (Bernstein, 1996)." However,
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this does not mean that no risk exists in the model. There is obviously risk for the service
provider in the case of loss of the servicer or the creation of third party damage. But,
since the customer and provider are separate, their risks remain separate. Without
servicing the target satellite will have no future; therefore no risk existsfor the customer
with regard to servicing. Risks for the service provider are assumed to be accounted for
as a risk premium that is incorporated into the servicing price.
4.2.12. Benefit Function
The benefit of operating the communications satellite is the annual revenue generated
from the sale of communications services. The annual revenues of the satellite were
computed by taking the product of the initial market value, the number of transponders
on the satellite, and the relative change in the market. Because the change in the market is
an uncertain parameter, the benefit of the satellite at any point will be an array of
variables whose size is based on the number of possible uncertain market values
described by the binomial tree distribution. Additionally, based on the probability
associated with the market uncertainty, a discrete probability is associated with each
element in the array. The expected benefit of any given uncertainty value for a given
point in time is shown below.
Equation 4-1
EBT = ($2.16M)(#transponders)(Xj )
4.2.13. Costs
The initial costs were estimated at $206M (FY 1997). This cost was based on the
initial cost of procurement ($76M), the launch costs ($86M), the additional cost of
insurance ($27M), and estimated research, development, testing, and evaluation
(RDT&E) costs ($17M).The annual operational cost of the satellite was estimated at 10%
of the satellite's initial annual revenue ($6.7M per year).
Equation 4-2
(C P)[TT] =0.1 * ($2.1 6M)(# transponders)*expIRR(n-To0
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Equation 4-3
Cioc =(1 + 91 Ins )(Csateite + C Launch) + CRDT&E + CMisc
Table 4-2 lists the switching costs for going between the operational states of the
satellite. It is assumed that a satellite will incur these costs when switching from one
operational state to another.
Table 4-2: Table of Switching Costs for GEO Life Extension
"Decommissioned" "Just Serviced" "Waiting"
"Decommissioned" Zero infinity infinity
"Just Serviced" Zero infinity Zero
"Waiting" Zero Servicing Price Zero
"EOL" Zero Servicing Price infinity
4.2.14. Value Function
Because the target satellite is a commercial GEO communications satellite, it was
assumed that the satellite operator was a commercial entity. The value for the commercial
satellite operator is strictly the additional profits from life extension. As a result, the value
function for the extension of Intelsat 801 is the classic profit function;
Profits = Revenues - Cost. Equation 4-4 describes the value function in terms of the
benefit function and the costs associated with the satellite.
Equation 4-4
EVsls' = EBs, T[T n 1,Tn1 ETq TJ iT-
+ e-"IRR (T n-1 )[ p( SEV -I ( X )T )+ (I - pXEV (X_ ) ]
-(COP)[ TT -- (C,,,,ch)s ,
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The expected value of life extension is then the expected value of the optimal strategy
over the entire time horizon described in Equation 4-5.
Equation 4-5
EV xe = EVEOL>S*LfExtension [TEOL :TH]
4.2.15. Utility Function
It is assumed that the satellite operator's risk preference was based on the expected
benefit that would be derived by extending the life of the satellite because no risk exists
with regard to the loss of potential future revenue. By basing the decision to service on
the expected future value, the satellite operator is portrayed to have a "risk-neutral" risk-
preference. As a result of the risk-neutral preference, the satellite operator's perception of
value is unaltered. Thus the utility function has no effect, i.e. a scalar value of one, on the
operator's value function.
4.3. Results
The value that a customer will receive from servicing is a function of the servicing
price associated with life extension. If the servicing price is high, one would expect that
the cost would cut into the customer's profits, thus decreasing value. If the servicing price
is low, one would expect the opposite effect to occur. The customer will make the
decision about life extension based on the cost of servicing and the value delivered by the
option for life extension. Because uncertainty about the future can only predict change in
the underlying market, one cannot determine ahead of time the actual value of life
extension. The only way for the value of servicing to be known is for the decision-maker
to be at the decision point in the future. However, by using the probability distribution
associated with the binomial tree distribution for the market uncertainty, one can
calculate the expected value that a customer would received from life extension.
4.3.1. Single Year of life Extension
Figure 4-1 shows the expected additional value provided to the customer by a life
extension in annual increments. Figure 4-2 provides a closer look at the results in Figure
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4-1 for clarity purposes. The value of servicing in Figure 4-2 only represents that
additional value that could be obtained for up to seven (7) additional years of life
extension. The X-axis represents the servicing price that a customer would spend on life
extension. The Y-axis provides the additional value, in this case the profits that a
customer would receive from life extension, as a function of the servicing price. Each line
in the figures represents the additional value that could be obtained if the satellite's
operational life was extended to the corresponding year. For example if servicing resulted
in a life extension of five years, the additional value from life extension as a function of
the servicing price would be represented by the 2016 line.
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By using Figure 4-2, a satellite operator is able to determine the expected profits
from life extension based on the servicing price. For example, if a customer paid $1 OM
for an extension of one additional year (2012 line), the customer could expect that option
to be worth -$ 19M. The servicing price, $1 OM in this case, has already been taken into
account in the calculation of the value. Continuing with the example, a customer could
expect to receive about $50M in profits by extending the life of their satellite six times
(2017), paying $1 OM annually for servicing.
The maximum servicing price can be determined by finding the point at which the
additional value from life extension (Y-axis) is zero. Figure 4-1 and Figure 4-2 indicate
that the value of the life extension never actually reaches zero, but the value of the life
extension approaches zero as the servicing price increases. It is clear that when the
servicing price is above $1 OOM, the value of life extension is very small. Thus one could
assume that the maximum servicing price is about $1 OOM.
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4.3.1.1. Explanation of the Non-Linear Relationship Between Option Value
and Servicing Price
The results in Figure 4-2 display a non-linear relationship that occurs between the
expected value of the option and servicing price. This non-linear relationship arises from
two characteristics of the servicing case:
1) Future profits are discounted to similar year dollars, which creates a compound
discounting relationship between option value and time. The effect of discounting can
be seen in the non-uniform increase in the option value for any fixed servicing price.
For example, at an annual servicing price of $1 OM, the value of the option is $19M
for one year of additional life, $26M for two years, $32M for three, and about $50M
for seven years. As additional years of operational life are provided, the incremental
increase in option value provided by an additional operational year decreases with
time.
2) The log-normal assumption of the market uncertainty creates asymmetric
predictions of future market values. This assumption bounds the range of potential
market value between zero and infinity, which in fact is a good prediction of
commercial markets. But, at the same time this assumption creates what may appear
to be misleading predictions of strictly positive option value. These misleading
predictions are a result of the real option analysis used to determine customer value.
The real options approach allows customers to limit losses, thus in this case the value
of the option is always between zero and infinity (negative option values would result in
a decision to decommission, which has a value of zero). Since the market forecast growth
is bounded by infinity, extremely high servicing prices can still result in valuable options.
Thus extremely high market values, although possible, have an extremely low probability
of occurrence. When the expected value of the option is calculated using this unlikely
event, the option value will always result in a positive value. As a result the value of the
option in Figure 4-2 never reaches, but approaches zero.
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4.3.2. Multiple Year Life Extension
The life extension scenario was further analyzed by varying the additional operational life
for both two and three year servicing scenarios. Here the servicing scenario was
represented as the case where the customer is provided with two or three years of station-
keeping capability as opposed to the single year provided by the single-year service case.
Figure 4-3 shows the results of the two year case and Figure 4-4 shows the results of the
three year case. The important difference to note in both figures is that, as the satellite is
provided with more station-keeping capability, the additional value provided by the
various EOL lines begins to separate in a staggered fashion.
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In the case where the customer pays for life extension once every three years, Figure
4-4, the option value for the second and the third operational years are a vertical shift up
of the first additional operational year. When the number of operational years reaches the
point where another service is required, the value of the option collapses back to the
relationship found in Figure 4-2. This effect can be seen in the uniform separation
between the 2012 and 2013 lines (second year of operation) and the 2013 and 2014 lines
(third year of operation). The relationship between the 2014 and 2015 (first year of
operation after second servicing) lines show the relationship between servicing price and
value reverting back to the relationship found in Figure 4-2. The reasoning for this effect
is that, in the second and third operational years, the satellite operator does not choose to
extend the life of the satellite. Thus, no servicing cost is required and the servicing price
does not undercut profits. This same effect can be seen in Figure 4-3, however in the two
year life extension case, the staggering of the relationship between servicing price and
option value alternates every two years instead of every three.
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4.3.2.1. Effect of Multiple Life Extensions
In general, as the service length is increased, the value delivered to the customer for
each period of extension increases. This effect can be seen by examining a theoretical
six-year life extension case. By examining the cases with three different servicing
lengths, six years of additional life could be delivered through three possible scenarios: 6-
one year life extensions, 3-two year life extensions, and 2-three year life extension.
Recall that when the servicing price was $1 0M per service and 6-years were provided
through 6 one-year life extensions, the value provided to the customer was about $50M.
In the case where six years of additional life is provided through 3-two year servicing
missions, at $10M per service, the expected value of the option increased to about 57M.
When six years of additional life is provided through 2-three year servicing mission, at
$10M per service, the expected value of the option increased to about $65M. Thus the
option value increases by providing longer operational lives with fewer servicing
missions.
In addition to generating more value, the longer servicing length allowed for larger
maximum servicing prices. In Figure 4-2 the maximum servicing price was about $1 0GM
per service. In the two year life extension case, the maximum servicing price ranges from
$100M to $150M per service. In the three year life extension case, the range increases
from $1 0GM up to $170M per service. Despite the fact that higher servicing prices
become feasible for longer periods of life extension, the overall shape of the relationship
between the servicing price and the value delivered by servicing remains the same.
Therefore, life extension remains significantly more likely the lower the servicing price.
4.3.3. The "True" Maximum Servicing Price
In Figure 4-2, the case where a single year of life is provided by each service, the
customer's maximum servicing price is about $1 0GM per service regardless of the
number of additional years. However, it is unlikely that a customer would choose to
service if such a low return on investment would result. One might expect that a decision
maker would want some minimum return on their investment. For the moment assume
that a satellite operator requires a minimum of 10% return on their investment in order to
service. By requiring that a servicing mission results in at least a 10% return, the
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operator's maximum servicing price is no longer the point at which the value of servicing
is zero. In light of the operator's threshold cut-off a new maximum servicing price needs
to be computed, one which represents the maximum servicing price that a satellite
operator would spend on servicing in order to receive the required level of return. For the
purposes of this discussion, this servicing price will be regarded as the "true" maximum
servicing price.
According to the operator's threshold cut-off, the "true" maximum servicing price
would be the point at which the value of servicing was 10% of the servicing price. In the
single year servicing mission scenario, Figure 4-2, a customer would likely choose to
spend $40M on an additional year (2012 line) of operational life to order to gain $4M in
profits ($44M in revenues). Thus the 10% threshold cut-off results in a "true" maximum
servicing price of $40M for a single servicing mission. In the case where three years of
additional life are provided by a single servicing mission, Figure 4-4, the "true"
maximum servicing price is not represented by the 2012 line, but the 2014 line. This is
because the satellite operator can receive three years of life for the price of one servicing
mission. Thus the 10% threshold cut-off for a single servicing mission is calculated with
respect to the value provided by three years of life extension. Therefore the "true"
maximum servicing price for the three year life extension mission is about $70M for
which the expected value is about $7M. It is important to emphasize that the maximum
servicing price is still the point at which the value of servicing is zero.
The "true" maximum servicing price is the result of post-processing analysis;
therefore the evaluation method discussed in Chapter 3 remains unchanged. For now the
"true" maximum servicing price is the price a customer would decide to pay for
servicing, while the maximum servicing price is the price at which the value of servicing
is zero. Nothing is stopping a customer from choosing to service their satellite at a price
equal to the maximum servicing price. Thus with regard to determining the feasible range
of servicing prices, the maximum servicing price will still be used as opposed to the
"true" maximum servicing price. The effect of the post-processing determination of the
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"true" maximum servicing price on a customer's decision to service will be discussed in
more detail in Chapter 7.
4.4. Conclusions
Life extension is a unique example of asset restoration that does not require the
design of a serviceable satellite. The appeal of life extension is that it restores a satellite
operator's value under circumstances when this value would have otherwise been lost.
An advantage of the evaluation method by which the additional value of this service is
determined is that the solution is not a function of the form of servicing. Life extension
could be achieved by satellite refueling or by permanently attaching a space tug; either
solution fulfills the same customer need. The important factor is not the servicing method
but the value that is delivered by the service.
Overall the result of the example shows that life extension becomes more feasible as
the servicing price decreases. While higher servicing prices make sense in certain
situations, these prices represent less probable future situations. The most critical finding
of the life extension example is that the relationship between option value and servicing
price is not linear. While a linear relationship might be expected, due to the classic profit
equation: Profits = Revenues - Cost, the relationship between value and servicing price
was higher-order in nature. The resulting relationship shows that while high servicing
prices may be feasible, the customer's value from servicing does not begin to
dramatically increase until the servicing prices are much lower. On the one hand, if a
service provider has low servicing prices then slight increases and decreases in the
servicing price can have a dramatic effect on customer value, thus making OOS more
attractive. On the other hand, if the servicing prices are high slight increases and
decreases in the servicing price will result in little change in the customer's value. Thus,
the lower the servicing price charged by the service provider, the greater the chance of a
feasible OOS market.
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By understanding the additional value that can be delivered through life extension and
its relationship to servicing price, a provider can design servicing architectures to meet
the market demand. Chapter 8 will walkthrough how a service provider goes about
deciding on a servicing architecture to meet customer demand in the case of end-of-life
extension of a commercial GEO communications satellite.
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Chapter 5. Example: Asset Augmentation -
Commercial Customer
One of the major benefits offered by OOS is the concept of upgrades. Satellite
upgrade is the idea of replacing components or payloads onboard a satellite with new
more capable components. The goal of upgrading is to provide additional value to the
satellite operator by increasing the value delivered by the satellite. By upgrading, a
satellite provider is able to integrate new technologies as they become available.
Upgrading has the potential to deliver the additional value provided by new technology
that would have been lost while waiting for the current satellite to reach its end-of-life
before launching a replacement. Since satellite upgrades seek to increase the value of an
existing satellite, upgrades can fulfill a customer's need for asset augmentation.
Unlike the previous life extension example, upgrading a provider's satellite is much
more complex and is likely to require that satellites be designed for servicing. Because of
this requirement, the satellite operator has two decisions to make. The first decision is
whether to design a serviceable satellite and the second decision is whether to service.
Because the decision to service is in the future, the satellite operator can only predict the
value that would result from upgrading. If the satellite operator believes that the upgrade
of new technology will deliver more value than alternative options, the operator will
design a serviceable satellite. Thus, the examination of the asset augmentation case is not
primarily aimed at determining if a satellite operator should service; the case is focused
on how to design the satellite.
Chapter 4 examined the additional value that could be delivered through the
restoration of a commercial GEO communications satellite. This chapter will again
examine the case for a GEO communications satellite, but will focus on the additional
value that could be delivered through augmentation of that asset. It was pointed out
earlier that technology development in the area of GEO communications is generally a
slow process and that technology has not vastly changed over the past decade. In
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response, satellite designers focused on the development of improved satellite bus
technology with the hope that improved bus technology would allow for more
transponders to be placed onboard a satellite. Thus, operators are able to gain greater
value by placing more transponders onboard a new satellite. This chapter aims to test this
hypothesis and determine if the additional value that could be provided through upgrades
outweighs the additional value delivered through more powerful satellite bus design.
5.1. Presentation and Objectives
In this example, a commercial satellite operator seeks to deploy a new satellite. The
operator would like to provide the satellite with the capability to be serviced, but is not
sure if the design will maximize the lifetime expected value. It is the goal of the satellite
operator that a serviceable satellite will be able to provide additional value by integrating
new technology as it becomes available. By integrating technology earlier, the operator
believes that additional value will be generated versus waiting for the additional value to
be delivered by a new satellite design. Therefore, if the satellite operator believes that the
upgrade of new technology will deliver more value than a replacement satellite, the
operator will design a serviceable satellite.
However, the operator has other options. While an operator could seek additional
value through either new technology upgrades or new bus technology, the satellite
operator also has the option of doing both. The use of both new technologies would result
in a more powerful replacement satellite. This more powerful satellite could consist of
new satellite bus technology that would allow for more value generating payloads. At the
same time, the value generating payloads could be improved through the new technology
that was used in the satellite upgrades. To pursue this option, the satellite operator would
not have to design a serviceable satellite because this satellite would be a replacement.
For a customer to launch a more powerful replacement satellite, both the new technology
and new bus technology would need to be developed at, or before, the customer's
decision for replacement.
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The focus of this example is to determine when servicing provides more value than
the alternatives. If the satellite operator believes that upgrading will result in the greatest
value, the operator should design a serviceable satellite. If the operator believes that an
alternative approach is more valuable, the operator should not design a serviceable
satellite. The question that needs to be answered is under what circumstances should a
satellite operator design a serviceable satellite and under what circumstances should the
operator pursue a more valuable alternative.
It is assumed that the satellite operator has a good idea of the uncertainties associated
with the development of all new technology and the underlying satellite market. Once
again, the price associated with upgrading the serviceable satellite is unknown. The
purpose of this example is thus two-fold; 1) Determine the customer's range of servicing
price with respect to the upgrade of the serviceable satellite. 2) From the range of
servicing prices, determine the maximum servicing price below which a satellite operator
should initially design a serviceable satellite. The maximum servicing price is determined
by finding the servicing price below which a serviceable design provides the same value
as a non-serviceable design. The value of upgrading is the additional value over all other
customer options, not just the baseline. As a result, the servicing price at which the value
of OOS is zero once again represents the maximum servicing price below which an
operator would initially design a serviceable satellite.
5.1.1. Customer Need: Asset Augmentation
The example examines cases where a satellite operator seeks to generate additional
value by upgrading the satellite with new technology (unit-value increase). Competing
for the chance to deliver the most value is the operator's option to deploy additional
value-generating payloads (unit increase) in the form of a new satellite or the
development of a more powerful replacement satellite (unit-value and unit increase). All
options seek to increase the satellite operator's value and therefore constitute an asset
augmentation.
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Unlike the life extension case, the upgrade case requires that a satellite be designed
for servicing. The requirement of a serviceable satellite forces the satellite operator's
decision process from a one-part process, found in Chapter 4, to a two-part process. The
two-part decision process described in Chapter 2 can be found in Figure 2-3. This
decision tree illustrates the customer's two-part decision process consisting of: 1) the
decision to design for servicing or not and, 2) potential future operational decisions in
reaction to future uncertainties. It was assumed that a satellite operator would not be
given the opportunity to decommission a satellite due to fear of losing its entire market
user base. As a result, at any point in time, a customer's options are to do nothing, deploy
a new satellite (replacement or more powerful replacement), or service.
5.1.2. Objectives
Because a customer's future decisions can only be finalized in the future when market
uncertainty has been resolved, the purpose of the decision analysis is to determine how a
customer should initially design the satellite. On the one hand, the satellite operator will
not design a serviceable satellite when the upper branch of the decision tree provides
more value than the lower branch. On the other hand, the customer should design a
serviceable satellite when the lower branch provides more value than the upper branch.
By varying the only unknown for the satellite operator- the servicing price- one can
determine the customer's maximum service price by finding the tipping point between
the choice to design a serviceable design and a non-serviceable design. In addition to
determining how the operator should design the satellite, the example examines how a
satellite operator would choose to build a serviceable satellite based on the increase in
satellite capability provided by transponder upgrades, the volatility of the underlying
market, the risk associated with the service, the risk preference of the customer, and the
readiness of the upgrades.
101
5.2. Model Assumptions and Characteristics
5.2.1. Effect of Servicing
By upgrading the satellite, a satellite operator will have a direct impact on the
capability of the satellite. In the case of GEO communications, satellite capability is
generally measured by the satellite's communications capacity. The communications
capacity is a measure of the communications traffic, in Giga-bits per second, which a
given satellite can handle. Due to the long transmission distance, all communications
traffic that reaches a satellite must be amplified before being sent back to the ground. The
combination of equipment required to amplify communications traffic within a given
frequency range is commonly referred to as a transponder. This equipment includes the
high power amplifier (HPA) and filters at the input and output of the amplifier to isolate
the communications traffic. The frequency extent over which the transponder operates is
commonly referred to as the transponder's bandwidth (Atrexx, 2002). The more
transponders that a satellite incorporates, the more communications traffic the satellite
can handle and the more value that satellite delivers to its operator. To increase the value
of the satellite, upgrading seeks to increase the communications traffic that a given
transponder can handle.
In Chapter 4, a transponder was assumed to have a fixed revenue stream based
entirely on the market value. This example looks at changing the capability of these
transponders. As a result of the change in the capability of the transponders, the
assumptions in Chapter 4 are no longer valid. Thus, new capability and performance
metrics for transponders must be used.
5.2.2. Satellite Characteristics
Table 5-1 describes the characteristics for the initial satellite and potential new
satellites. The initial satellite is assumed to have a procurement cost of $150M, launch
costs of $1 OOM, a 15% insurance premium, and annual operations costs of 10% of the
initial operating costs. Operating costs were assumed to be 10% of procurement cost of
the satellite. Any new satellite is assumed to have the same cost parameters as the initial
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satellite. The cost penalty to design a serviceable satellite is assumed to be 20% of the
procurement cost.
Table 5-1:
Commercial GEO Communications Satellite Characteristics
Characteristic Value
Analysis Start Time (to) 2002
Analysis Stop Time (t) 2022
Planned Replacement, expected EOL for l' satellite 2012
Initial Satellite Procurement Cost $150M ($FY 2002), 10yr operational life
New Satellite Procurement Cost $150M ($FY 2002), 10yr operational life
Launch Cost, regardless of satellite $ 1OOM ($FY 2002)
Satellite Operating Cost 10% Satellite Cost ($15M/Yr)
Launch Risk 2%
Insurance (9INS) 15%
Inflation Rate ( 9 InNF) 2%
Internal Rate of Return (TIRR 8%
Interest Free Discount Rate (PIFR) 10 INF 9 IRR)
Mark Up for Serviceable Satellite - Pmarkup 20%6
Percent Small Terminals 25% (Bonds et al., 2000)
-(BS-dset al., 2000)
Percent Large Terminals 75% bo/netz
Ku-band Large Terminal Bit Rate 1.1 bps/Hertz (Bonds et al., 2000)
C-band Large Terminal Bit Rate 1.1 bps/Hertz (Bonds et al., 2000)
Ku-band Small Terminal Bit Rate 0.5 bps/Hertz (Bonds et al., 2000)
C-band Small Terminal Bit Rate 0.29 bps/Hertz (Bonds et al., 2000)
Satellite 1&2: 10 Year Contracts 40%, $58M annually ( 19 9 8 ) (Bonds et al., 2000)
Satellite 1&2: 1 Year Contracts 40%, $77M annually (1998) (Bonds et al.,20oo)
Satellite 1&2: 3 Month Contracts 5%, $154M annually (1998) (Bonds et al., 2000)
Satellite 1&2: 1 Month Contracts 5%, $274M annually (1998)(Bonds etal.,2 oo)
Published Interest Rate for Satellite Repayment 5%
Payments Per Year for Satellite Repayment 4
Amortization Period for Satellite Repayment 5 Years
Times Per Year Interest Is Calculated for Satellite Repayment 4
Transponder for Initial Satellite 25 C-band & 25 Ku-band (36Mhz)
Transponder for New satellite 35 C-band & 35 Ku-band (36Mhz)
5.2.3. Baseline Strategy
The baseline strategy is the design and operation of all satellites according to the
current industry practice. This includes the design of a non-serviceable satellite, operation
of that satellite for its entire operational life of ten years, and finally replacement of that
satellite when EOL has been reached. The replacement satellite that will replace the
initial satellite will be another non-serviceable satellite that will be operated until its
expected end-of-life.
6 No specific estimate of the cost of design for serviceability has been established. Carole Joppin suggests, in her Master's Thesis, that
the cost of designing for serviceability is approximately 10%. For the purpose of this study, a significant mark-up of 20% is used.
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5.2.4. Uncertainties
The asset augmentation scenario addresses three types of uncertainties. In addition to
uncertainty in the underlying market, future decisions incorporate new transponder
technology development uncertainties (potential unit-value increase) and new satellite
bus development uncertainties (potential unit increase). Advancement in new transponder
technology is assumed to increase the capability for each transponder onboard the
satellite, thus increasing customer value. Advancement in satellite bus technology is
assumed to increase the capacity of the satellite bus, allowing for additional transponders
on a new satellite. It is assumed that any new transponder technology can be applied to
any satellite on-orbit (given that is was designed for servicing), but that new bus
technology can only be applied to new satellites.
A technology freeze of three years beyond the launch date is assumed on all
technology. The technology freeze is meant to capture the assumption that regardless of
the customer's actions the customer cannot affect the design of any new technology. In
reality a customer can always speed up the development of new technology by increasing
spending, but this effect was not examined in this study. As a result of the technology
freeze, new technology will not be ready before the fourth operational year of the initial
satellite. However, the readiness date for any technology after the technology freeze is
uncertain. It is assumed that any technology ready after the first day of any given year
can be deployed at the start of the succeeding year, or a subsequent year. As a result, the
upgrade or replacement of the target satellite cannot occur until the fourth year of
operation. Furthermore, it is assumed that a decision maker will have to wait two years
between the decision to launch a new satellite and the deployment of that satellite in
order to account for development.
Uncertainties associated with the readiness of new technologies were modeled with
an exponential probability distribution (H.S.Ang and Tang, 1975). The mean recurrence
time for the readiness of new satellite bus technology was assumed to be five years. The
mean occurrence time of the new transponder technology will be varied in the analysis to
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see the differing effects of fast and slowly evolving technologies. Because each
uncertainty represents different sets of underlying circumstances in the customer's
decision analysis, the effects of the uncertainties were modeled using Monte Carlo
simulation. In all test cases, the simulation was run 200 times; the resulting range of
servicing prices were computed as the mean of the range of servicing prices in all the
simulations.
5.2.5. Market Uncertainty
In the GEO communications satellite case, the underlying market is described as the
selling price for an annual one Gigabit per second (Gbps) contract. The initial value of
the satellite's underlying market (X,) at the time of launch is computed by taking the
weighted average for the various forms of satellite communications contracts.
Commercial communications contracts typically exist in four forms: 1 month, 3 month, 1
year, and 10 year contracts. Each of these contracts has it own annual price. Historically
communications contracts are quoted as the annual price for 1 Gbps of capacity. Thus the
annual communications contract prices are based on market research, found in Table 5-1.
It was assumed that the total capacity of the satellite was distributed among the
various communications contracts in the following manner: roughly 40% to 10-year, 40%
to 1-year, 5% to 3-month, and 5% to 1-month. As a result of the distribution, the total
load per satellite was assumed to be 90%. The remaining 10% of the satellite capacity
was assumed to be held in reserve; therefore, this 10% provided no direct benefit to the
satellite operator. After the initial expected price for 1 Gbps of capacity was computed,
the underlying market was modeled as a log-normal binomial tree distribution. The
market was assumed to have a -4% annual drift rate and the market volatility was varied
so that the effect of market volatility on the customer's maximum servicing price could
be examined. Since the value is a function of the amount of traffic that a single
transponder can handle, all transponders on a given satellite were valued equally using a
fixed bandwidth of 36MHz.
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5.2.6. Time Horizon
Since there is potential for a more powerful satellite to be ready at any point in time
during the operational life of the initial satellite, there is a need to evaluate the full value
of this option on the same time scale as the other options. Chapter 3 discussed how
previous research failed to take into account the potential for more valuable options. Due
to the potential for higher valued future options, the capability is needed to compare the
higher value options with lower value options. One solution to the problem is to extend
the time horizon of the valuation to encompass both the operational life of the initial
satellite and the operational life of its planned replacement
5.2.7. Decision points
The following example assumes that the customer has two decisions to make: 1) the
decision to design a serviceable satellite and 2) the decision to service. Unlike the asset
restoration example, it is assumed that the customer has only one decision regarding
reaction to future uncertainty. The customer's initial decision to design a serviceable
satellite is assumed to take place at the time of launch (T0 ) and the operator's decision to
service will be varied between the earliest point in time that new technology is available,
year three, and the end of the initial satellite's operational life, year 10. By varying the
decision to service through the satellite's operational life, the effect that time has on the
customer's maximum service price can be examined.
5.2.8. Operational States
Because the operator's choice to decommission is not examined, the satellite has five
possible states of operation. These states of operation are: Normal Operation (Initial
Satellite), Normal Operation (Serviceable Satellite), Upgraded Operation, Normal
Operation (New Satellite), and Improved Operation (New Satellite).
* Normal Operation (Initial Satellite) - Normal operation of the initial satellite
follows the baseline strategy. The satellite is operated as normal, the value of the
satellite is unchanged and the only satellite costs are operational costs.
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e Normal Operation (Serviceable Satellite) - Normal operation of the serviceable
satellite is identical to that of the normal operation of the initial satellite, except
for one difference. The serviceable satellite has additional cost associated with
being designed for servicing.
" Upgraded Operation - The upgraded operational state is the state where the
satellite has been upgraded with new transponder technology. As a result, the
value of the satellite increases due to the increased capacity. To reach the
upgraded state, a satellite must be in the normal operation (serviceable satellite)
state and the satellite operator must spend the additional cost associated with
servicing.
* Normal Operation (New Satellite) - Normal operation of the new satellite follows
the same operational state as normal operation of the initial satellite except that
the new satellite has an increase in value due to the increase in the number of
transponders.
" Improved Operation (New Satellite) - Improved operation of the new satellite
follows the same operational state as normal operation of the new satellite except
that, in addition to the increase in value due to the increase in the number of
transponders, the improved satellite has an additional increase in value from the
incorporation of new transponder technology.
5.2.9. Risk
In the event that a servicer caused a satellite failure, the satellite operator would incur
a loss equal to the amount of the expected future revenue along with any remaining
repayment costs associated with the purchase of the satellite. Risk is therefore viewed as
a probabilistic reduction in value associated with the risk of servicer failure.
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5.2.10. Benefit Function
The benefit provided by both the initial satellite and any new satellites is based on the
satellite's total capacity. The capacity of any given satellite depends on the efficiency of
its transponders, the number of transponders, and the operational band of the
transponders. The incorporation of any new transponder technology on the satellite will
be represented by a unit-value increase in the efficiency of each transponder by a given
percent, AU. The development of new satellite bus technology will result in the new bus
being able to handle additional 10 C-Band and 10 Ku-band 36-Mhz equivalent
transponders.
The revenues generated by the customer's satellite are determined based on the
satellite's total capacity and the annual market price for 1 Gbps. Since each transponder
type has a different capacity, the satellite's total capacity is a combination of the number
of each type of transponder on the satellite (N), the bandwidth associated with each
transponder in Hertz (36MHz), and the efficiency (bps/Hz) over the frequency of each
transponder. Equation 5-1 describes the total capacity of the satellite.
Equation 5-1
Capacity(Gbits) = (N)K,1 (36MHz)KK (bps/Hz)K, + (N)c (36MHz)c (bps/Hz)c
The capacity for a particular transponder frequency is determined by the increase (if
any) in the transponder efficiency (AU), the percentage of small and large terminals the
transponder frequency serves (% TotalCapacity), and the efficiencies associated with
communicating with these terminals (bps/Hz). Table 5-1 lists the percentage of large and
small terminals and the associated data rate/Hz ratios used in this study. Based on other
research, satellite capacity (C and Ku-band) is distributed such that 25% went to small
terminals and 75% went to large terminals. The expected data rate capacity for a given
frequency range (C or Ku-band) is determined by the product of the bps rate/Hz ratio for
a particular ground station, the percentage of dedicated satellite capacity for that ground
station, and any increase in efficiency due to new transponder technology. After this
quantity is calculated for each type of ground terminal, the products are summed together
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to get an average data rate capacity for a given transponder (see Equation 5-2). Finally,
the annual benefit for any period of time is computed using Equation 5-3.
Equation 5-2
(bps / Hz), = (1+ AU)(%TotalCapacity) largex (bps / Hz) ,, + (1+ AU)(%TotalCapacity),sinallx (bps / Hz)
Equation 5-3
EB,7 = (Capacity)T (XiT)
5.2.11. Costs
Table 5-1 lists all of the associated costs for both initial and new satellites. The cost
associated with developing new transponder technology was assumed to be independent
of the customer, while the cost of developing new bus technology was assumed to be
factored into the cost of the new satellite. Operating costs were assumed to be 10% of
procurement cost of the satellite. The operating cost estimate in the life extension
example was based on revenue and pricing data obtained through interviews conducted
by McVey. For this example, revenues were calculated by a different method. It is
reasonable to conclude that the operating costs for a GEO communications satellite
would be similar in both cases. As a result, the annual operating cost was set at 10% of
the satellite cost, $15M annually. This estimate is similar to McVey's result. In the life
extension case, McVey's approach estimated the annual operating cost at about $15.5M.
The total initial procurement costs are given by Equation 5-4.
Equation 5-4
CoCseviceable = (1 + ,markup )( + 1 Ins )(Csatemiite + C Launch
CIOC,Non-Serviceable = (1 + 9 3Ins )(Satefite + CLaunch)
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Table 5-2 is a matrix of the switching costs for going between the operational states
of the satellite. It is assumed that a satellite will incur these costs when switching from
one operational state to another. Normal Operation (New Satellite) and Improved
Operation (New Satellite) have been removed from the first column of the matrix because
these two states can only be operational end states of the satellite.
Table 5-2:
Switching Costs between operational States of Generic GEO Communications Satellite
Normal Operation Upgraded Normal Operation Normal Operation Improved Operation
(Initial Satellite) Operation (New Satellite) (Serviceable Satellite) (New Satellite)
Normal Operation 0 Infinity Cost of Replacement Infinity Cost of Improved
(Initial Satellite) Replacement
Upgraded Infinity Infinity Cost of Replacement Cost of Replacement Cost of Improved
Operation Replacement
Normal Operation Infinity Servicing price Cost of Replacement 0 Cost of Improved
(Serviceable Replacement
Satellite)
5.2.12. Value Function
Because the target satellite is a commercial GEO communications satellite, it was
assumed that the satellite operator is a commercial entity. The value of upgrading for the
commercial satellite operator is the additional profit resulting from upgrading over the
next most beneficial strategy. The value function for the commercial satellite operator
that results from upgrading is:
Equation 5-5
E Tirs ,I L )IT1 =, EB r(Xi )rT"-
+ e-I" T -"- [p(E V j" (X +1)T )+ (I - pXEV n]( X ql)T)
-- (CoP )T- , -(Cwitch ) T
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5.2.13. Utility Function
The utility function was defined with respect to the potential total program value.
Utility was defined on an ordinal scale with a range of 0 to 1, with 1 representing the best
case for the customer and 0 representing the worst case. In terms of the possible program
values, the worst case was defined as a loss of $1B in revenue; conversely, the best case
scenario was defined as profits of $3B. A "risk-neutral" preference was associated with a
customer who based his decision on the expected value. Therefore, a risk neutral
customer has a linear utility curve of 0 to 1 over the range of -$1B to $3B. A "risk-
adverse" customer was defined to have a risk premium of $250M at a utility of 0.5 and a
"risk-seeking" customer was defined to have a risk preference of $250M at a utility of 0.5
(De Neufville, 1990). When determining the customer's optimal strategy, the customer's
value was converted into customer utility using the utility function. After the optimal
strategy was determined, the utility value was converted back into the expected value so
that the remainder of the decision process could continue. Equation 5-6 describes the
three different customer utility functions with respect to potential value.
Equation 5-6
UisNetak = (EVTK ±1000)/4000URisk-Neutral,Tk V K
U Risk AdverseT 1 .25 (EVTK -9000) 2 1 +.5625
RiskAdveseT K 16000000)
Uk_ =25 (EVT +7000) 1 -. 5625Risk-Prone,Tk T2 (V 16000000)-
Equation 5-7
U(EVs-l (X,) ... U(EVs (X,))( U(EV (X,))[-3 .- EVss*
UE.X)-- U(EVsl (X, ) U(EV X,[) (
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5.3. Sample Results
Figure 5-1 is a sample output from the commercial GEO communication satellite
augmentation analysis. In this case, the unit-value increase provided from new
transponder technology was assumed to increase the data rate/Hz ratio of a single
transponder by 50%. In reality, this value would be extremely high, but this value is used
to demonstrate its effect. The mean occurrence time for the readiness of the new
transponder technology was assumed to be one year. The volatility of the market was
assumed to be 20% (higher than one might expect- again used for effect), the risk
associated with the loss of the satellite due to servicing was assumed to be 5%, and the
decision maker was assumed to be risk neutral. In the event that a servicer caused a
satellite failure, the satellite operator would incur a loss equal to the amount of the
expected future revenues along with any remaining repayment costs associated with the
procurement of the satellite.
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Figure 5-1 is designed so that a decision maker can make a quick decision concerning
the choice to design for servicing. The x-axis represents the decision year beyond the
launch of the initial satellite. At each decision year, the customer can choose between the
available options, depending on how the satellite was initially designed. Therefore, a
decision maker who designed for servicing could choose to do nothing, replace,
decommission, or service the satellite (see the lower branch of Figure 2-3) at the decision
point. However, if the decision maker did not design for servicing, the option to service
would not be available to the customer (see the upper branch of Figure 2-3 ).
On the Y-axis, Figure 5-1 provides three distributions with respect to time; P(New
Sat), P(New Tech), and the servicing cost penalty (CPser). P(New tech) represents the
cumulative probability as a function of time for the readiness of the new transponder
technology. Because of the imposed technology freeze of three years and the uncertainty
about the readiness of the transponder technology, it cannot be known with absolute
certainty that the transponder technology will be ready in year three. For later decision
points, the probability of technology readiness increases and approaches certainty. Note
that the cumulative probability only describes the expected readiness of one generation of
technology. Additional generations of technology will be developed as time goes on, but
in this case only the development of one generation of technology was assumed. P(New
Sat), like P(New Tech), represents the cumulative probability as a function of time about
the readiness of the new satellite bus technology. Recall that satellite bus technology
allows the customer to incorporate additional transponders on future replacement
satellites. In this case a decision maker can expect that new transponder technology will
be ready before new bus technology. This is because of the assumption that the new
transponder technology development occurs at a faster rate (occurrence time of one-year),
than the bus technology (occurrence time of five years).
The distribution for the servicing cost penalty represents the mean change in relative
program cost for which the decision to service provides the customer with the greatest
expected value. The servicing cost penalty in each case was computed by determining the
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difference between the cost of the customer's baseline strategy7 and the cost of designing
an initial satellite to be serviced, along with any incurred cost resulting from the decision
to service, relative to the customer's baseline strategy (See Equation 5-8). The servicing
cost penalty is the fraction of the baseline costs that must be spent to pursue the optimal
servicing strategy. It was assumed that the cost penalty associated with designing a
serviceable satellite (PMark-Up), the cost of initial deployment (Csat), the satellite insurance
premium (9 INs), and the cost of operations (Cop) are all known. The cost associated with
developing new transponder technology was assumed to be independent of the customer,
while the cost of developing new bus technology was assumed to be factored into the cost
of the replacement satellite. The only remaining unknown cost in the servicing cost
penalty is the servicing price. Each value of the servicing cost penalty above the
minimum incurred cost (assumed costs where the servicing price is $0) is calculated by
varying the servicing price. Therefore, the distribution for the servicing cost penalty
describes the range of servicing prices below which the customer should initially design
the satellite for servicing.
Equation 5-8
CPr CServiceabi e Satellite + CServicing - CBaselineserc
Baseline
The purpose of examining the distribution is to determine whether a customer should
design the satellite for servicing, not whether the customer should service. If the cost of
servicing is such that the servicing cost penalty lies within the distribution, designing a
serviceable satellite is probabilistically the most valuable strategy for the customer. The
distribution then becomes a kind of "GO/No GO" gauge with respect to designing for
servicing: Go, if the expected servicing cost penalty is within the distribution; No Go,
otherwise. For example, in Figure 5-1 if the expected servicing cost penalty in year five
was 0.1, the customer should design the satellite to be serviced. Since the distribution
describes a range of acceptable servicing prices, the upper bound of the distribution
7 The baseline strategy is the decision not to design a serviceable satellite and to decide to do nothing when
faced with future operational decisions.
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represents the maximum servicing price a customer is willing to spend on servicing as a
function of the decision year. Recall that the maximum servicing price is the point where
the customer is indifferent to servicing versus the next best alternative strategy. From
Figure 5-1, the customer's mean maximum servicing price is estimated using the
following equation:
Equation 5-9
CSat (CPser - Mark-up (I + INS + Cop n e FR (t-t 0
L ~t=toServicePriceMa -eIFR tk -L0 o
where t is the expected end-of-life year of the satellite, to is the initial launch year, tk is
the decision year, and 91IFR is the customer's unique interest free rate.
Although the results in Figure 5-1 show that a feasible market exists if a customer
expects to service during years four through eight, these results are only one example of a
potential market. In fact, there are several design elements that can affect the feasibility
of OOS. The effect of these elements was examined by performing a sensitivity analysis
on their effect on the customer's maximum servicing price. The sensitivity of the
customer's maximum servicing price was examined by varying the following parameters:
transponder technology efficiency, market volatility, servicer risk, customer risk
preference, and the speed of new technology development. The remaining graphs in this
chapter display the maximum servicing cost penalty. A feasible servicing range exists for
all servicing prices below the maximum servicing cost penalty shown in the graphs.
5.3.1. Sensitivity to New Transponder Technology Improvement
Figure 5-2 shows the effect of varying the increase in the transponder efficiency on
the customer's maximum servicing price. The change in efficiency was varied from 10%,
30%, 50%, 70%, and 90%. Notice that an increase in efficiency of 10% (which is the
most likely increase in efficiency given today's technology growth) is not large enough to
create a feasible market. As the increase in efficiency from new transponder technology
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becomes greater, the range of servicing prices increases uniformly at all points in time.
This linearly increasing pattern is likely the result of the linear dependence of the
customer's value on the benefit generated by the satellite. In this case, the customer is a
commercial entity. For commercial companies, value is usually computed using the
classic function Profit = Revenue - Cost.
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Figure 5-2: Effect of Varying Increases in Transponder Efficiency
It is reasonable to assume that, if there is a high correlation between the increase in
performance and the benefit delivered by that increase, there will be a high correlation
between the increase in performance and the customer's maximum servicing price.
Therefore, to dramatically increase the customer's maximum servicing price, a customer
should focus on the upgrade of technologies that significantly increase the customer's
value. Since small increases in capability did not create a feasible market, servicing only
makes sense when significant increases in the capability of the satellite are present.
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5.3.2. Sensitivity to Market Volatility
Figure 5-3 shows the effect of varying the underlying market volatility on the
customer's change in relative program costs. The annual change in market volatility was
varied in 15% increments between 15%, 30%, 45%, 60% and 75%. Figure 5-4 shows that
the maximum servicing price for all the volatilities remains about the same for earlier
decision points in the satellite's operational life. However, highly volatile markets
quickly become less attractive as a customer waits until later decision points. The
decrease in the maximum servicing price for later decision points occurs because highly
volatile markets have the potential for greater value. Recall that the most valuable option
for a customer in this example is to replace the satellite with a satellite incorporating new
transponder technology and new bus technology. The ability to deliver greater value
through replacement is what drives down the price at which a customer is indifferent to
servicing versus replacement. Therefore, there is a point at which a market can be too
volatile to make servicing an attractive option.
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Figure 5-3: Effect of Varying Market Volatility
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5.3.3. Sensitivity to Servicer Risk
Figure 5-4 shows the effect of varying the servicer risk on the customer's maximum
servicing price. The service risk was varied from 0%, 5%, 10%, and 15%. In determining
the value that OOS delivers to the customer, risk was assumed to be the chance that a
satellite would be destroyed due to servicing and therefore represented as a probabilistic
reduction in value. The analysis did not take into account the fact that a service failure
could result in a partial failure of the satellite, thus only reducing the value of the satellite.
The benefit of determining the effect servicer risk has on customer value is that a service
provider can determine an appropriate level of risk associated with the servicer design
while still providing value to the satellite operator.
In this particular case, a servicer risk of 15% is too high to create a feasible OOS
market. Notice that as the servicer risk is increased, the range of potential servicing prices
decreases fairly uniformly with respect to time. This effect is due to the assumption that
risk is a probabilistic reduction in value. However, the magnitudes of the change between
the different maximum servicing prices do not change linearly with the different levels of
servicer risk. For example, the difference between the maximum servicing price between
the 0% servicer risk and 5% servicer risk cases is not the same as the difference between
the 5% servicer risk and 10% servicer risk cases. It is suspected that the cause of this
relationship is related to the risk preference of the customer. In particular, in this case the
decision-maker was assumed to be "risk-neutral". Therefore, as the servicing risk
increased, a decision maker would choose to service less often, thus the expected value of
the option decreases. If a decision-maker is portrayed using another form of risk-
preference, for instance" risk-prone", the differences in value between different levels of
service risk would differ from that of a "risk-neutral" decision-maker. Regardless of the
true cause of this effect, the more risky the servicer, the less value it delivers to the
satellite operator, and therefore the lower the maximum servicing price.
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5.3.4. Sensitivity to Customer Risk Preference
Figure 5-5 shows the effect of varying the customer's risk preference on the
maximum servicing price. The customer's risk preference was varied between a "risk-
adverse", "risk-neutral", and "risk-seeking" decision maker. (De Neufville, 1990) Utility
theory was used to determine how risk preference would affect a customer's decision
making.
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Figure 5-5: Effect of Varying Customer Risk Preference
From Figure 5-5, the distribution of the maximum servicing price is almost identical
for a "risk-adverse" and a "risk-neutral" decision maker. However, the maximum
servicing price for a "risk-seeking" decision maker is dramatically different. This
dramatic difference is due to "risk-seeking" nature of the customer. "Risk-seeking"
customers generally choose options that are probably less profitable, but have the chance
of substantial rewards. Simply put, "risk-seeking" decision makers want to take risks. As
was seen with the higher volatility example, the potential for greater rewards with
servicing exists during the earlier part of the decision period. By waiting until later
decisions points, a "risk-seeking" customer would tend towards more profitable actions
such as replacement. As a result, "risk-seeking" customers are likely to choose to service
earlier rather than later because earlier service events have the potential of greater long-
term rewards. By varying the customer risk preference, it was discovered that "risk-
adverse" and "risk-neutral" decision-makers have very similar maximum servicing
prices. Thus, the "risk-adverse" decision maker in today's satellite industry should not be
adverse to the idea of satellite servicing.
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5.3.5. Sensitivity to Technology Readiness
Figure 5-6 shows the effect of varying the mean recurrence time of new transponder
technology on the customer's maximum servicing price. The mean technology recurrence
time was varied between one year, three years, and five years. From Figure 5-7, the faster
the new transponder technology is expected to be ready, the more potential value it
delivers to the customer. But, the benefit of fast evolving technologies dies out the longer
a decision maker waits to implement the technology. Thus, OOS can provide value to the
customer by allowing for the integration of fast evolving technologies earlier than could
be accomplished with current satellite designs. Joppin comes to the same conclusion
about fast evolving technologies in a study concerning the upgrade of the Hubble Space
Telescope. The study discusses how the upgrade of multiple fast-evolving technologies
leads to a significant increase in value (Joppin and Hastings, 2004).
Although fast evolving technologies have the potential to deliver greater value, the
decision to upgrade technology must be acted on earlier rather than later if maximum
value is to be attained. As a customer waits until later decision points, the difference in
the value that fast-evolving technologies provide over slowly-evolving technologies
decreases. The longer it takes a decision maker to act, the less valuable the benefit of fast-
evolving technologies. The relationship between fast- and slowly-evolving technologies
provides proof of the generalized notion that OOS provides value to the customer by
allowing the customer to integrate new technologies into a system earlier than could be
achieved through conventional satellite design.
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Figure 5-6: Effect of Varying Technology Readiness Time
5.4. Conclusions
The objective of this commercial satellite technology upgrade example was to
determine the customer's maximum servicing price and to characterize the elements of a
serviceable market. It was demonstrated that the customer's maximum servicing price
depends on a number of the variables. The most significant variable that affects the
customer's maximum service price is the increase in capabilities due to the incorporation
of new transponder technology. Regardless of other factors in the model, if the increase
in satellite capability from servicing is not significant enough, OOS for the purpose of
asset augmentation seldom makes sense.
Examination of the effect of market volatility demonstrated that highly volatile
markets do not make the best OOS markets. Highly volatile markets also make later
decisions to service less valuable, thus earlier decisions to service make greater sense in
all ranges of volatile markets. Servicer risk was found to have a uniform
increasing/decreasing effect over the decision period making less risky servicing missions
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more feasible, as would be expected. With regard to customer risk perception, it was
found that feasible OOS markets exist for customers who follow a "risk-adverse" or
"risk-neutral" stance. "Risk-seeking" decision makers prefer potentially more valuable
alternative actions such as replacement. Finally, when compared to slowly-evolving
technologies, it was also found that fast-evolving technologies provide greater value to
the customer the earlier the decision to service is made.
Through the examination of the asset augmentation case, it was found that satellite
upgrades can provide additional value over traditional satellites designs. Based on this
result, it might be concluded that the current design approach is not the best approach for
maximizing value. However, this statement only holds true for a small range of servicing
prices. For higher servicing prices, the design for servicing does not make sense and
alternative options such as satellite replacement result in greater customer value. Thus,
designing for a serviceable satellite is the best decision for the customer when the price of
servicing remains low; in cases when the servicing price is high, a customer should
design the satellite according to traditional methods. Chapter 6 examines the same effects
on the maximum servicing price for the case of a customer who is a non-commercial
entity.
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Chapter 6. Example: Asset Augmentation -
Non-Commercial Customer
Up to this point, the focus of this thesis has been on the servicing of commercial
satellites. However, the use of space stretches far beyond that of commercial customers.
While an initial OOS market may focus on servicing commercial satellites, a large
majority of satellites do not derive direct monetary benefits for their operators. This does
not mean that servicing cannot provide non-commercial customers with value. In fact,
non-commercial customers may be the most likely candidates for servicing.
To determine if OOS is feasible for non-commercial customers, a service provider
must be able to determine the non-monetary value servicing provides. One of the benefits
of the evaluation methods discussed in Chapter 3 is its ability to determine value for
satellite operators whether they are commercial or non-commercial. Recall that the value
function for an operator is a function of many elements, which include the benefit
provided by the satellite and the costs associated with the satellite. Thus the value for a
non-commercial satellite operator is a function of benefits and cost. Therefore, by
determining the costs associated with the satellites and the benefits created by the
satellite, one can determine the value of servicing for a non-commercial satellite operator.
This chapter examines another augmentation example, but focuses on the case where
the satellite operator is not a commercial entity. It is likely that the characteristics of a
feasible markets found in Chapter 5 are not unique to the commercial case. This chapter
examines this hypothesis, determines the characteristics of the non-commercial case, and
compares these characteristics to the characteristics of the commercial case. Once
completed, the results of this chapter and the previous chapter should provide a general
set of characteristics that will aid in defining a feasible asset augmentation scenario. To
determine the characteristics of the non-commercial case, this chapter examines the
maximum servicing price that is associated with the upgrade of the GOES weather
satellites.
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6.1. Presentation and Objectives
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) uses GEO
observation satellites to predict and observe weather formations over the United States.
The GOES satellites provide a constant vigil for the atmospheric "triggers" for severe
weather conditions such as tornadoes, flash floods, hail storms, and hurricanes. When
these conditions develop, the GOES satellites are able to monitor storm development and
track its movement. In addition, other sensors onboard the GOES satellites are able to
detect temperature variations across the United States. With the measurement of the
temperature variations, NOAA is able to accurately create short-term temperature
forecasts (NOAA-GOES). However, the limitations of the benefits provided by these
sensors onboard the GOES satellites, have yet to be reached. As improvements in sensor
design are developed, better monitoring of severe weather and more accurate temperature
forecasts are possible. It has been suggested that improvements in the capabilities of the
GOES satellites could lead to substantial improvements in daily commerce throughout
the United States.
In response to the potential improvements to commerce provided by weather
prediction, NOAA is planning the development of its next generation of weather
satellites, the GOES-R series, which should be deployed starting in 2012. The key
instruments in this new series of satellites are the Hyperspectral Environmental Sounder
(HES) and the Advance Baseline Imager (ABI). The HES is expected to provide
substantial improvements in the prediction of convective weather, such as thunder
storms. The combination of the ABI and HES is expected to lead to an overall reduction
in the variance and error in short term (3-hr) temperature forecasts throughout the United
States.
Based on the procurement process of the U.S government, NOAA purchases its
satellites in series. Each satellite in a series is essentially identical to all other satellites in
that series. Thus, the value provided by each satellite in a series is unchanged. The only
way to increase the value provide by a satellite is to procure a new series of satellites.
125
But, as new technologies are developed, greater value could be delivered to NOAA if a
serviceable satellite was procured instead of a series of satellites. The increase in
capability (unit-value increase) provided by the new instruments is described in a NOAA
cost benefit analysis study and is fixed. It was assumed that only one HES and one ABI
are needed on a target satellite or replacement satellite. The purpose of this example is to
determine the additional value provided to NOAA by the early deployment of the ABI
and HES through upgrades instead of waiting until the deployment of the GOES-R series.
6.1.1. Objective
If NOAA adopted a serviceable satellite design over the traditional satellite design,
NOAA would have been able to deploy the new ABI and HES as the instruments become
available instead of waiting until the next procurement period. Early deployment of the
ABI and HES would have allowed for better weather prediction capabilities earlier,
which would have provided benefit to the public earlier than would have been
accomplished with the current deployment approach. Thus, the purpose of this example is
the following:
e Determine the range of servicing prices below which NOAA would have chosen
to upgrade the GOES satellites (assuming that the satellites were designed to be
serviced).
" Based on the range of the servicing prices, determine the maximum servicing
price below which NOAA would have originally designed the current series of
GOES satellites to be serviceable.
e Through sensitivity analysis, determine the characteristics of the feasible non-
commercial asset augmentation.
" Compare the characteristics of a feasible OOS market found in the commercial
service case with those found in the non-commercial case. Determine the
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differences, if any, between commercial and non-commercial OOS and make
general conclusions about the feasibility of asset augmentation.
6.2. Model Assumption and Characteristics
The GOES satellite system consists of two operational satellites at any given point in
time. In order to provide constant observation of the continental United States, one
satellite is positioned over the East coast and one satellite is positioned over the West
coast. The current deployment process for satellite systems requires that the satellite have
an operational life of about five years. As a result, every four years a new satellite is
deployed in order to replace an older satellite. The deployment of these satellites is
staggered by three years and alternates between the East and West coast locations. When
the new GOES-R series of satellites are developed, NOAA anticipates that these satellites
will have a longer lifetime. The deployment of the new series will shift from once every
three years to once every five to seven years. See Figure 6-1 for NOAA's planned launch
and deployment process. See Table 6-1 for definition and values of terms used in this
example.
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Figure 6-1: Procurement and Launch Schedule for the GOES Satellites (GAO, 2000)
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Table 6-1: GOES Satellite Characteristics
Characteristic Value
Start Time 2002
Stop Time 2028
GOES R/Replacement satellite cost $90M (FY 2002), 7yr expected life, except for the 1st
GOES-R
GOES - R Planned Launch 2012
GOES -R Instruments (HES and ABI) $157.522M (NOAA, 2005)
GOES N & 0 Satellites $123.5M each (FY 2002),5yr expected life (NOAA,99)
GOES P $101.5M (FY 1998), 5yr expected life(NAA 198)
GOES Q $94.8M (FY 1998), 5yr expected life(NOAA, 1998)
GOES N Launch Date 4/2002 (GOES, 1998)
GOES 0 Launch Date 4/2005 (GOES, 1998)
GOES P Launch Date 4/2007 (GOES, 1998)
GOES Q Launch Date 4/2010 (GOES, 1998)
Launch Costs $105.6M (FY 2002)
Total Airline Delays due to Weather (TDw) Underlying Market
Airline Delays due to Convective weather (PDcwx) 50% (NOAA/DOC, 2002)
Percentage delays impacting U.S carriers (PDus) 75% (NOAAIDOC, 2002)
Percentage delays avoided due to reduced watch area 20% (NOAA/DOC, 2002)
(PDRWA) _____DOC,_2002)
Percentage of delays avoided due to advance sounder 50% (NOAA/DOC,2002)
(PDAS)
Average delay time 3/4 hr (NOAA/DOC, 2002)
Weighted average operations cost $3,055 / hr (FY 2002) (NOAA/DOC, 2002)
Value of passenger time $30.44 / hr (FY 2002) (NOAA/DOC, 2002)
Average number of commercial passenger per flight 115 (NOAA/DOC, 2002)
Cost per % delay (CPD) $2291 (NOAA/DOC, 2002)
Temperature forecast error -Percent of load forecast 40% (NOAA/DOC, 2002)
error (TFERR)
Temperature error reduction for 3-hr forecasts (ERED) 25% (NOAA/DOC, 2002)
Average load forecast error (ETOT) 2.6% (NOAA/DOc, 2002)
Total Production (TPROD) [MWH] 3,413,000,000 (NOAA/DOC, 2002)
Cost of Service per MWH (CSER) Underlying Market
6.2.1. Baseline Strategy
The baseline strategy is defined by the 1997 GOES procurement plan. The first
satellite, GOES-N, was launched in 2002, followed by GOES-O in 2005, GOES-P in
2007, and GOES-Q in 2010. The new GOES-R series, with the new ABI and HES, will
begin deployment in 2012. The next series of GOES satellites is not anticipated until
some time after 2028.
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6.2.2. Uncertainties
The model looked at five future uncertainties. The first uncertainty is market
uncertainty. Because the model examines the benefits of two industries, two market
uncertainties must be developed. The third uncertainty is the uncertainty about the
development of the new GOES-R series of satellites. Due the nature of the design of the
GOES satellites, only one ABI and one HES will be required on a given satellite. As a
result, there is no ability to increase satellite performance by a unit-increase, as was seen
in the GEO communications example. The only benefit of the new GOES-R satellite is a
reduction in satellite cost. The final two uncertainties in the model deal with the
uncertainty around the readiness of the ABI and HES instruments.
As in Chapter 5, it was assumed that the readiness of the HES is independent of the
readiness of the ABI and that the customer cannot effect the development of either
technology. As before, the probability associated with the readiness of both technologies
was modeled with an exponential distribution. A technology freeze of three years was
assumed, thereby delaying any decision to upgrade until the fourth operational year.
6.2.3. Market Uncertainties
In the first two examples, customer value was a function of the uncertainty in a single
underlying market. In this example, there are two underlying markets, which represent
the two beneficiaries of the satellites: the airline industry and the electric companies. A
pseudo-market of airline delays due to convective weather was modeled after historical
data obtained from the U.S. Department of Transportation. (DOT Stats) The market for
airline delays was modeled as a log-normal binomial tree distribution; thus the number of
airline delays was bounded between zero and infinity. While a zero or infinite number of
airline delays is not realistic, these values for the number of airline delays are not outside
of the realm of possibility. One additional benefit of using the log-normal distribution is
that it is consistent with the expectation that the difficultly in achieving an incremental
reduction in airline delays will increase as the number of airline delays decreases; thus
the chance of eliminating all airline delays due to convective weather is extremely small.
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The initial market value was assumed to have 113,000 delays per year, an annual market
drift of 0%, and annual market volatility of 25%.
For the electricity market, the market was modeled as the change in price for a Mega-
watt hour (MWhr) of electricity. The uncertainty was modeled using historical data from
the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE Stats). Again, the market was modeled using a log-
normal binomial tree distribution because the log-normal distribution provides a realistic
estimate for the change in price of a commercial investment. The initial market price for a
Mega-Watt Hr of electricity was set at $41.3/MWhr, the drift in the price was set at 0%
per year, and the volatility in the price was 2.5% per year. Finally, a constant demand of
3,413,000,000 MWhr/yr of electricity was assumed over the operational life of the
satellite.
6.2.4. Time Horizon
The time horizon was set at the time of the expected development of the replacement
series of satellites for the GOES-R series; i.e. the end-of-life of the fourth GOES-R
satellite (2028). Because deployment strategies can vary over a fixed time horizon, any
additional satellites, other than the planned satellites, that are needed to fill any remaining
time in the time horizon were modeled after the fourth GOES-R satellite. Thus, if a
strategy calls for the early deployment of the GOES-R series in 2008, the expected end of
life of the fourth GOES-R satellite would be 2024. Under these conditions the time
horizon would be filled with the deployment of a fifth R-Series satellite, which would be
modeled after the fourth GOES-R satellite.
6.2.5. Decision Points
The decision points were chosen in the same way as they were for the commercial
augmentation example. A satellite operator is given a single choice to service. The choice
is varied annually between the earliest readiness of the ABI and HES (year four of the
analysis period) and ends at the planned deployment of the GOES-R series of satellites
(2012). The decision point for the GOES augmentation case are therefore 2006, 2007,
2008 ... 2011.
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6.2.6. Operational States
The operational states of the GOES system are similar to that of the GEO
communications example with one exception. In the case of the GOES system, a satellite
operator has the choice of either an ABI upgrade or an HES and ABI upgrade. The
GOES-R series does not allow for an additional imaging instrument; therefore, the option
for the launch of a more powerful satellite that was seen in the GEO communications
example is not an option in the current example. The states of the system therefore reflect
only the possible upgraded states of the satellite or the replacement of the system with the
GOES-R series. The operational states of the GOES system are: Normal Operation
(GOES-N), Normal Operation (Serviceable GOES-N), Upgraded Operation (ABI),
Upgraded Operation (ABI & HES), and Replacement Operation (GOES-R).
" Normal Operation (GOES-N) - Normal operation of the initial GOES-N series
satellite follows the baseline strategy. The satellite is operated as normal, the
additional value provided by the satellite is zero and the only satellite costs are the
operational costs.
e Normal Operation (Serviceable GOES-N) - Normal operation of a serviceable
GOES-N satellite is identical to that of the normal operation of the initial GOES-
N, except for one difference. The serviceable GOES-N satellite has the additional
initial development cost associated with the serviceable satellite design.
" Upgraded Operation (ABI) - The upgraded ABI operational state is the state
where the serviceable GOES-N satellite has been upgraded with the new ABI
instrument. As a result, the additional value of the satellite is the savings that
occurs from only the ABI. The ABI creates savings for the Airline industry due to
the decrease in convective weather delays. In order to reach the upgraded ABI
state, a satellite must be in the Normal Operation (serviceable GOES-N) state and
the satellite operator must spend the additional cost associated with servicing and
procurement of the ABI imager.
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* Upgraded Operation (ABI & HES) - The upgrade ABI & HES operational state is
the state where the serviceable GOES-N satellite has been upgraded with the new
ABI and HES instruments. As a result, the additional value of the satellite is the
savings that occurs from both the ABI and HES. In addition to the savings for the
airlines generated by the ABI, the HES provides savings to the electricity industry
due to the decrease in overproduction of electricity. In order to reach the upgraded
ABI & HES state, a satellite must be in either the "Normal Operation (serviceable
GOES-N)" state or the "Upgraded Operation (ABI)" state. To enter the
"Upgraded Operation (ABI & HES)", the satellite operator must spend the
additional cost associated with servicing and procurement of the either just the
HES or the ABI & HES.
" Replacement Operation (GOES-R) - Replacement operation of the GOES-R series
satellite follows the normal operation of the GOES-N satellites except that the
GOES-R series has the additional value provided by the savings created by the
new ABI and HES instruments along with the reduced cost of satellite
deployment. To switch to this operational state, the satellite can be in any one of
the other operational states. The operator must spend the cost associated with
procurement as well as the cost of development of the new instruments.
6.2.7. Risk
In the event that a servicer caused a satellite failure, the satellite operator would incur
a loss equal to the amount of the expected future savings. Once again risk is viewed as a
probabilistic reduction in value associated with the risk of satellite failure.
6.2.8. Benefit Function
In a cost benefit analysis developed for the Department of Commerce, NOAA experts
state that the new GOES instruments will provide benefit to at least eight areas of
industry. The two areas that this study addresses are the aviation industry and the electric
power industry. Everyday the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the airlines
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collaborate to set and modify flight plans to ensure that flights depart and arrive on
schedule. Severe weather proves to be the major deterrent to maintaining the airline
schedules. Today, the best available weather forecasting product, the collaborative
convective forecast product, shows a large box within which storms have a probability of
occurring. This box typically comprises an area of about 10,000 to 30,000 square miles.
According to industry and scientific experts, the GOES HES will provide forecasting that
can predict convective weather one to two hours in advance. The result of this
improvement will be a significant reduction in the severe weather watch area that results
in savings for the airline industry (NOAA/DOC, 2002). The costs savings that could be
provided to the airline industry due to augmenting the current GOES satellite with the
new HES is described by Equation 6-1.
Equation 6- 1 (NOAA/DOC, 2002)
Savingssr1 11e = (TDW XPDCWX XPDus XPDR WA XPDAs XCPD)
Another beneficiary of the GOES instrument upgrades is the electric power industry.
Electricity cannot be economically stored and production is essentially consumed
instantaneously. Power fluctuations throughout the day in response to temperature
changes create power demands that often require last minute decisions to buy or sell
power and/or start expensive gas-fired "peaking units." Operators typically recompute
load productions every two-hours around the clock using updated weather forecasts. With
huge amounts of electricity being produced each day, electric utility companies have a
great desire to reduce the over production of electricity. Currently, electric utility load
forecasts are off by approximately 2.6 percent on average. Experts predict that the
implementation of the GOES HES and ABI will decrease power production error by 0.26
percent, reducing the total average error in power production to 2.34% (NOAA/DOC,
2002). The resulting cost savings for the electric power industry as a result of
augmenting the current GEOS satellites with a new HES and ABI is described by
Equation 6-2.
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Equation 6-2 (NOAAIDOC, 2002)
Savingsp0oe = (TFERpJ XERED XETOT XTPROD XCSER)
The total benefit provided by augmenting the GOES satellite with new payloads
includes the savings for both the airline and electric power industries. However, the costs
savings for the industries are separate from the costs associated with the GOES satellites.
It was assumed that because NOAA is a government agency that its purpose was to
support the U.S. public. Thus, the relationship between the cost savings for industry and
the cost of the GOES satellites was assumed to be 1:1. As a result of this assumption, the
value delivered from the upgrades is the sum of the cost savings from the airline and
electric power industries less the cost of operation, development, and servicing of the
GOES satellite system.
Equation 6-3
EBTK = SavingsPwe + Savingsjijlie
6.2.9. Costs
The matrix for the switching costs between operational states of the system is given
below in Table 6-2. Normal Operation (GOES-R) was not included in the first column of
the matrix because this state only represents an end-state of the system. The annual
operating costs were assumed to be 10% of the procurement cost of the satellite.
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Table 6-2: Switching Cost between the Operational States of the GOES System
Normal Normal Operation Upgraded Upgraded Replacement
Operation (Serviceable GOES-N) Operation Operation Operation
(GOES-N) (ABI) (ABI & HES) (GOES-R)
Normal Operation 0 Infinity Infinity Infinity Cost of GOES-R
(GOES-N)
Normal Operation Infinity o Servicing Price Servicing Price Cost of GOES-R
(Serviceable GOES-N) + price of ABI + price of
ABI and HES
Upgraded Operation Infinity Infinity 0 Servicing Price Cost of GOES-R
(ABI) + price of HES
Upgraded Operation Infinity Infinity Infinity 0 Cost of GOES-R
(ABI_& HES) I I I_1_1
6.2.10. Value Function
In this example, the value delivered from the upgrades is the sum of the cost savings
from the airline and electric power industries less the cost of operation, development, and
servicing of the GOES satellite system. The equation for the expected value at any point
in time is therefore:
Equation 6-4
EVSi Sf EBsl (.T[ T,Tn ] [_jL T,T ] Xi T,_,
+e IRI (T -T- ) [p(Evng (XS ) )+ (1 - p)(EVj " n1 (X _)
-(CoP)T ,Tn] - (Cswitch )T_
6.2.11. Utility Function
Developing a utility function for the decision-maker (NOAA) is difficult because the
decision-maker is not the benefactor of the servicing. NOAA provides the resources and
capital investment that delivers the weather prediction capability and the airline industry
and power production industry reap the benefits. Based on the division of the benefits and
costs between three different entities, it was assumed that NOAA would expect that, for
each dollar it spends, at least one dollar will be delivered to the benefactor of the weather
system. Based on this assumption, the utility function for NOAA was modeled using a
"risk-neutral" (expected value) risk preference. There may be some debate about this
assumption, but it was not the intention of this thesis to suggest how the U.S government
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should evaluate its expenses. The "risk-neutral" utility function assumption allows for the
effect of the decision-maker's risk preference to be removed from the calculation of value
(i.e. the customer's utility function (U) is simply a scalar multiplier), thus it does not
change the customer's perception of risk and rewards.
6.3. Sample Results
Figure 6-2 illustrates the results for one feasible case of servicing the GOES system.
In the GOES case, the customer has the potential for two upgrades; the sounder or the
sounder and imager. The servicing cost penalty below which the two upgrades provide
the most value to the customer can be determined from Figure 6-2. The lighter shaded
region represents the feasible range of servicing prices for the combination of the imager
and sounder upgrade. The darker shaded region represents the range of servicing prices
for only the sounder upgrade. The servicing cost penalty represents the difference in
program costs between the serviceable strategy and the current GOES procurement and
development strategy. P(HES) represents the cumulative probability of the readiness of
the HES, and P(ABI) represents the cumulative probability of the readiness of the ABI.
P(New Sat) represents the cumulative probability about the readiness of the GOES-R
series. Note that, while the new series of satellites cannot include additional value-
generating units, the GOES-R series is are expected to cost less to develop. Therefore, it
is assumed that the development of new satellite bus technology is used to reduce the cost
of satellite procurement.
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Figure 6-2: Sample GOES Results
The extent of the feasible servicing region in Figure 6-2 indicates that the
combination of the imager and sounder upgrade provides significantly more value to the
customer than the sounder upgrade alone. The reason for this large difference is that the
combination upgrade creates benefits for both the airline and electricity markets, while
the sounder upgrade only provides savings to the airline industry. The sensitivity of these
results to changes in the model parameters was examined to determine if the sensitivities
of the non-commercial satellite example are the same as those found for the commercial
satellite example.
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6.3.1. Sensitivity to New Technology Improvement
Since only a single data point for the benefits of the new sounder and imager could be
found, there was not enough data to predict the effect that varying levels of technology
improvement would have on the customer's maximum servicing price.
6.3.2. Sensitivity to Airline Volatility
Figure 6-3 shows the results of varying the volatility associated with airline delays.
The volatility of the airline market was varied in 15% increments between 15%, 30%,
45%, 60% and 75%. The volatility of the electricity market was fixed at the historical
value of 2.5%. From the airline sensitivity analysis, there is no change in the customer's
maximum servicing price for either upgrade. The results for the different volatility values
are so similar that they cannot be distinguished on the graph. The lack of any change due
to varying market volatility is the result of the overwhelming savings provided by the
combination upgrade. The combination upgrade contains the savings for both the airline
and electricity market. Therefore, the option for the combination upgrade will always
provide more value over the option for only the sounder upgrade regardless of the level
of volatility in the airline market. Thus, when multiple forms of augmentation exist, a
customer should focus his decision to service on upgrades that are not common among
multiple augmentations options.
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Figure 6-3: Varying Airline Volatility
6.3.3. Sensitivity to Electricity Volatility
Figure 6-4 shows the results of varying the volatility of electricity prices on the
maximum servicing price. Although the electricity market has a historically low volatility
of 2.5%, the volatility of the electricity market was varied to examine its effect on the
customer's maximum servicing price. The volatility of electricity prices was varied
between 10%, 30%, 50%, and 70%. The volatility of the pseudo-airline market was fixed
at the historical value of 25%.
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Figure 6-4: Varying Electricity Volatility
From the sensitivity analysis around the price of electricity, there appears to be
significant change in the customer's maximum servicing price. It is apparent that, as the
volatility in the price of electricity increases, the customer has the potential to gain more
value, making highly volatile markets more favorable. This appears to be in direct
contradiction with the finding for the previous examples that highly volatile markets are
not favorable servicing markets. In the commercial satellite upgrade example, a highly
volatile market made it more attractive to pursue more valuable strategies, thus
decreasing the attraction of servicing. In this case, however, the customer is fixed to only
unit-value increases. Due to the constraints on the design, the customer is prevented from
putting up more value-generating units. The result is that servicing will always be the
most beneficial option because it allows for the earlier deployment of new technology.
Thus, servicing makes sense in highly volatile markets when the option to service always
provides more value over alternative options. Therefore, in situations where a customer
only has the option to service (i.e. replacement is not an option) or replacement would not
result in a more capable satellite, servicing will be the best choice for the decision maker
no matter the volatility of the market. This finding supports past work that has shown that
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the more volatile the market, the more value servicing delivers to the customer
(Lamassoure, 2001), (Saleh, 2002).
6.3.4. Sensitivity to Servicer Risk
Figure 6-5 shows the results of varying the risk of failure associated with servicing.
As before, the servicer risk was varied between 0%, 5%, 10%, and 15%. From the
sensitivity analysis for the servicer risk, the same behavior is seen as was seen in the
commercial satellite upgrade example. When the servicer risk is increased, the
customer's maximum servicing price decreases fairly uniformly with respect to time, thus
making servicing less attractive.
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Figure 6-5: Varying Servicer Risk
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6.3.5. Sensitivity to Risk Preference
Since the decision maker and the benefactor are different entities in the GOES
satellite example, it is assumed that a decision maker will make the servicing decision on
a risk-neutral (expected value) basis. No assumption about the decision process of a
government agency is made with regard to its effect on commerce. As a result, risk-
preference evaluation was not performed.
6.3.6. Sensitivity to Expected Availability of Sounder
The unique nature of the GOES case is the option to perform one or two upgrades.
However, the ability to perform these upgrades depends on the availability of new
technologies. In the case of servicing the airline market, the only required technology is
the sounder. However to serve the electricity market, both the imager and sounder must
be developed. The interplay between the uncertainties of these two technologies produces
some interesting results.
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Figure 6-6: Varying Expected Availability of Sounder
Figure 6-6 shows the result of a sensitivity analysis around the readiness of the new
sounder technology. In this case, the mean availability of the imager was fixed at one
year, while the mean availability of the sounder was varied between one, three, and five
years. As can be seen, the longer it takes for the sounder to be developed, the lower the
expected value for both levels of upgrade. The reason for this effect is that neither form
of servicing can take place without the development of the HES. The longer the HES
takes to develop, the longer one has to wait for the development of this payload and the
lower the cost savings for the airline and electric power industries. Therefore,
technologies that play essential roles in multiple forms of servicing become a potential
bottle-neck in the upgrade of the customer's satellite. To increase the likelihood of
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servicing, emphasis should be placed on reducing any uncertainty in the development of
payloads that are essential to multiple forms of upgrade.
6.3.7. Sensitivity to Expected Availability of the Imager
Figure 6-7 summarizes the results for the sensitivity analysis of the readiness of the
imager. Here the mean availability of the sounder was fixed at one year, while the mean
availability for the imager was varied between one, three, and five years. The figure
indicates that, the longer the imager takes to develop, the less valuable the option.
However, the figure also shows that the maximum servicing price for upgrading of just
the sounder increases over time. This does not mean that the airline industry receives
more value from the upgrade. The increase in maximum servicing price is the result of
the uncertainty in the readiness of the imager. This uncertainty results in an increase in
the likelihood that a customer would spend more on the upgrade of the sounder. Since
there can be substantial uncertainty about the readiness of the imager, the customer's
optimal strategy becomes the choice to upgrade only the sounder. The effect of the
uncertainty in the imager readiness reinforces the previous finding that uncertainties in
the occurrence of essential technology should be reduced in order to maximize customer
value.
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Figure 6-7: Varying Expected Availability of Imager
6.4. Conclusions
Overall, the findings for the non-commercial case are consistent with those of the
commercial case with only two exceptions. The two new findings that resulted from the
non-commercial case are: 1) highly volatile markets produce favorable servicing markets
if servicing is always the most beneficial option and 2) emphasis should be placed on
reducing uncertainty around the readiness of technologies that play critical roles in
various upgrade options. Through the examination of both asset augmentation cases, it
was found that satellite upgrades continue to provide additional value over traditional
satellite design. Thus, regardless of the type of customer, the design of a serviceable
satellite provides a satellite operator with the flexibility to react to future uncertainty that
traditional satellite design does not offer. From this flexibility, satellite operators are able
to create additional value that could not be captured with traditional design.
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If only for the purpose of satellite upgrade, OOS appears to provide a needed change
for the satellite industry. The change consists of new satellite designs that promote
flexibility as opposed to traditional satellite designs that are completely inflexible with
respect to future uncertainty. By adopting the idea of OOS, the aerospace industry can
grasp the concept of generating value out of uncertainty that has eluded the industry since
its creation.
Now that the characteristics of a feasible OOS market have been determined, methods
for meeting the customer's need for this value must be identified. The next chapter
examines the other side of the commercial servicing market--the provider side. By
utilizing the characteristics of a feasible OOS market found in the last three chapters, the
service provider can determine which form of servicing promotes the largest range of
servicing prices. The largest range of servicing prices will result in the most favorable
market of OOS for both the customer and provider.
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Chapter 7. Provider Side of On-Orbit
Servicing
The next step in the framework for the evaluation OOS is to determine the provider's
minimum servicing price. After determining when the customer's value delivered by
servicing is zero and the associated maximum servicing price, the next step is to examine
how the provider will deliver value to the customer. Recall, that the provider is concerned
with fulfilling one or more of the customer's fundamental functions of servicing (asset
assessment, re-organization, restoration, or augmentation). The fundamental functions are
unique to the customer and provide no information concerning how a service provider
will provide the functions. Thus the service provider must develop an understanding of
the relationship between the customer's functions of servicing and the provider's forms
of servicing.
The previous three chapters examined the customer's side of OOS. These chapters
focused on determining the additional value that OOS provided and from that value
determined the maximum servicing price. This chapter will give a brief description of
how to examine the provider's side of OOS. Six forms of servicing are introduced as
ways in which OOS can provide value to the customer through meeting customer need.
Through the description of these forms of servicing, it will be discussed how different
forms of servicing map to customer needs. In the end, the provider should be able to
determine a servicer design that meets customer needs and the minimum servicing price
associated with that design. Due to the complex nature of the provider side of the market,
the provider side of the OOS market is being left for future research. Thus the discussion
in this chapter is conceptual. The purpose of this chapter is to provide an introduction to
how the various forms of servicing map to the fundamental functions of servicing.
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7.1. Understanding the Provider's Perspective
A provider can select different architectural forms of servicing with which to meet the
customer's needs. Another way to look at this is that multiple service providers exist each
with their own different forms of servicing. Each form of servicing has a minimum price
at or above the price that a provider must charge for servicing. To determine if a form of
servicing meets a customer's need, the provider must compare the minimum price of
servicing for his form of servicing with the customer's maximum servicing price. If the
minimum servicing price is greater than the maximum servicing price, the provider's
form cannot deliver the required value to the customer. If the minimum servicing for the
provider's form is at or below the maximum servicing price, the provider's form is
capable of delivering the required value (or more) to the customer.
7.2. On-Orbit Servicing Forms
Before getting into the specifics of determining the minimum servicing price, there is
a need to discuss the different forms of OOS available to the OOS provider. Kreisel
suggests that there are three distinctive classes of OOS: motion, manipulation, and
observation (Kreisel, 2005). While these classes of OOS capture the general aspects of a
provider design, they do not provide enough distinction to map customer function to
provider form. To gain a better distinction among the forms of servicing, Kreisel's
"manipulation" and "motion" can be broken down into more distinct forms of servicing.
By breaking down Kreisel's classes of servicing, servicing is categorized into the
following six forms of on-orbit servicing: inspection, refueling, relocation, recovery,
repair, and upgrade.
7.2.1. Inspection
Inspection is the most basic form of OOS. Inspection is the visual observation of a
satellite in orbit. By observing a satellite, a large number of satellite problems can be
resolved. De Puetuer states that inspection is valuable in the case of a satellite that has a
severe malfunction where close-up view of the satellite could help to clarify the problem.
Diagnostic data derived from inspection can be a basis for recovery actions from the
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ground (De Peuter). The actual level of visual resolution can vary depending on the
nature of the service.
For instance, on a macro-scale, inspection could be used to determine the physical
state of the satellite. Inspection could be used to determine if an antenna or solar array
has deployed, or inspection could be used to determine the existence of damage. On a
micro-scale, inspection could be used to determine failure in satellite components or
subsystems. Inspection could assist with mechanical problems that cannot be resolved
from the ground. Finally inspection is required for rendezvous and docking of the
servicer with the target satellite, a basic element of servicing. Because inspection of a
satellite is incorporated into a large number of servicing missions, inspection is the
building block of all other forms of service. As with all cases, inspection relates to
fulfilling one of the fundamental functions of servicing. In this case the primary purpose
of inspection is to provide information about the physical condition of a satellite; hence
inspection fulfills the customer need for the fundamental form of asset assessment.
7.2.2. Refueling
Refueling is the case of on-orbit servicing where a servicer resupplies a target satellite
with propellant. Additional propellant could be used to support maneuvers, orbit
relocations, or station-keeping. In general, refueling supports two practical servicing
scenarios:
1) Refueling can extend the life of a satellite that has reached the end of its
operational life due to running out of propellant. Here the servicer could provide
propellant that would be used for station-keeping, thus allowing the satellite to remain
operational. By extending the satellite's operational life, refueling restores the satellite's
value. As a result, refueling for the purpose of life extension fulfills a customer's need for
asset restoration. This case would be identical to the life extension case discussed in
Chapter 4.
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2) By replenishing propellant before or after a maneuver, refueling can allow
satellites to reposition themselves and maintain the operational life. In this case,
maneuvering to a new orbit would be performed by the satellite without the help of the
servicer. The servicer would either provide additional propellant to complete the
maneuver or replenish the satellite's exhausted propellant after the maneuver was
completed. By providing/restoring the operational life of the satellite, it may appear that
refueling represents a form of asset restoration, but this is not the case. Refueling a
satellite for the purpose of maneuvering provides the customer with one way to re-
organize the asset(s). The operational life of the satellite is maintained, not extended. The
purpose of refueling in this case is to move the satellite.
7.2.3. Relocation
Relocation is the form of servicing in which the purpose of servicing is to move the
satellite from one orbit to another. Unlike refueling, relocation of a target satellite is
accomplished by the servicer physically attaching itself to the target satellite. Relocations
can be applied in three general cases: repositioning, decommissioning, and life extension.
In the case of repositioning a satellite, relocation has the identical effect as refueling a
satellite. However, the difference between refueling and relocation is that in the case of
relocation the servicing satellite provides the maneuvering capability and the target
satellite does not need to expend its own fuel. It is important to note that both refueling
and relocation can satisfy the same customer need for re-organization, but in significantly
different ways. Thus, a customer is given the choice of two forms of service that can
fulfill the same need.
Another case of satellite relocation is the decommissioning of the target satellite.
Decommissioning is currently the most practical application of relocation servicing. For
decommissioning, the servicer places a target satellite into a graveyard orbit. Although
decommissioning of a satellite does not allow for additional revenue to be generated, it
provides a customer a way to prevent the loss of future revenue. For example, in 2004 the
U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) required that satellite operators
guarantee the decommissioning of their GEO communications satellites (FCC, 2004). If
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an operator is unable to decommission the satellite, the operator takes on the risk of
losing future FCC licenses. Thus, decommissioning provides security for the customer
(satellite operator) by providing a means of guaranteeing future value. Decommissioning
fulfills the customer need for asset restoration because decommissioning increases the
customer's overall expected value by preventing loss of future revenues brought about by
FCC mandates.
The last case of asset restoration consists of satellite decommissioning, but for a
different purpose than was discussed above. In this case a satellite gains additional
operational life by using the propellant it would have used for decommissioning to
supplement propellant used for station-keeping. This allows a customer to extend the life
of the satellite without the need for servicing, dependent however on the customer's
ability to decommission the satellite in the future (through servicing). De Peuter believes
that "a telecom satellite could continue operating until propellant depletion (roughly six
months of extra exploitation)", and then have a servicer move the satellite into a
graveyard orbit (De Peuter). Generally, a servicer that performs satellite relocation would
provide the customer with the re-organization of assets, but relocation also opens the
doors to other possibilities, such as life extension (asset restoration).
7.2.4. Recovery
Recovery is the unique case of a servicer repositioning a target satellite into a new
orbit in response to a maneuver or upper stage failure. This case differs from the refueling
and relocation forms of servicing because in this case recovery of a satellite takes place
before the satellite has become operational. Since the satellite is not operational before
servicing takes place and the service aims at delivering the customer the expected value
from the satellite, recovery restores a customer's assets.
7.2.5. Repair
Repair is the case where a servicer rendezvouses with a target satellite and repairs a
damaged or malfunctioning system. An example of a repair mission is physically
deploying an antenna, solar array, or installing replacement components. A special form
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of repair is that of software upload. The remote upload of software to a target satellite is a
case of satellite servicing where a servicer is not needed. Nilchiani points out that
"remote software upgrades can help the system to maintain its functionality in an
uncertain environment (Nilchiani and Hastings, 2004)." If software upload is a way in
which to maintain satellite functionality, then it represents a form of satellite repair.
Satellite uploading would require that a satellite designer design for this form of
servicing. This would mean that software upload would be a two-part decision process.
However, with today's current satellite design practices, satellites already have the
inherent capability to be reprogrammed on-orbit. As a result, software uploading should
be viewed as a form of servicing involving a one-part customer decision process.
Repairing a customer's satellite is an example of restoring a customer's value by
restoring the satellite to its expected state of operation.
7.2.6. Upgrade
Upgrade is the case in which a servicer rendezvouses with the target satellite and
performs a service in which the capability of the satellite is changed, preferably
increased. In this case, the replacement of the Hubble Space Telescope (HST) camera(s)
is an example of upgrading. Replacing the HST cameras allows operators to look at
additional parts of the visible spectrum, as well as to look deeper into the universe. The
result is an increase in the value HST delivers to its operator. Software uploading also
provides a unique opportunity for satellite upgrade. As in the case of satellite repair,
software upgrading represents a form of servicing involving a one-part decision process.
The purpose of software upgrade is to increase the value delivered to the customer
through new software programs. Upgrade is a form of service that increases the capability
of the customer's assets such that the asset provides additional value to the customer.
After a provider determines which form of servicing to employ, the provider must
determine the minimum price of servicing associated with that design. The specifics of
how to determine this price are unique to the provider. This price could be based on the
customer's architecture, delivery method, company model, financing, etc. It is not the
intention of this thesis to describe how a provider should design the servicing
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architecture. Therefore, it is assumed that a provider can determine his own minimum
servicing price. Given that a provider has the minimum servicing price for his
architecture, the next step is for the provider to determine if a market exists.
7.3. Mapping Customer Function to Provider Form
The previous section provided a discussion of the various forms of servicing and how
they can be applied to meeting the customer's fundamental functions of servicing. Table
7-1 depicts the relationship between the customer's fundamental functions of servicing
and the provider's architectural forms of servicing. Examination of the table shows that
certain forms of servicing cannot meet a certain customer need. For example, a servicer
design solely for inspection cannot perform asset re-organization, restoration, or
augmentation. But a servicer that is designed for refueling or relocation can provide all
functions of servicing except asset augmentation.
Table 7-1: Mapping Fundamental Functions of Servicing
to the Architectural Forms of Servicing
Fundamental functions of servicing
Asset Asset Asset Asset
Assessment Re-organization Restoration Augmentation
Architectural C
forms of ZZ
on-orbit 00 F00 0
servicing ----
(D C CD D C CD
Inspection Visual Visual N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Refueling Visual/ Visual/ N/A Orbit GEO Life Life Extension N/A N/A
Physical Physical Relocation Extension
Relocation Visual/ Visual/ Space Orbit GEO Life Decommission N/A N/A
Physical Physical Tug Relocation Extension
Life Extension
Recovery Visual/ Visual/ N/A N/A N/A Launch Failure N/A N/A
_________ Physical Physical _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _
Repair Visual/ Visual/ N/A N/A Software Physical N/A N/A
_________Physical Physical ________
Upgrade Visual/ Visual/ N/A N/A N/A N/A Software Physical
Physical Physical _ I I I
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An implication of Table 7-1 is that a provider is capable of determining which
servicer to design in order to meet a customer need. For example, if a customer needed
orbit relocation and has designed a serviceable satellite, the customer is looking to fulfill
the need for asset re-organization. A service provider could fulfill the customer's need by
designing either a servicer capable of refueling or a servicer capable of relocation. Thus
Table 7-1 provides a means of mapping the various forms of servicer design to the
various fundamental functions of servicing associated with customer need.
7.4. Elements of the Provider's Point of View
Although this thesis does not detail the steps that are required for determining a
provider's minimum servicing price, the aim of this section is provide an idea of some of
the elements a service provider should take into consideration. Unlike the customer side
of the market, the provider's minimum servicing price is a function of the form of
servicing. Thus with each servicer design, representative of at least one form of servicing,
comes a unique minimum servicing price. Each potential servicer design has many
elements of its design that can define the minimum servicing price for that design. For
instance, a servicer that could be used once would have a dramatically different minimum
servicing price compared to a servicer that could service multiple satellites. Therefore,
based on these design elements, it is assumed that a service provider can determine his
own minimum servicing price based on his unique economic and technical choices.
Below is a list of design elements that a service provider should consider when designing
a satellite servicer.
7.4.1. Type of Servicer
The type of servicer that a provider might choose depends on the forms of servicing.
Recall, there are six forms of servicing: inspection, refueling, relocation, recovery, repair,
and upgrade. Based on a provider's choice, the design of a servicer could support
multiple forms of servicing or only one form of servicing. For example, Orbital
Recovery's ConeXpress is the case of a servicer designed to act as a space tug. Based on
the design of ConeXpress, the only form of servicing that this design supports is
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relocation; i.e ConeXpress is designed to extend the operational lives of satellites through
supplementing station-keeping ability, but it could also be used for orbit relocation.
Therefore, the choice of a servicer depends on which form of servicing the provider is
aiming to support, i.e. the need of the customer that the provider intends to fulfill.
7.4.2. Servicing Infrastructure
A service provider's servicing infrastructure consists not only of the servicer, but the
supporting infrastructure for the servicer as well. The following are a few of the
suggested elements to consider when developing a servicing infrastructure:
e Number of Servicers
" Number of In-Orbit Depots, if any
e Response time of servicer
* Automated vs. Telerobotic servicer
e Ground station coverage/communications requirements
* Location of parking orbits
* Re-supply Options
* Choice of Launch Vehicle
(low risk launchers for high value payloads
vs. high risk launchers for low value payloads)
* Launch Site location
* Rendezvous location
e Re-supply to depot or servicer
e Business strategies
" Network externalities
* Required Return on investment
* Co-operations/Coalitions/Monopolies/etc
Based on the service provider's choices concerning the elements in the servicing
infrastructure, the service provider will have a minimum servicing price that corresponds
to the design. The purpose of this thesis is not to look at the design of servicers, it is to
examine the value that servicing can offer. Therefore, the design of servicer and the
calculation of the minimum servicing price are left as future work.
7.5. Conclusion
It should be clear by now that the service provider is separate from the customer. The
provider has his own decisions to makedesign choices, costs structure, etc. What
matters to the service provider is the development of a servicer that meets the customer's
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need. To begin the design of a servicer, the provider must understand the relationship
between the forms of servicing and the customer's fundamental functions of servicing.
On the customer side of the market there are four fundamental functions that a
customer seeks to fulfill the need for additional value: asset assessment, asset re-
organization, asset restoration, and asset augmentation. The service provider has the
ability to meet any one of these needs in a number of ways. The service provider has at
his disposal six forms of servicing: inspection, relocation, refueling, recovery, repair, and
upgrade. Because the customer is not concerned with the form of servicing, a service
provider can use any one of the forms of servicing to meet customer need. The goal of the
service provider is to design a servicer that has a low enough servicing price such that the
servicer meets customer need, thus creating a feasible OOS market.
The next chapter will discuss the next step in the evaluation of OOS, determining a
feasible OOS market. Chapter 8 compares the customer's maximum servicing price with
the provider's minimum servicing price for a given form of servicing. A feasible OOS
market will exist when the two sides of the market have a common range of servicing
prices. To determine if such a range exists, all that needs to be done is to overlay the
customer's maximum servicing price with the provider's minimum servicing price and
determine if there is an overlap between the two curves.
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Chapter 8. The Final Step: Determining the
Feasible OOS market
The final step in the evaluation method is to determine if a feasible OOS market
exists. For a feasible market to exist, the price a customer is willing to pay for servicing
must be greater than the provider's minimum price. The feasible OOS market is found by
overlaying the customer's maximum servicing price and the provider's minimum
servicing price. This chapter will walk through the steps of this process and later describe
an example of determining the feasible OOS market for the servicing case found in
Chapter 4.
In addition to determining the feasible OOS market, the overlaying of the two cost
curves is representative of the classic supply and demand curves. This chapter discusses
how the customer's maximum servicing price represents an "implied" demand curve with
respect to servicing and alternatively how the provider's minimum servicing price
represents an "implied" supply curve. Through the ability to describe the OOS market in
the terms of supply and demand curves, an examination of how classic microeconomic
principles can be used to effect change in the servicing prices is discussed. Through this
discussion, certain ideas are presented on how one can affect the range of the servicing
prices, thus changing the feasible OOS market.
This chapter concludes with a discussion of some of the remaining problems that
OOS faces before OOS can become a reality. For example, certain legal issues that are
brought about by the creation of a satellite servicing market are unclear and require
attention. How certain policy choices by the United States may cause corporations to
move off-shore. Conversely, how certain U.S. policies may prevent foreign service
providers from servicing U.S. satellites. The legal and policy choices that are made with
regard to these issues have the potential to have greater effects on the development of a
feasible OOS market than either the economic or technical issues. Thus, the tangled web
of legal, political, technical, and economic issues creates major trade-offs for the
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development of OOS capabilities. Both a service provider and national governments must
understand the implications of these issues before the development of a feasible OOS
capability can be developed.
8.1. How to Find the Feasible Servicing Region
The OOS market is a range of feasible servicing prices under which an interaction
between the buyer and seller exists. Because it was assumed that the decisions of the
buyer and seller are independent, the servicing prices for each side of the market can be
found without regard to the other side of the market. The determination of these servicing
prices was the focus of the previous chapters. To determine if a feasible market is
present, the minimum servicing price found by examining the provider's side of the
market is overlaid onto the maximum servicing price from the customer's side of the
market. A feasible range of servicing prices for the service provider exists for all
servicing prices greater than the minimum servicing price, while feasible servicing prices
for the satellite operator exist for all servicing prices below the maximum servicing price.
If any overlap exists between the two servicing prices, then a feasible market for OOS
exists within the overlapped region. For instance, if the customer's maximum servicing
price is greater than the provider's minimum servicing price, a feasible OOS market
exists for all servicing prices between the minimum servicing price and the maximum
servicing price. However, if the minimum servicing price is greater than the maximum
servicing price, no overlapping range of servicing prices exists and as a result no market
exists.
An added benefit of the independence between the buyer and seller is that it allows
for the comparison of multiple service providers to fulfill the need of a single customer.
This can be looked at in two ways. The multiple sellers can represent a service provider
that has multiple forms of servicing. Each form of servicing can meet customer need, but
in a different way. i.e. in the case of life extension, both refueling and relocation fulfill a
customer's need for asset restoration. Because each form of servicing has a unique
minimum servicing price, each form of servicing creates its own unique servicing market.
Thus a service provider can choose between servicer designs and determine which design
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creates the largest feasible servicing region. The largest feasible servicing region is the
overlap region that consists of the largest range of servicing prices and thus has the
greatest chance of delivering value to both side of the market through bargaining.
Alternatively, the ability to overlay multiple servicing prices can be looked at as
multiple service providers, each with its own servicer design that is competing for the
business of the customer. Here a customer can determine which service provider offers
the lowest servicing price while still creating value. Whichever way the situation is
examined, the ability to compare multiple sellers with a single buyer clearly represents
the traditional idea of a competitive market: different forms of servicing are demand
substitutable.
8.1.1. Customer Supply
On one side of the market is the customer. In general, as the servicing price a
customer is charged increases the value that is delivered to the customer decreases, see
Figure 8-1. When the value from servicing begins to decrease the customer demands less
and as a result the range of feasible servicing prices decreases. Thus, as servicing price
increases customers demand servicing less. The servicing price above which the customer
would no longer demand servicing is the maximum servicing price. This same conclusion
was reached in Chapter 4 where it was shown that as the servicing price increased the
customer was delivered less and less value and therefore demanded servicing less. Recall,
Figure 4-2 portrays the customer's servicing price as a function of the value of the
option. In that figure, the point at which the value of the option was zero represents the
maximum servicing price. Another example, Figure 5-1, shows the customer's maximum
servicing price as a function of time. Thus, the customer's maximum service price
represents a kind of traditional customer demand for servicing.
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Value
Customer
Demand
Servicing Pice
Figure 8-1: Implied Customer Demand
8.1.2. Provider Demand
On the other side of the market is the provider. Like the customer's implied demand
function, the provider's minimum servicing price represents the provider's implied
supply. It is expected that, as the service price increases, the provider can provide a better
service to the customer, which results in higher customer value (Figure 8-2). No explicit
minimum servicing price was found in this thesis; this work is being left for future
research. It is assumed that the minimum servicing price is fixed in time and is a function
of the value it delivers to the customer. However, in reality, the minimum servicing price
would probably change as a function of time based on the economics behind the service
provider's servicing architecture.
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Supply
Servicing Price
Figure 8-2: Implied Provider Supply
8.1.3. Creating an Overlap
The entire purpose of the evaluation method has been to resolve the uncertainty about
the potential OOS market. After understanding the value of OOS and determining the
customer's maximum service price, a provider is able to determine the appropriate form
of servicing to meet the customer's need. After the provider has determined the
customer's maximum service price, the provider can overlay multiple servicing
architectures and determine if these architectures meet the customer's need. This process
allows providers to test the feasibility of their designs without the need to continually
recompute the customer's maximum servicing price. If any overlap exists, as in Figure 8-
3, a feasible OOS market exists for the servicing prices within the overlap. If no overlap
exists, as in Figure 8-4, no feasible OOS market exists because the customer and
provider do not share a common servicing price.
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Figure 8-3: Conceptual Example of a Feasible Service Market
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Figure 8-4: Conceptual Example Which Lacks a Feasible Service Market
8.1.4. Actual Servicing Price
Recall from Chapter 2 that the purpose of separating the market was to examine the
interaction between buyer and seller in order to determine the actual price of servicing.
Up until now only the minimum servicing price and the maximum servicing price have
been discussed. The sought after actual servicing price exists somewhere between these
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two servicing prices. Figure 8-5 gives a representation of the theoretical actual price of
servicing. Although the actual price of servicing in not computed in this thesis, this point
- the intersection of the actual customer demand curve (D,Act) and the actual service
provider supply curve (S,Act)- must exist somewhere to the left of the intersection
between the customer's maximum demand (D,Max) and the provider's minimum supply
(S,Min). Thus, the actual servicing price can only exist at a point within the overlap
region. However, if the overlap region defined by the maximum and minimum servicing
prices is not large enough, no actual servicing price may exist for a given value level
because the service provider supply curve may be greater than the actual customer
demand curve. To create the greatest chance that an actual servicing price exists for
which satellite servicing makes commercial sense, a service provider wants to make the
feasible range of servicing prices between maximum demand and minimum supply as
great as possible.
Actual
Value Servicing c
Servicing Price
Figure 8-5: Theoretical Actual Servicing Price
8.1.5. Comparison of Multiple Servicer Designs
Figure 8-6 depicts how different forms of servicing (represented by different S,Min
lines: {S1, S2, S3}) can create different feasible OOS cases. Here a service provider is
able to evaluate multiple architectures and determine their feasibility by looking for the
164
intersection of supply and demand curves. By changing the design of the servicer, the
service provider is able to create a supply curve that results in a greater range between the
maximum demand and minimum supply curves, thus creating a greater chance that a
feasible servicing market exists.
Value
S1
Servicing Price
Figure 8-6: Overlaying of Multiple Servicer Designs
8.1.6. Example
At this point, the customer's maximum servicing price and one, if not more, provider
minimum servicing prices have been determined. The feasible servicing region is
determined from the viewpoint of the satellite operator. Figure 8-7 and Figure 8-8 show
the results from the Intelsat 801 case in Chapter 4. It was assumed that in this case the
satellite operator, at a minimum, would like an expected 10% return on investment. Thus,
the satellite operator will only choose to service if the servicing price is at or below the
servicing price where the expected value that results from a single servicing mission is at
least 10% of the cost of that servicing mission. This point was referred to as the "true"
maximum servicing price in Chapter 4- See:.4.3.3: The "True" Maximum Servicing Price
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While a larger servicing price still creates value, the 10% threshold cut-off was
assumed so that the price of servicing was not too disproportional to the value of the
option. The creation of the "true" maximum servicing price is therefore an attempt to
capture some of the customer's post-process decision analysis that would be used at the
time of servicing. Note: this is not the same as the customer's utility function; the
threshold cut-off is simply a post-process analysis attempting to describe the likely
decision of a satellite operator.
8.1.6.1. Single Year Life Extension Case
The first case to be examined is the case of life extension where only a single year of
additional life is provided per servicing mission. Figure 8-7 shows the different threshold
cut-off values for the customer's return as a function of the number of servicing missions.
For example, if the satellite operator plans to only service the satellite once, the
maximum servicing price, based on the 10% expected return on investment requirement,
for a single servicing mission is a little less than $40M. This point is represented by the
intersection of the 2012 value line (solid) with the one mission servicing cut-off (dashed).
All servicing prices to the right of this price on the 2012 line represent feasible servicing
cases where servicing can provide value, but based on the mission cut-off price the
operator will not choose to service.
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Figure 8-7:
Intelsat 801 Life Extension Case, Single Year Life Extension, 10% ROI Cut-Off
In Chapter 4 it was shown that the expected value from servicing increased as
additional operational years were provided. However, based on applying the 10%
threshold value, the satellite operator's maximum servicing prices actually decreases as
additional operational years are delivered. For example, the maximum servicing price for
two missions is around $1 OOM, but the "true" maximum servicing price reduces to about
$37M per service. Similarly the maximum servicing price for 10 missions was also about
$1 00M, but the threshold cut-off reduces the "true" maximum servicing price to about
$25M per service.
In effect the threshold cut-off shows that as additional years of operational life are
provided, less value is delivered to the customer. Therefore, as the servicing price
increases the customer will demand fewer additional servicing missions. Thus, by finding
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the "true" maximum servicing price, one can determine the classic demand curve that
describes the customer's relationship between units supplied, in this case the number of
servicing missions and the price of those units. To find the actual demand curve, the
number of servicing missions that are available to the customer-in this case the number
of additional operational years- is used to determine the customer's "true" maximum
servicing price for each mission. The customer's demand curve is determined by plotting
the "true" maximum servicing price as a function of the number of servicing missions.
8.1.6.2. Multi-Year Life Extension Case
What effect does lengthening the number of additional years provided by the
servicing mission have on the customer's demand curve? Figure 8-8 provides four
threshold values for the case where the service provider provides three years of additional
operational life with each service instead ofjust one. In this case it was assumed that a
service provider would purchase life extension and wait the full course of the extension
before purchasing the option again. In Figure 8-8 the first servicing mission would
provide operational life until 2014, the second mission until 2017, and the third until
2021. Here, the operator's "true" maximum servicing price for a single mission is
increased to about $70M (intersection of the 2014 line and the first threshold cut-off).
Similarly, the "true" maximum servicing price for two life extension missions is
increased to about $67M, and three missions is increased to about $62M. Once again, the
customer's maximum servicing price decreases for each consecutive servicing mission.
However, the extension of the length of the additional operational life provided by the
servicing missions shifts up the value of the life extensions, which has the effect of
shifting the 'true' maximum servicing price to the right.
The customer's actual demand curve is found in the same way as described in the
single year case above. The application of the threshold cut-off supplies an additional
constraint on the feasible servicing prices, but allows for a service provider to compute
the actual customer demand curve, as opposed to the implied demand curve discussed
earlier.
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8.1.6.3. Adding the Supplier Perspective
After the new range of feasible servicing prices is determined by adding the
constraint of the operator's threshold cut-off, the next step is to switch to the provider
perspective. The provider has several minimum servicing prices based on the different
forms of servicing. For instance, servicing architecture A might have a minimum
servicing price of $30M per service, while architecture B has a minimum servicing price
of $60M. Both architectures have the same end result of providing the customer with the
same value, in this case a single additional operational year, but both architectures fulfill
that need in different ways. Architecture A could represent a refueling type servicer while
architecture B could represent a space tug type servicer.
The service provider can determine which architecture creates the greatest range of
servicing prices by overlaying the minimum servicing price for the architectures on the
plot of the customer's maximum servicing price. If a service provider were to design
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architecture A, represented by line A, the service provider would expect that on average
the satellite operator would only purchase the option to extend three or four times. The
number of desired servicing missions being represented by the point at which the
minimum servicing price is at or just below the "true" maximum servicing price for that
number of servicing missions. For example, if the operator desired to only service their
satellite once, the "true" maximum service price would be $40M. The feasible range of
servicing prices would be defined as the servicing prices between the provider's
minimum price of $30M and the customer's "true" maximum price of $40M. Thus, the
feasible market would exist for this servicing mission because the minimum servicing
price was below the "true" maximum servicing price.
In the event that the provider designed architecture B, represented by line B, no
feasible range of servicing prices would exist. This is because the minimum servicing
price for architecture B is greater than the operator's "true" maximum servicing price,
$60M>$40M. Therefore architecture B would not meet the customer's demand and thus
would not create a feasible OOS market.
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8.2. Future Applications
By essentially describing 00S markets as a function of service provider supply
curves and satellite operator demand curves, classic microeconomic principles can be
applied to maximize the feasible range of servicing prices. The most direct effect that can
be examined here is that of policy intervention, more precisely the effect of a tax or
subsidy on OOS. A subsidy would be seen as a uniform positive shift up in the
customer's demand curve (maximum service price), or a uniform shift down in the
provider's supply curve (minimum servicing price). Similar to traditional supply and
demand curves, subsidies increase the feasible range of servicing prices and thereby
increase the number of feasible designs. By increasing the number of designs that meet
customer need, greater competition can be created through competing designs. As
competition increases servicing price will decrease, thus making 00S more attractive.
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Thus, a potential policy decision for a government could be the creation of a government
subsidy or grant for OOS architectures in order to foster innovation and competition.
The other microeconomic principle that can directly affect the range of servicing
prices is a tax. A government might want to levy a tax on OOS for two reasons: to gain
additional revenues to support launch infrastructures or to collect corporate tax from
profits generated by the service provider. Either reason for levying a tax would result in a
decrease in the feasible servicing region by either lowering the customer's maximum
service price or increasing in the provider's minimum servicing price. The end effect of
imposing a tax on OOS would be a reduction in the feasible region of servicing that
would make it harder for multiple service providers to compete; thereby making satellite
servicing less attractive.
8.3. Remaining Unanswered Questions
Although it is clear that a subsidy would benefit the development of OOS, the
question remains why would a government offer a subsidy? Possible reasons include:
promotion of space commerce, promotion of technology development, promotion of new
satellite design, and increase in a military advantage over its adversaries. However, in the
past these arguments alone have not convinced the United States government as they
have the European Union. Given the current state of U.S government funding,
government subsidies for the development of OOS are more likely to occur outside the
U.S. rather than within. But if one wanted to obtain U.S government funding for OOS,
what would be the best approach?
8.3.1. Promotion of OOS Development by the United States
Government
Why would the U.S government promote/support the development of OOS? What
part of the U.S government is likely to benefit most from OOS? In examining the players
within the U.S. government, the best approach would probably be to focus on military
applications.
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In looking at past U.S. government actions, the U.S. military has supported new
technology developed when that technology would give the U.S military a decisive
advantage over its adversaries. At the same time, it is well known that military
technology will probably spill over to the commercial sector, thus allowing for the
commercial development of the technology. The question that must be answered is
whether or not OOS should be any different. If the U.S. military were to adopt and
support the development of OOS, OOS must provide the U.S. military with an advantage
over its adversaries.
Chapters 5 and 6 show that one of the characteristics of a feasible servicing market is
the case of integrating technologies that result in significant increases in value. Based on
this finding, the U.S. military is likely to benefit from the capabilities of OOS. The U.S.
military could benefit from OOS because OOS could allow the military to integrate new
technologies into their observation satellites. Recall that Joppin showed that OOS made
sense in the case of the Hubble Space Telescope because the optical systems allowed for
magnitude increases in value. These magnitude increases could probably be replicated in
optical satellites used by the military. Thus, OOS could provide the military with the
ability to generate significant improvements in their observation satellites and thereby
significantly increase the military's advantage over its adversaries.
When an OOS infrastructure is up and running, OOS could deliver additional
strategic advantages to the U.S. military such as: satellite responsiveness, orbit
relocations, etc. The U.S. military, as opposed to the commercial satellite industry, is thus
the likely player in the space industry that would benefit the most from OOS. When the
U.S. military has bought into the idea of OOS, the technologies developed through U.S
military support would eventually spill over into the commercial realm thus allowing for
the creation of a commercial OOS market. Therefore, if one seeks to attain government
subsidies for OOS from the United States government, one should focus on military
based customers.
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8.3.2. Unanswered Legal Questions
Aside from the economic and technical problems that OOS faces, there are additional
inherent legal questions that must be answered before a competitive satellite servicing
market can be developed. The following section explores three areas of legal
uncertainties that can have an effect on the development of future OOS infrastructures.
The legal question pertaining to the development of OOS are: determining the assignment
of liability for damages that can result from servicing, corporate tax policy pertaining to
revenues generated from providing OOS services, and export control concerns that might
arise during the OOS process.
8.3.2.1. Liability for Damages
Generally two bodies of space law oversee the operation of satellite in space;
international law and national law. Since 1959, international space law has been
overseen by the United Nations Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COUPOS).
Since its creation COUPOS has created five international legal instruments and five sets
of legal principles governing space-related activities (COUPOS, 2004). The relevant
COUPOS treaties that pertain to OOS are the 1967 treaty on Principles Governing the
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and
Other Celestial Bodies, the 1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage
Caused by Space Objects, and the 1975 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched
into Outer Space (Richards et. al, 2005). In terms of national law, the relevant national
legal principles with regard to space operations tend to criminal law pertaining to the
restrictions on commercial satellite operations.
The problem that current international space law creates for OOS is primarily based
around liability and legal rights to property. In this thesis, it was assumed that a non-
governmental agency would be in control of OOS activities, namely that the service
provider would be a commercial company. What does the COUPOS treaties have to say
about commercial activities in space? According to Article VIII of the Treaty on
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
a state "shall retain jurisdiction and control over such object (satellite, service, etc), and
over any personnel thereof, while in outer space or on a celestial body." Article VI also
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states that a State "shall bear international responsibility for national activities in outer
space... whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by non-
governmental entities." What this means is that the State from which a satellite, or
servicer, was launched is responsible for the activities of that satellite. Thus, when a
servicing satellite causes damage to a target satellite, who is responsible for the damages?
The concern over damages is answered in the 1972 Convention on International
Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects. Article 1I of the liability convention
provides that a launching State is absolutely liable for damage caused by its space objects
in space, and Article III provides that this liability is determined by fault (Richards et. al,
2005). Therefore under the current legal standings, if a commercial satellite servicer were
to attempt to service a satellite in space and that satellite was launched from a different
State, then the State (not the commercial company) from which the servicer was launched
would be liable for the damages resulting from servicing. However, if the servicer and
satellite were launched from the same State, international space law would not apply and
the national laws of the state would come into play.
The problem of liability is only compounded in the event of third party effects. Recall
from Chapter 3 that one form of risk that exists is that of third party effects. Third party
effects are the case where servicing fails and due to that failure orbital debris may be
released that affects a third party's satellite. In the case where all three satellites are
launched from the same State, the national laws of that State would take effect as before.
However, how would liability disputes be handled if the three satellites were not
launched from the same State?
Assume that a servicer was launched from the United States and was servicing a
satellite launched from the United States. In the course of servicing, the servicer caused
damage to the satellite which resulted in the creation of orbital debris. Under the current
international law, the dispute over damage caused by the target satellite would be settled
by U.S. law. However, assume that the debris that was released by the failure caused
damage to another satellite that was not launched from the United States, a North Korean
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military satellite for example. Although the initial dispute was resolved within the Unites
States court system, the third party damage created would have to be settled by
international law. According to international law, the United States would be liable for
the damages to the North Korean military satellite despite the fact that the servicer was
launched by a commercial entity. Imagine the legal nightmare, let alone the political
crisis, that could result.
Additionally, two other complications can arise with third party effects:
1) What would happen if the servicer was launched from state A, the target
satellite from state B and the third party satellite from State C. According to Article
VI of the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects
"the burden of compensation for the damage shall be apportioned between the first
two States in accordance with the extent to which they were at fault; if the extent of
the fault of each of these States cannot be established, the burden of compensation
shall be apportioned equally between them." One can expect that this situation would
result in arguments over who was responsible for the initial damage (State A or B),
and then who would be responsible to pay for the third party damages to State C.
2) How would liability be placed if a commercial servicer were launched in
international waters? According to Article I of the Convention on International
Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, "launching State" means: "(i) A state
which launches or procures the launching of a space object; (ii) A state from whose
territory or facility a space object is launched." It would appear then that, if a satellite
was not procured by a given State and was not launched from a particular State's
launch facility (for instance in international waters), that satellite would not have a
"launching state" according to Article I. How then would liability be placed on an
international scene if a servicer launched from international water was to cause
damage to any satellite? Could the commercial company be held liable under this
condition? The current legal framework is unclear. Table 8-1 provides a quick
reference to current legal instruments governing potential satellite servicing
operations. Thus, some of the legal inadequacies, in particular those involving
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liability for damages, will have to be worked out before a commercial satellite
servicing market is established.
Table 8-1: Relevant international and national legal instruments (Richards et al, 2005)
1967 Article Vill: Provides a state jurisdiction and
Outer Space Treaty control over its registered space objects
Article II: Holds a state liable for damage
caused by its launched space objects
1972 Article Ill: Determines liability by fault
Liability Convention Article IV: Holds states jointly liable if a
collision of their space objects causes third
party damage
1973
Bans harmful interference to the
Telecommunication
communications of other states
Convention
1975 Requires states to maintain a registry of
Registration Convention objects launched into space
US Criminal Law Makes interference with satellite
Title 18, Section 1367 communications a federal offense
8.3.2.2. Corporate Tax Policy
The first suggested reason for levying a tax on satellite servicing, for the support of
launch infrastructure, seems unlikely. However, taxing commercial revenues without a
doubt occurs today and would not require a second thought on the part of government
agencies. This raises an interesting question for both U.S federal and state governments;
can federal and state governments tax corporate business that is conducted in space?
Another interesting question, if the federal and state governments are able to tax business
conducted in space, would this form of taxation drive U.S.-based corporations off-shore?
Surprisingly enough this question has come up before and the answer is clear in one case
and vague in another.
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Table 8-2: Basic Statutory Rules for Determining Whether
Income Is U.S. or Foreign Source (GAO, 2004)
Income from space Income from international
Type of corporation and ocean activity communications activity
U.S. corporation U.S. source 50 Dercent U.S. source,
Foreign corporation-if income is
attributable to a fixed place of
business in the United States
Foreign corporation-if income is
not attributable to a fixed place of
business in the United States
Source: GAQ.
Foreign source
Foreign source
50 percent foreign source
U.S. source
Foreign source
8.3.2.2.1. Federal Taxes
According to a GAO report, the rules that determine federal tax on a corporation's
income from business conducted in space or the ocean depend on where the corporation
is incorporated and the source of the income. The GAO report describes two forms of
corporations, foreign and domestic, and two forms of income sources, space/ocean
activity and international communications. Table 8-2 summarizes the basic statutory rules
provided by the GAO report. Under the basic statutory rules, a U.S incorporated
corporation whose income is derived from space or ocean activity, no matter the activity,
is classified as a U.S. source and therefore subject to U.S federal taxes. However if the
U.S corporation engages in international communications, i.e. provides communication
capabilities to a foreign country, the corporation's income is treated as "50 percent from
U.S. sources and 50 percent from foreign sources (GAO, 2004)" and is thus taxed
accordingly. But, claims to U.S. taxes cease in cases when a corporation is foreign-based,
not U.S.-based.
In cases of non-U.S. corporations, a foreign corporation's income from space activity
is viewed as foreign source and thus subject to only foreign taxes even if that corporation
does business within the United States - with one exception. In addition, even if a foreign
corporation has a fixed place of business in the United States, the corporation is not
responsible for paying federal taxes. The one exception to the exclusion from avoiding
federal taxes is the case where "a foreign corporation has an office or fixed place of
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business in the United States [and] all of its international communications activity income
[is] attributable to such an office or business. "Under these circumstances the
corporation's income is treated as U.S.-source (GAO, 2004) and is therefore subject to
federal taxes. Thus there is some prevention, in cases of international communications,
by the United States government against allowing U.S. based companies from move off-
shore in order to avoid federal taxes.
For the most part the United States' federal tax policy with regard to space commerce
is sound; U.S corporations that generate revenues through space communications
activities involving U.S-based ground sites are subject to federal taxes, or 50% of a the
revenues are subject to federal taxes in cases where revenues are generated through
international communications. As for non-U.S. corporations, foreign corporations pay
foreign corporate taxes for space activity to the foreign country from which it originated
unless that corporation provides communications services to the United States, in which
case the source of the communications revenue would be viewed as U.S. source and thus
taxable. However, OOS is not a form of satellite communications and thus the United
States cannot capture taxes on revenues generated by foreign corporations even if that
corporation has a fixed place of business in the United States. Thus, a loophole might
exist in the collection of federal taxes in the case of on-orbit servicing. In response to this
loop-hole, U.S based service providers may move-off shore in order to avoid paying
federal taxes.
8.3.2.2.2. Local/State Taxes
The implications of local or state corporate tax policy on OOS are murky at best. The
reasons for the debate surrounding taxing a corporation's income from space activities on
the local level rest on problems with assigning jurisdiction. Take for example the
problems that have arisen with taxing e-commerce. The main issues regarding taxing e-
commerce are a concern of jurisdictional assignment-- i.e. which governmental entity
shall have the authority to tax a transaction that spans several jurisdictions (GIPI, 2005)?
In general, the collection of taxes on commerce at the state level is accomplished through
sales taxes. Sales taxes are paid by the consumer, but they are collected by the merchant.
But the problem with taxing e-commerce led to a U.S. Supreme Court decision. In 1992,
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the US Supreme Court held that a state cannot require a business without any physical
presence inside its borders to collect taxes on sales to residents within its borders (Quill
1992). Thus, a local government cannot collect sales taxes in cases where business was
conducted with a company whose physical presence is outside the state's borders. Thus,
due to the fact that e-commerce companies exist in cyber-space, many argue that e-
commerce cannot be taxed at the local level because an e-commerce company does not
have a physical presence in a state.
To temporarily resolve the dispute, in 1998 the US Congress imposed a three year
"moratorium" on "discriminatory" or "multiple" taxes on Internet commerce, by using its
power to preempt state laws on matters affecting interstate commerce. However, the
moratorium only allows e-commerce to avoid taxes in cases where the type of business
involves internet transactions; however, internet sales can be taxed according to state law.
The moratorium was extended in 2001 for a two year period and became known as the
Internet Tax Freedom Act (ITFA). As of August 2003, the US Congress was considering
making the moratorium a permanent ban (GIPI, 2005).
Despite the future actions of congress, the main problem that arises with taxing e-
commerce is defining a company's location and thus assigning jurisdiction. "Existing tax
systems tend to determine tax consequences based on where the taxpayer is physically
located. The e-commerce model enables businesses to operate with very few physical
locations...also, some business assets, such as servers, are not necessarily tied to a single
physical location, but can easily be relocated without any interruption to business
operations. That is, the location of the server is not relevant for business purposes and
thus, may not be a logical taxing point (Nellen, 2001)." The problem over jurisdictional
definition exists in the same way for satellites. One could argue that, based on the current
debate and legislative history around e-commerce, a purely space-based enterprise does
not have a physical presence that falls under the jurisdiction of a local government. Even
though a ground station would be physically located within the jurisdiction of a local
government, one could argue that a ground station, like a server for the internet, can
easily be relocated without any interruption to business operations. Thus, ground stations
are not a logical taxing point for local taxes. Therefore, for the time being, local or state
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governments appear to not have the jurisdiction over taxing sales on space-based
business.
While the debates about preventing taxation of e-commerce support the prevention of
state taxation for on-orbit satellite servicing, the same debates actually lend support for
taxing satellite servicing on the national level. The problem with taxing e-commerce at
the state level was assigning jurisdiction, or who owns what on the internet. However,
based on the COPOS treaties, a nation retains jurisdiction over a satellite that was
launched from within that nation for as long as that satellite is in space. Due to the fact
that the U.S is responsible for any satellite launched from within the United States, the
U.S. should be well within its rights to require that taxes be paid on the business
conducted by that satellite no matter where the corporation was incorporated. Since the
business does not take place within a given state in the United States, a corporation
cannot be held liable to pay state taxes. On the same note because a nation has
responsibility over any satellite launched from within that nation, it is well within that
nation's right to tax the business of that satellite. Therefore, the current taxation
definition of income source for the United States, described by the GAO report, could be
extended to include space businesses where the satellite in question was launched from
within the U.S., even if the owner of that satellite was not based within the United States.
8.3.3. Does Export Control Apply
A major concern that runs throughout the aerospace industry is export control. Export
control applies to the export of controlled U.S technology to either foreign countries or
foreign nationals within the United States. But does it apply to in-space applications? It
certainly does! Although U.S. technology may not be transferred to a foreign country
through space business, export control applies to space when information about
controlled technologies is transferred to a foreign nations or its citizens no matter if they
are in space or not.
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In the case of OOS, export control would apply if a U.S based satellite was serviced
by a foreign based servicer. While the U.S may not be concerned with the servicer
transferring knowledge or information to the satellite being serviced, the U.S is certainly
concerned with transferring knowledge or information about the satellite to the servicer.
One may assume that any form of servicing will result in satellite servicer gaining some
form of knowledge about the target satellite. Recall satellite inspection, assessing the
physical state of the satellite, is the building block of all forms of servicing. It does not
matter whether the knowledge of the target satellite is intentional or unintentional. Any
form of satellite servicing will result in information transfer that concerns the target
satellite to the satellite servicer. Due to the fact that almost all technology onboard a
satellite is controlled under the U.S. Department of State's munitions list, any U.S.
satellite operator that has a satellite serviced by a foreign servicer would potentially be in
violation of U.S Export Control Law.
While the limits imposed by U.S. export control law may limit innovation by
preventing foreign servicers from servicing U.S satellites, U.S export control also has the
effect of protecting U.S. companies from commercial competition. Is this a fair trade-off?
This of course is not something that can be answered in this thesis, but export control
could be used as a lever by the U.S government to prevent U.S corporations from moving
off-shore by restricting foreign servicers from servicing U.S-launched satellites.
Due to the potential of high revenues from satellite servicing and the fact that
corporations that launch servicers from within the United States are likely to be required
to pay federal taxes on their business, what is the likely reaction by the commercial
satellite service provider? The likely reaction, as it was previously stated, is that satellite
service providers are likely to move off-shore in order to avoid U.S federal taxes on their
business. But, in moving off-shore, these corporation may restrict themselves from being
able to service U.S launched satellite due to export control policies. The question that
must be answered by the satellite provider is whether or not moving off-shore is a sound
business practice or is it simply a tradeoff between the lesser of two evils?
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The unanswered legal questions create quite a dilemma for prospective OOS
companies and governments in which these satellite servicers could potentially be
launched. Should a government be able to restrict the servicing of satellites that were
launched within that state to only servicers that were launched from that state? If so this
would benefit the government by allowing the government to avoid potential liability in
cases of servicer failure and maintain export control, but this would also limit the
potential for international business and innovation on the part of service providers. The
decision that a government should make in such cases is unclear. Clearly, the current
legal precedents are not sufficient for handling the creation of an OOS market. Therefore,
on-orbit satellite servicing has additional obstacles that must be tackled before the
technical and economic questions can be discussed.
8.3.4. Getting U.S. Satellite Manufacturers Onboard
A final roadblock in creating an OOS architecture is the need to get satellite
manufacturers to accept the idea of OOS. The case has already been made that satellite
operators would benefit from OOS capabilities if they existed. In fact these operators
would be willing to pay higher satellite costs to gain additional value provided by OOS.
However, what incentives do satellite manufacturers have for changing the paradigm of
their satellite design? Will slight increases in the selling price of serviceable satellites
outweigh the additional costs that manufactures would be required to spend on the
development of these satellites? What needs to be determined is if satellite
manufacturers, such as Boeing or Lockheed Martin would be interested in the
development of more complex satellites or would these designs decrease their profit
margins?
As it stands, the Aerospace industry revenues were on the order of $87 billion dollars
in 2003. Over the past couple of years, the world aerospace industry as a whole appears
to have been growing at a rate of 15% per year (McAlister, 2004). However industry
growth has mainly been concentrated in one area of the industry. Figure 8-10 shows that
since 1996 the percentage of the industry revenues associated with satellite manufacturers
and launch providers has decreased from almost 35% in 1996 to about 20% in 2002.
While satellite manufacturers and launch providers have seen a combined increase in
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revenues from $12.5B in 1996 to $15.8B in 2002, the satellite service sector of the
industry has seen revenues increase from $15.8B in 1996 to $49.8B in 2002. Clearly the
growth in the industry is concentrated on the satellite service provider and not the satellite
manufacturers and launch provider. A statement by Jim Albaugh, president and CEO of
Boeing Integrated Defense Systems, supports this conclusion. Jim Albaugh stated that
"The commercial space market has eroded to a point where it is no longer a driving factor
in either our satellite or launch services business." Clearly, the manufacturers of satellites
and launch vehicles are not capturing the profit increases seen by the rest of the industry.
If OOS will only add value to satellite service providers, what incentives do satellite
manufactures and launch providers have to invest in new satellite design?
Revenue Breakdown
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
D Sateflte Services ESatelite Manufacturing
El Launch Industry U Ground Equip. Manufactuing
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Figure 8-10: Breakdown of the satellite industry's revenues McAlister, 2004
The answer to the incentive problem may not rest in the space industry but in the
automotive industry. Recall, the problem with current satellite design is the lack of
accessibility. OOS however eliminates this problem by allowing satellites to be accessed
via robotic servicers. In the automotive industry, a substantial portion of industry
revenues is from the initial sales of cars, but another substantial part of the industry
revenues come from aftermarket sales and service.
The aftermarket for cars exists solely because automobiles can be accessed. By
eliminating the inaccessible nature of satellites, OOS has created the potential for an
entirely new satellite aftermarket. A satellite aftermarket could consist of not only
satellite manufacturers, who design serviceable satellites, but also satellite manufacturers
and launch providers who develop and deliver replacement parts, new technologies,
additional fuel, etc. Satellite manufacturers and launch providers can thus supply satellite
service providers with needed replacement parts, not unlike how the automotive
companies supply replacement parts to service shops. For example, satellite
manufacturers would design new components or supply replacement parts that would
then go to launch providers who would then place those parts in orbit on low cost launch
vehicles. Once in space these parts would be delivered to the satellite service provider. It
is out of the creation of a new satellite aftermarket that satellite manufacturers and launch
providers can capture new undiscovered industry revenues. The potential of a satellite
aftermarket, not the increases in price of a serviceable satellite design, should be what is
needed to attract satellite manufacturers and launch provider to investing in OOS.
8.4. Conclusion
By examining the OOS market as two sides of a competitive market, a range of
servicing prices is determined below which satellite servicing makes sense. As stated in
Chapter 2, the first step in determining a feasible range of servicing prices is to determine
the customer's maximum servicing price. Given the maximum servicing price, the
customer's "true" maximum servicing prices can be determined based on customer
interviews, or some other form of post process analysis. From the "true" maximum
servicing price, a customer demand curve can be created for the number of servicing
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missions as a function of servicing price. Without calculating the customer demand
curve, one is still left with the option of determining the customer's "implied" demand
curve, defined by the customer's maximum servicing price.
The next step in the process is to determine the provider's minimum servicing price.
This price is unique to not only the service provider, but the servicing architecture as
well. With the minimum servicing price, a service provider can determine the feasible
range of servicing prices in two ways: 1) The service provider can examine just the cases
where servicing provides value to the customer. Thus, by overlaying the minimum
servicing price with the customer's maximum servicing price, the service provider can
determine if its service architecture creates a feasible range of servicing prices. 2) The
other possible course of action for the service provider is to determine the actual price of
servicing. To determine the actual servicing price, the service provider would need to
determine any threshold requirements of the customer. From these threshold
requirements, the provider can determine the customer's "true" maximum servicing price
with respect to servicing. Then by overlaying the minimum servicing price with the
"true" maximum servicing price, a service provider can determine the actual price of
servicing. To determine the actual price of servicing, a service provider would need to
compute the customer's demand function based on the "true" maximum servicing price,
determine the associated supply curve with respect to servicing, and determine the
intersection of the two curves. The intersection of the two curves would represent the
number of servicing missions that a customer would purchase and the actual price of
servicing that a customer would pay - a traditional application of the classic supply and
demand curves.
With the knowledge of the supply and demand curves for servicing, a service
provider can begin to examine the effects that legal and political issues have on the
creation of feasible OOS market. For instance, a service provider can expect that a tax
will result in a decrease in the feasible range of servicing prices, thus making satellite
servicing less attractive; while a subsidy would increase the range of servicing prices,
making servicing more attractive. The remaining problem for the service provider is to
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understand the current legal questions that OOS creates and thus develop a servicer that
takes into account the potential ramifications that government actions would have.
Therefore, addressing only the technical and economic issue of on-orbit satellite servicing
is not sufficient for the creation of a feasible servicing market. A satellite service provider
must also be aware of the unanswered legal questions that surround satellite servicing and
determine how future government actions can affect the creation of a feasible servicing
market. It is the intention that this chapter will assist in alerting potential satellite service
providers to the legal questions that can affect the creation of an on-orbit servicer, as well
as reminding governments how their actions could result in the stifling of innovation
and/or prevention of potential on-orbit satellite servicing infrastructures.
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Chapter 9. Impacts and Conclusions
Is OOS a paradigm shift in satellite design
or is OOS just a solution looking for a problem?
This thesis examined the economic roadblocks in the development of on-orbit
satellite servicing capabilities and developed a method for evaluating the economic
viability of on-orbit satellite servicing. However, the thesis looks to answer a much larger
fundamental question. That question is whether or not traditional monolithic satellite
design has limited the value that the satellite market generates for the space industry?
Thus, has the technology development S-curve for monolithic satellites reached its
saturation point and if so can on-orbit satellite servicing be a design method that will
allow the industry to jump to a new s-curve?
The goal of this thesis was to answer the question posed in Chapter 1, does a method
of satellite design exist that addresses the access constraint of satellites while providing
greater satellite performance and maintaining investor return. Based on the results
provided in this thesis, the answer should be clear - yes; at least one method exists.
Hopefully, it is clear that this method is on-orbit satellite servicing. To support this
conclusion, it was stated that, if OOS could provide greater value than alternative design
options, OOS could provide greater performance while maintaining investor return.
To prove that such a statement was true, on-orbit satellite servicing was examined in
terms of a commercial service market. The market was divided into a customer and a
provider viewpoint. Dividing the analysis allowed for the evaluation of both sides of the
market to be performed independently. An on-orbit satellite servicing market was said to
exist if, for a given amount of value, a common range of servicing prices existed for both
the customer and the provider.
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The first part of the analysis was to examine the customer side of the market. It was
assumed that the goal of any customer was to maximize the value of the satellite.
Therefore, a service provider would only service a customer's satellite if servicing
provided greater value than all other options. To determine the value brought about by
servicing, on-orbit satellite servicing was viewed as a way in which a customer could
react to future uncertainty, i.e. as an option.
By using real options analysis, the additional value that OOS provided to the
customer can be determined. The customer's maximum servicing price can be determined
by finding the point at which the customer is indifferent to servicing (additional value =
zero) versus the next most beneficial option. The customer's maximum servicing price
then sets an initial range for common servicing prices for both sides of the market; Zero
-+ Maximum servicing price.
In addition to determining the customer's maximum servicing price, critical
information was gathered with regard to the characteristics of a feasible on-orbit satellite
servicing market. This information is vital for service providers because these results
direct a provider toward the design elements that have the greatest effect on creating a
market. From the provider's point of view, the goal is to make the customer's maximum
service prices as high as possible. By understanding how to affect customer value and the
maximum servicing price, a provider can change the servicer design to maximize the
customer's maximum servicing price and thus create a larger range of feasible servicing
prices.
By performing sensitivity analysis on three example servicing scenarios, the
following effects were found to affect the customer's maximum servicing price.
* The relationship between servicing price and value is not linear, even in the
case of a commercial customer. It was found that due to the non-linear
relationship between servicing price and customer value, slight variations in
the servicing price around the maximum servicing price were only reflected as
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small changes in the customer's expected value. To produce a larger change in
the expected value of servicing, a service provider must move away from the
customer's maximum servicing prices and focus on lower, more attractive,
servicing prices.
* Increasing the capability of the satellite through servicing has a proportional
effect on the customer's maximum servicing price. Although only a linear
relationship between unit-value increase and customer value were examined, it
is expected that OOS will allow for significantly higher servicing prices if high
correlations exist between the effect of new technology and customer value.
* Highly volatile markets provide the best case for servicing only when servicing
will be the most valuable option for the customer. When other options exist
that may provide more value to the customer, servicing is not the best option
within highly volatile markets.
* Servicer risk has a uniformly decreasing effect on the customer maximum
servicing price. As the risk of failure associated with the servicer increased, a
customer would choose the option to service less often and as a result the
expected value of the option decreased. Because the expected value of the
option decreased, the customer's maximum servicing price decreased.
* Servicing is generally attractive to "risk-adverse" and "risk-neutral" decision
makers and not to "risk-seeking" decision makers. This finding contradicts the
general understanding that on-orbit satellite servicing is too risky for today's
"risk-adverse" satellite industry.
* Fast-evolving technologies provide the most value to the customer. This
supports the current belief that the value of OOS is its ability to incorporate
new technologies earlier than is possible with traditional methods.
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After the customer side of the market was analyzed, the next step was to focus on the
provider side of the market. For the provider's side of the market, it is critical to
understand that the design of the servicer is not dependent on the results of the customer
side of the market. The purpose of the provider is to fulfill customer need for value. How
the provider goes about fulfilling this need is up to the provider. Because the provider is
not tied to a specific design, multiple forms of servicing can be used to meet a single
customer need.
Each one of these potential forms of servicing has its own design elements,
supporting economics, policy implications, etc. But each form of servicing has one thing
in common- each form of servicing has a minimum servicing price. The minimum
servicing price is the lowest price that a provider could charge for servicing. It is assumed
that a provider would provide a servicer for any servicing price above the minimum
servicing price. Therefore, the range of feasible servicing prices for the provider is
bounded between the minimum servicing price and infinity.
By determining the customer's maximum servicing price and the provider's minimum
servicing price, a range of feasible servicing prices can be determined. The customer's
range is bounded by zero and the maximum servicing price and the provider's range is
bounded by the minimum servicing price and infinity. Thus the feasible range of
servicing prices consists of the servicing prices between the minimum servicing price and
the maximum servicing price. It is within this range of servicing prices that a feasible on-
orbit satellite servicing market exists. This range can be determined by overlaying the
customer's maximum servicing price with the provider's minimum servicing price and
looking for an overlap.
By creating this overlap, a higher level conclusion is discovered. The customer's
maximum servicing price represents an "implied" demand curve and the provider's
minimum servicing price represents an "implied" supply curve. The overlap of these two
curves therefore creates an artificial representation of the classic microeconomic supply
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and demand curves. By comparing the curves in this manner, one can apply and
determine the effects of classic microeconomic principles such as tax and subsidy.
The implied effect of a tax, discussed in Chapter 8, would be an increase in the
minimum servicing price or a decrease in the maximum servicing price depending on
who would be taxed. It was also discussed in Chapter 8 that, due to the current U.S.
corporate tax laws, it is possible that a service provider would incorporate outside the
United States in order to avoid U.S corporate tax. However, while this strategy has tax
benefits, it also carries with it policy reactions such as export control restrictions.
Therefore, avoiding corporate tax by moving off shore may not be the best idea for a
service provider. What might be needed to keep service providers within the United
States is for the U.S government to apply some tax-incentives on the first-movers in order
to push innovation.
The development of on-orbit satellite servicing is not limited to solely economic and
technical issues. OOS may create the first purely commercial space-based enterprise.
Along with the development of an entirely new market come the legal issues, liability
issues taxation issue, etc. The legal and political implications from the development of
OOS remain unclear due to the fact that as of yet these areas of interest have yet to be
tested. Therefore, for an OOS market to exist, the current legal and political policies of
today's satellite industry will need to be updated.
Finally, it is the push for innovation that is lacking from the development of on-orbit
satellite servicing. While many research programs are being conducted by a wide variety
of industry players, what is lacking is government or industry incentives for technology
development. A push for on-orbit technologies could be seen with a wide variety of
incentives. For instance: on-orbit satellite servicing innovations could be pushed with the
creation of tax breaks or government subsidies, the shift to a more modular and
standardized satellite design, or finally the acceptance by the industry that uncertainty can
generate value. Whichever one of these approaches is to be the best remains to be seen.
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Thus, it is likely that these answers may only come to light once the first mover has
entered into the market.
Despite the tangled web of economies, political, technical, and legal issues that are
created by the development of a space-based market, OOS clearly addresses and resolves
the issues of satellite access and delivery of additional value to the satellite operator while
maintaining investor return. Therefore, OOS is not a solution looking for a problem, but
is a shift in satellite design. What then is preventing the shift in satellites design towards
serviceable satellites?
For OOS to bring about a paradigm shift in satellite design, OOS must revolutionize
or transform the way satellites are designed. In addition to the revolutionary design, a
paradigm shift requires that breakthroughs in thinking or capability result from the
change. Based on this definition of paradigm shift, one could argue that, if a technology
could be classified as a disruptive technology as according to Christensen (Christensen,
1997), that technology has the potential to produce a paradigm shift. Thus, does on-orbit
satellite servicing meet Christensen's requirements for a disruptive technology and if so
does it have the makings of a paradigm shift?
According to Christensen, a disruptive technology is a technology that brings to the
market a very different value proposition than was previously available (Christensen,
1997). Based on Christensen's definition, on-orbit satellite servicing clearly represents a
disruptive technology because it delivers value based on the customer's ability to react to
future uncertainty. Not only does the ability to react to future uncertainty classify OOS as
a disruptive technology, but also generating value by reacting to uncertainty is a shift in
the space industry's thinking. The shift in thinking represents a paradigm shift in satellite
design over traditional satellite design, which prevents the satellite from reacting to future
uncertainty due to its design. Thus OOS not only represents a disruptive technology, but
OOS leads the way towards a paradigm shift in the design and valuation of satellites.
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OOS provides a means for escape from the traditional approach of satellite design,
thereby allowing one to make a paradigm shift towards more valuable design approaches.
OOS may be the new technology that allows satellite designers to escape from the
technology s-curves described by Christensen (Christensen, 1997) and move towards new
design methods, higher performance, and new technology s-curves. OOS represents a
disruptive technology due to the fact that OOS creates a new valuation proposition for the
satellite industry. With disruptive technologies come the opportunities for greater value
and dramatic change. With OOS comes the opportunity for a paradigm shift in satellite
design that can lead to dramatic new ideas, uses, and valuation of space. In conclusion: to
promote the adoption of on-orbit satellite servicing by the satellite industry, today's
satellite operators should focus on medium volatility markets, low risk servicing
missions, and incorporate fast evolving technologies that result in significant increases in
satellite value.
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